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ABSTRACT 
The decisions of the arbitral tribunals have been under heavy attack for the inconsistent 
and unintended interpretations that went beyond the intent of the parties as it is 
expressed in the treaty provisions. One of these misinterpreted provisions is the MFN 
clause. Many tribunals have used this clause to allocate the adjudicatory authority 
between international arbitration and domestic courts. The problem of this application 
is a matter of treaty interpretation that is governed by the international rules of 
interpretation in the VCLT. These rules provide a balance approach to treaty 
interpretation and recognize equally the legitimate rights and interests of the host states 
and foreign investors. The root cause of the interpretive problems in investor-state 
arbitration is the neglect and misapplication of the international rules on treaty 
interpretation. Although, interpretation is not an exact science, it is still a science 
requiring the application of particular rules to produce correct results. These rules are 
established to respect the states' intentions, not to deny any relevance of these intentions 
to interpretation. A full compliance with these rules will lead to correct interpretations 
and ensure that these interpretations are consistent with parties’ intentions as it is 
expressed in the terms of the treaty. The duty of adjudicators is to discover the meaning 
of the treaty provisions; examining evidence according to the logical sequence of the 
rules of interpretation in the VCLT, and provide the parties with impartial 
interpretations. It is not their duty to harmonize dispute settlement arrangements in 
BITs or impose this harmonized system upon states against their intent. The actual 
application of these rules of interpretation works as a roadmap to reach the consistent 
meanings of the treaty provisions and will give us a negative answer to the question of 
whether the MFN clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs or 
not.  
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  1 
Introduction 
 
Treaties are generally considered the most important source of international law 
sources. It seems that the existence of a formal written binding agreement signed by its 
parties is not a problematic issue within a consent- based theory of law. The provisions 
of this agreement accord rights to its parties and establish obligations upon them. 
However, the creative role of interpreters hampers this comforting picture of 
international mutual obligations. This creative role raises two concerns. First, to what 
extent do the texts of a treaty have determinate meaning? Second, do adjudicators have 
the right to interpret the text in the way they choose or are they constrained by certain 
rules that regulate the interpretation process? 
 
The exponential proliferation of arbitral tribunals, ad hoc committees and international 
investment treaties has led to unintended and inconsistent interpretations in respect of 
the determination of treaty rights and obligations. Some adjudicators may adopt correct 
interpretations and other reaches wrong interpretations to the same text. Consequently, 
some interpretations deprived a party to a treaty from his rights and others may accord 
rights beyond the clear meaning of the text. The problem is the neglect and 
misapplication of the international rules on treaty interpretation. 
  
The dilemma of interpretation has its overwhelming effects on international investment 
law. The investment relations between states are govern by bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs). The world has witnessed a great proliferation of BITs that contain many 
provisions. These provisions determine the rights and obligations of foreign investors 
and host states or define what might be called the standards of investment protection. 
In this paper, I focus on the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause that has become, in 
one form or another, a usual provision in BITs. The interpretation of this clause affects 
the scope of its application to the extent that it may be applied to dispute settlement 
provisions in BITs regardless the wording of this clause. The application of this clause 
to dispute settlement provisions - in BITs - has recently attracted significant attention 
in international investment Law. The debate is about whether foreign investors should 
rely on the MFN clause from in BIT – the basic treaty - to incorporate dispute settlement 
provisions from a third-country BIT. Arbitral tribunals expand the scope of the 
application of this clause based on the interpretation process. Moreover, they alleged 
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that MFN clause connects the BITs of the host states with the basic treaty through this 
clause, which may resulted in the harmonization of dispute settlement arrangements in 
various BITs      
 
Dispute settlement provisions are the most important provisions in BITs. These 
provisions address foreign investors, host states and arbitral tribunals. These clauses 
determine how any dispute may arise out of BIT between states and foreign investors 
shall be resolved. Nowadays, international arbitration is generally accepted as an 
effective avenue for resolving international investment disputes. From the perspective 
of the foreign investors, recourse to international arbitration guarantees the 
international protection for his rights and interests. They think that domestic courts lack 
to the sufficient impartial and independence to judge against their governments and 
cannot grant sufficient protection to the foreign investors. From the perspective of the 
host states, allowing foreign investors to access international arbitration is ample 
evidence that these states will met their treaty obligations. This may increase the 
foreign direct investments on their territories. However, states try to narrow the scope 
of access to international arbitration by limiting the jurisdiction of the international 
arbitral tribunals.  
 
These limitations may prevent the foreign investors from access to international 
arbitration or impose procedural requirements before initiating international 
arbitration. The question here is should investors circumvent these obstacles, the 
binding dispute settlement provisions, to access international arbitration by the 
incorporation of most favorable procedural treatment from a third-country treaty, 
despite the clear host state's consent to a certain type of dispute settlement 
arrangements. Can we face a different answer in case that this consent is not clear and 
the text is ambiguous?  
 
The scope of the application of any treaty provision, the MFN clause for instance, 
depends on the interpretation of this provision. The application of the MFN clause to 
dispute settlement provisions has proved to be one of the most controversial issues. 
Arbitral tribunals have given contradicting meanings to the same MFN clause. Some 
tribunals do not apply this clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs and other do. 
The application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement arrangements covers many 
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situations. For instance, when the basic treaty does not contain dispute settlement 
arrangements, should an investor rely on the MFN clause to invoke dispute settlement 
arrangements contained in a third-party treaty to access international arbitration? When 
the basic treaty allow an investor to access international arbitration without no choice 
in respect of the type of arbitration, such as ad hoc arbitration, should investors rely on 
MFN clause to benefit form a certain type of international arbitration contained in 
dispute settlement arrangements in a third-party treaty? When the basic treaty allows 
access to international arbitration only for a specific type of disputes, such as the 
amount of compensation for expropriation, should the beneficiary of MFN clause 
benefit from the dispute settlement arrangements contained in a third-party treaty that 
allow access to international arbitration for any type of disputes? When the basic treaty 
requires the fulfillment of certain procedures before initiating international arbitration, 
such as the exhaustion of domestic remedies, should the investor rely on the MFN 
clause to benefit from dispute settlement provisions in a  third-party treaty that do not 
required these procedures. 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the broad wording of the MFN clause does not allow 
adjudicators to expand the scope of its application to dispute settlement provisions in 
BITs. In other words, the MFN clause should not serve as a title of jurisdiction, to 
allocate the adjudicatory authority between international arbitral tribunals and domestic 
courts. Moreover, the interpretation of this clause came one-side oriented - investor 
oriented - and gave the ultimate effect to facilitate access to international arbitration to 
guarantee excessive protection to investors' rights and interests. They simply adopt a 
broad interpretation to investors' treaty rights provisions. The treaty parties did not 
intend to expand the scope of the MFN clause, as a treaty provision, under the will of 
the investors.   
 
The answer of this research question may guide the decision-making of arbitral 
tribunals, investment treaty makers and legal scholars to the real role of the MFN clause 
and the proper way of interpreting and applying this clause to matters of dispute 
settlement in a way that respect the mutual treaty obligations and rights. 
 
It is a necessity to differentiate between two kinds of provisions that are contained in 
BITs and both of them can be subject to the application of the MFN clause. The first 
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kind is the substantive provisions that determine the substantive treaty obligations of 
the host states and the treaty rights of the investors. For instance, BITs provisions that 
deal with denial of justice; fair and equitable treatment standard; full protection and 
security; international minimum standard; legitimate expectations and national 
treatment. The second kind is the procedural provisions or dispute settlement 
provisions that determine how a host state and an investor will resolve any investment 
dispute arises out of BIT. This paper focuses on the second kind; the application of the 
MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs and whether foreign investors 
should rely on this clause to expand or establish the jurisdiction of international 
investment tribunals or not. 
 
The main obstacle that may limit this paper is that the jurisdictional decisions of the 
international arbitral tribunals are confidential, especially the new decisions, and they 
are not published until the arbitral parties allow so. However, I use all publicly available 
arbitral awards and decisions that are relevant to the purpose of this thesis.   
 
In this paper, I attempt to shed the light on the answer of the question of whether the 
MFN clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs or not? In clear 
words, should MFN clauses serve as a title of jurisdiction, should these clauses allocate 
the adjudicatory authority between international arbitral tribunals and domestic courts? 
Therefore, it would be substantial to examine many MFN calluses that are contained in 
various BITs and the arbitral decisions that dealt with the interpretation and the 
application of these clauses to dispute settlement provisions. I analyses the legal 
reasoning of these tribunals to figure out their ways of thinking in interpreting these 
provisions. 
 
 In chapter I of this thesis, I explore generally the MFN clause in BITs. I discuss the 
origins of investment protection to prove that interpretation of MFN clause is not the 
first or the latest "episode" in a long history of a constant demand of foreigners to 
prevent domestic courts to hear their cases. Then I discuss the historical background of 
a MFN clause, its definition and the scope of its application. Then I explore the 
distinction between substantive and procedural provisions in BITs. In addition, the 
contemporary practice regarding MFN clauses in GATT and the WTO. Then I briefly 
discuss the arguments of proponents and dissenters to the application of the MFN 
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clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. In chapter II, I discuss the nature of 
treaty interpretation. This includes the answer to the question of whether treaty 
interpretation is an exact science or an art. Then I scrutinize the arbitral use of the 
international rules on treaty interpretation in the VCLT and the correct way of their 
application. In chapter III, I discuss the contemporary case law on the application of 
the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I indicate the problems with 
the decisions that have applied this clause to dispute settlement provisions and the 
solutions of these problems by discussing decisions that have rejected this application. 
In chapter IV, I point out the two visions on the application of the MFN clause to 
matters of dispute settlements. I assess the vision that calls for the application of the 
MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs and suggestions to resolve the 
interpretive problem of this clause.  
  6 
I. Most Favored Nation clauses in BITs 
 
The awards of arbitral tribunals have been under heavy attack for the inconsistent and 
unintended interpretations of some provisions in BITs. Tribunals have criticized each 
other for interpretations that went beyond the intent of the parties as it is expressed in 
the treaty provisions. Some of these tribunals interpreted a treaty provision to increase 
states' treaty obligations in a way that incompatible with the actual meaning of the texts. 
One of these misinterpreted provisions is the MFN clause. 
 
It is impossible to analyze the debate about the interpretation of the investment treaties 
without going into the characteristics of the MFN clause as a practical example of this 
thesis. The first section of this chapter explores the origins of investment protection. It 
proves that the interpretation of the MFN clause is not the first or the latest "episode" 
in a long history of a constant demand of foreigners to prevent domestic courts to hear 
their cases and instead seek the assurance of an international or internationalized forum. 
The second section provides the historical background of the MFN clause. The third 
section provides the definition of the MFN clause. The fourth section provides the 
scope of the application of the MFN clause. The fifth section discusses the distinction 
between substantive and procedural provisions in BITs. The sixth section discusses the 
contemporary practice regarding the MFN clause in GATT and the WTO. The seventh 
section explores briefly the arguments of proponents and dissenters to the application 
of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. 
 
A. The Origins of Investment Protection: 
 
Interpretation of the MFN clause in relation to its application to dispute settlement 
arrangements in BITs is not a today issue. In fact, it is not the first nor will be the latest 
"episode" in a long history of a constant demand of foreigners to prevent domestic 
courts to hear their cases and instead seek the assurance of an international or 
internationalized forum. Indeed, investors, foreigners and colonial powers always 
wanted "exceptionality" in the forum that deals with legal disputes. By keeping the 
dispute outside the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, they will not be treated as 
"equals", but as "superior". Therefore, foreign investors do not accept the local 
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jurisdiction and demand special treatment in in a manner where they can control better 
the outcome of the adjudicative process. The development of foreign investors' 
treatment started from the complete outlawry in the early political communities to what 
is reflected in the current network of international investment agreements. 
 
There is no a comprehensive history of the treatment of foreigners and their property 
under international law.1 However, historical records tell us that the early political 
communities denied any legal capacity and rights to foreigners.2 Those "outsider" or 
"aliens" were treated as enemies or outcasts.3 The legal status and treatment of the 
aliens have been improved through history. Edwin Borchard in his book, The 
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, wrote that the" legal position of the aliens 
has in the progress of time advanced from the complete outlawry, in the days of the 
early Rome and the German tribes, to that of the practical assimilation with nationals, 
at the present time".4  
 
International law protected the right of aliens to travel, live and trade in foreign lands.5 
A host state's mistreatment of foreigners or his property was considered as an injury to 
foreigners' home state and gave the later state the right to claim reparation.6 This 
underlying the exercise of the diplomatic protection that can be traced back to the 
Middle Ages.7 According to the principle of diplomatic protection, "an injury to a 
state's national is an injury to state itself, for which it may claim reparation from any 
responsible state"8. The examination of the rules of the diplomatic protection is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but it is important highlight that foreigner investors, in that 
time, have no control over the international claim-making process. A state has 
 
1  See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT, 3 (1st edition, Kluwer Law International Publisher, 
2009). 
2  See id.  
3  See id. 
4  EDWIN BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD: OR THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS. 33 (New York Banks Law Publishing Co. 1915). 
5  See Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 1, at 4. 
6  See id.  
7  See id. at 5. 
8   Id. See also Art .1 of the ILC's Draft articles on Diplomatic Protection provides that "diplomatic 
protection consists of the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful 
settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act 
of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the 
implementation of such responsibility. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 4 -June 5, July 6-
Aug 7, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006). 
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discretion power to decide whether to exercise the diplomatic protection or not.9 The 
exercise of diplomatic protection depended on many things like the merits of the claim 
or geopolitical interests that might be affected by the making of a claim.10 
 
If we see the evolution of the diplomatic protection in its historical context, we will 
recognize the abuse of diplomatic protection. In the era of colonialism and imperialism, 
"states exercised all possible means – political, economic and military – to protect their 
nationals' interests abroad"11. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
exercise of this protection by powerful states was accompanied by "gun-boat 
diplomacy", since "the use of force to exercise the diplomatic protection was not 
inconsistence with international law"12.  
 
International trade and investment expanded within the colonial political and legal 
regimes.13 With the existence of the colonial territories and extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
there was no need to powerful countries to recourse to international law process to 
protect their nationals.14 Colonial political and military power protected their nationals 
- colonists - and their property from any domestic control in the colonies.15 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction allowed powerful states to apply their laws to their nationals 
in foreign states.16 The extraterritorial jurisdiction was imposed by force through the 
treaties of capitulation.17 This extraterritorial jurisdiction, in one form or another, was 
existed in Egypt, Morocco, china, japan, Thailand, Iran, Turkey and other parts of 
Ottoman Empire.18 
 
I will speak about Egypt as a concrete example. On the nineteenth century, foreigners 
were immune from the jurisdiction of domestic courts and were exempt from the 
ordinary legislations. Before the Conference of Montreux in 1937, when the 
Convention of 8 May 1937 regarding the abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt was 
 
9 See Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 1, at 6. 
10 See id. 
11 Id. at 8. 
12  See id. at 9. 
13  See id. at 10. 
14  See id. at 11. 
15  See id. 
16  See id. 
17  See id. 
18  See id. 
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concluded, foreigners "were immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the Egyptian 
Courts and could be tried only by their own Consular Courts"19 which were competent 
to decide anything that affect their legal status. Foreigners also were exempt from 
ordinary Egyptian legislations unless Assembly of the Mixed Court of Appeal accepted 
the application of these legislations upon them.20 Moreover, the application of Egyptian 
financial legislations to foreigners required the formal consent of their governments.21 
These large exceptions from the Egyptian jurisdiction allowed foreigners to move 
freely and pursue their interests in Egypt without any restrictions by the Egyptian 
authorities. Foreigners subjected only to the domestic legislations of their own 
countries and the laws that their own Consular Courts chose to impose.22  
 
Not everyone has agreed that achieving justice to foreigners was the aim of the 
establishment of the Consular Courts and Mixed Courts.23 These courts were about a 
set of privileges granted to the nationals of certain countries who were exempted from 
the application of domestic laws and the jurisdiction of domestic courts. These 
privileges had been established by an agreement between the Egyptian government and 
the capitulatory powers.24 These exceptions were closely associated with the 
capitulations of the Egyptian government. The consular courts and mixed courts might 
appear to some as tools of achieving stability in the judicial system to foreigners.25 
However, for others these courts were a product of the foreign influence on Egypt and 
a limitation on its sovereignty.26 Even when a foreigner was found guilty by these 
courts, the Egyptian government could not expel him without the consent of his 
Consul.27 Indeed, these privileges were misused and great abuses were existed,28 to the 
extent that in 1936 the weekly al Musawwar described these courts as a "crime against 
humanity".29  
 
19 A. McDougall, The Position of Foreigners in Egypt on the Termination of the Mixed Courts, 
26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.358, 359 (1949). 
20  See id. 
21  See id. 
22 Id. at 360. 
23   See Nathan J. Brown, The Precarious Life and Slow Death of the Mixed Courts of Egypt, 25 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES. 33, 33 (1993). 
24  See id. 
25 See id.  
26  See id. 
27 See McDougall, supra note 19, at 360. 
28 See id.  
29  See Al-Musawwar, 29 June 1936, included in Fish to secretary of state, 29 June 1936, State General 
Records, Record Group 59, 783.003/116 National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
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After the Conference of Montreux in 1937, the legal position for the foreigners was 
modified.30 Their subjection to the domestic legislation would no longer required the 
consent of their governments.31 Moreover, they subjected to the jurisdiction of the 
mixed-courts.32 Although, Britain had recognized the independence of Egypt in 1922, 
she had reserved responsibility of the protection of minorities and foreign interests in 
Egypt. This reservation had been withdrawn by Article 12 of the 1936 Treaty that 
expressed "that the responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt 
devolves exclusively upon the Egyptian Government, who will ensure the fulfilment 
of their obligations in this respect".33 The Egyptian obligation of protecting the lives 
and property of the foreigners was imposed on Egypt by international law.34 This was 
the usual situation with the third world states, the obligations towards foreigners and 
their interests were and still imposed by international norms after the termination of the 
Mixed Courts. 
 
It seems that the history repeats itself and the old ideas have a capacity for a revival in 
new forms. Most international lawyers in Africa and Asia think that the international 
order "was formed by the statesmen and thinkers of the past, in order to facilitate the 
suppression of the people of the non-European world"35. M. Sornarajah, for instance, 
argues that the use of the standard of civilization in international law is a clear example 
for doctrines of exclusion in respect of the non -European world.36 Sornarajah sees that 
the " in many other areas of international life, the instrumental use of international law 
in order to fashion rules that will ensure respect for the will of the powerful will be 
attempted and may succeed"37.  
 
The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s can be described as milestone in 
the development of the investment protection.38 In many cases, Investors could 
 
30   See McDougall, supra note 19, at 360. 
31  See id. 
32 See id. 
33  Id. 
34 See id. 
35  M. Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International Law, 10 SINGAPORE YEAR 
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.19, 26 (2006). 
36  See id. 
37  Id. at 29. 
38  See Jean d'Aspremont, International Customary Investment Law: Story of a Paradox, 8 Amsterdam 
Center for International Law.1, 13(2012).   
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recourse to international adjudication based on clauses that allow investor-state 
arbitration with unqualified state consent.39 Foreign investment protection played a 
significant role in the formulation of international norms.40 With the massive 
proliferation of arbitral tribunals and international courts, it has become easy to 
formulate binding and enforceable norms upon states. Sornarajah rejects that a series 
of arbitral awards followed by confirmatory writing of the so-called "highly qualified 
publicities" result in the creation of international law.41 He said that "members of the 
so-called "arbitration fraternity" elevate each other in status, cite each other’s views 
and create law on the basis that they are highly qualified publicists"42. This way of 
lawmaking found a resistance by the Third World states. 
 
However, this resistance to the preferred norms of private power crumbled because of 
the dissolution of the unity of the Third World, theories of free market-led 
development, and the strategies of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank.43 Developing states have become parties to many BITs to protect reciprocal 
flows of foreign investment. In reality, this protection is for one-way flows of foreign 
investment that happened from developed and powerful countries to developing 
countries.44 These BITs include many clauses that ensure the protection of foreign 
investors - special treatment - from the domestic courts and domestic legislations of the 
host states.45 Moreover, the scope of this protection is enhanced by the expansive and 
wrong interpretations that produced by arbitral tribunals.46Arbitration clauses are the 
most important provisions of these BITs, since this kind of clauses gives foreign 
investors the right to invoke arbitration unilaterally.47 This resulted in a profusion of 
the awards and decisions of arbitral tribunals that give affirm and articulate the 
principles of investment protection that work as an immunity against the jurisdiction 
of the domestic courts in the host states.48  
 
 
39  See id. 
40  See Sornarajah, supra note 35, at 30. 
41  See id. at 31.  
42  Id. 
43  See id. 
44  See id. 
45  See id. at 32. 
46  See id. at 33. 
47  See id. 
48  See id. 
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The previous practices constitute the history of a constant demand of foreigners to 
prevent domestic courts from hearing their cases and instead seek the assurance of an 
international or internationalized forum. Because of the diverse and the constantly 
changing of the international environment, no one can predict the future of dispute 
settlement mechanisms in respect of international investment disputes. In this thesis, I 
focus on the problem of the application of the MFN clauses to dispute settlement 
arrangements as one of the recent practices of arbitral tribunals and foreign investors. 
This clause has been used to serve as a title of jurisdiction to allocate the adjudicatory 
authority between international arbitral tribunals and domestic courts. Moreover, this 
clause has been used as a multilateralization tool that works on the harmonization of 
dispute settlement arrangements and as a procedural protection for foreign investors, 
regardless the wording of the MFN clause. 
 
B. The Historical Background of the Most Favored Nation clause:  
    
The MFN clause is a treaty provision under which a state accords to other contracting 
state's investors "treatment that is no less favorable than that which it accords to other 
or third States"49. This clause was contained in the bilateral Treaties of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation (FCN treaties), which were concluded to facilitate and 
regulate a variety of matters, of commercial nature, between states parties and 
reciprocally protect investors and investments. For instance, a 1654 treaty between 
Great Britain and Sweden provided "the People, Subjects and Inhabitants of both 
Confederates, shall have and enjoy in each other’s Kingdoms, Countries, Lands, and 
Dominions, as large and ample privileges, relaxations, liberties, and immunities, as any 
other Foreigner at present doth, or hereafter shall enjoy there"50.  
 
Such a clause was a form of non-discrimination clause that guaranteed that host state 
would provide foreign investor with treatment as good as, what other foreign investors 
were received. The MFN provisions aimed to facilitate economic activities and to 
guarantee that the subjects of a state will not be discriminated against with comparison 
 
49 See Andreas R. Ziegler, STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION, 60 (A. REINISCH. eds., 
1st ed. Oxford University Press, 2009). 
50   Treaty of Peace and Commerce, Great Britain. Sweden., art. IV, Apr. 17, 1654, British and State 
Foreign Papers 1812–1814, vol. I, Part I. 
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to a third state. It was not a guarantee of national treatment that was received by citizens 
who may receive a better or worse treatment than foreign investors. Thus, we cannot 
consider that the MFN clause was a comprehensive non-discrimination clause.51 
  
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Most Favorable Treatment was not 
granted automatically, it was granted conditionally. A country would grant this 
treatment in exchange for any benefit provided by other third country. Therefore, to 
benefit from Most Favorable Treatment a state had to pay for. This is known as 
"conditional most favored nation". With  the greater realization of the great benefits 
that a state can achieve from granting "unconditional most favored treatment" to other 
state rather than "conditional most favored nation", the granting of "conditional most 
favored nation" lost its significance and the scope of its implementation has been 
decreased today.52 
 
With the overwhelming proliferation of BITs that govern, facilitate and protect 
international investments, The MFN clause has been given a new lease on life. There 
has been a vast increase in the negotiation of BITs that usually include, in one form or 
another, most favored nation clause. Resorting to dispute settlement mechanisms such 
as the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration 
Rules has resulted in contradictory interpretations of the MFN clause. These 
contradictory interpretations have brought this clause to the front of the debate. 
 
C. The Definition of the MFN Clause: 
 
In 1978, The International Law Commission's draft article (ILC) defined the MFN 
clause as follows, "a most-favored-nation clause is a treaty provision whereby a state 
undertakes an obligation towards another state to accord most-favored-nation treatment 
in an agreed sphere of relations".53 Due to the ambiguity of the previous definition, the 
working group of the ILC redefines the MFN clause as follows; "a most-favored-nation 
 
51  See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 67th Sess., May 4 -June 5, July 6-Aug 7, 2015, U.N. Doc. A/70/10; 
GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 10 part II, para 7 (2015).  
52 See id.  
53  See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 33rd Sess., May 8 – July 28, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/33/10; GAOR, 
30th Sess., Supp. No. 10 Vol II, 18 (1978). 
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clause is a provision in a treaty under which a State agrees to grant to the other 
contracting partner treatment that is no less favorable than that which it accords to other 
or third States."54  
 
  The previous ILC's definitions determine three important elements of the MFN clause. 
First, this clause prohibits host states from discriminating against persons "investors" 
or things "investments" of a state and a third state. Second, the MFN clause is applied 
where the "investors or investments" of the beneficiary state is in the same relationship 
of the third state with the host state. Third, the investor receives less favorable treatment 
than the host state provides to, the comparators, the third state.55 
 
Two main MFN clause's characteristics should be paid our attention. First, states' 
obligations under the MFN clause are strictly treaty obligation; this obligation does not 
based on customary international rules, but on the basic treaty. Therefore, the scope of 
the MFN clause as a treaty provision should be determined according to the wording 
of this clause.56 Second, the MFN clause imposes relative obligations upon the states 
parties. Unlike other treaty provisions, it is impossible to determine an absolute content 
of the favorable treatment that is granted by the host state to various investors. 
Therefore, the treaty parties can restrict the scope of the application of the MFN clause 
to certain kinds of treatment. 
 
D. The Scope of the Application of MFN Clauses: 
 
The traditional view is that the MFN clause is applied only to the substantive treatment. 
To prohibit discrimination that may occurs by the host states against foreign investors 
or foreign investment of different nationalities. The decision of the arbitral tribunal in 
Maffezini was the point of change that gave the MFN clause unpredicted dynamic role 
as a title of jurisdiction.57 Under an extensive interpretation, this clause can allocate the 
adjudicatory authority between international arbitral tribunals and domestic courts 
regardless the intentions of the treaty parties. In contrast, under a narrow interpretation, 
 
54 Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Annex II, supra note 33, para 3. 
55 See Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 1, at 196-198. 
56  See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 51, at 25. 
57  See Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain., ICSID Case No.ARB/97/7, Decision on 
objections to jurisdiction, (Jan. 5, 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 396, (2002). 
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many arbitral tribunals have refused the application of the MFN clause to dispute 
settlement provisions in BITs. These visions of arbitral tribunals have resulted in 
contradictory interpretations based on different interpretations to the MFN clauses that 
have the same wording. 
 
The application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions has become a 
significant interpretive problem in investor-state arbitration. Practitioners, civil 
societies and states have criticized the arbitral tribunals for their expansive, narrow or 
inconsistent interpretation to these clauses. Moreover, arbitral tribunals have criticized 
each other for the wrong interpretations that went beyond what the parties had intended 
to achieve from this clause.58 In addition, some commentators see that arbitral tribunals 
have interpreted investment treaty provisions "in a manner not contemplated by the 
original drafting of the parties"59. The dilemma of interpretation has its overwhelming 
effects on the international investment law as a dynamic branch of the public 
international law, and the MFN clause as an investment treaties provision. 
 
E. The Distinction between Substantive and Procedural Provisions in BITs: 
 
It is a necessity in this thesis to differentiate between the substantive provisions in a 
treaty and another kind of provisions in the same treaty that addressing the jurisdiction 
of an arbitral tribunal and confer to it the legal power to resolve disputes arising out of 
this treaty.  
 
Public international law and international investment law are familiar with the idea that 
the conferral of rights under law is inextricably linked to making available remedies 
for their breaches within the same legal system. Hans Kelsen asserted that: 
 
If “rights” are to be conferred on individuals by an international agreement, 
the latter must impose upon the states parties to the agreement the 
obligation to recognize the jurisdiction of a tribunal to which the 
 
58   See TRINH HAI YEN, THE INTERPRETATION OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, 9 (Loretta Malintoppi & 
Eduardo Valencia-Ospina. eds., BRILL, 2014). 
59  M. SORNARAJAH, APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 
51-73 (Sauvant, Karl P and Michael Chiswick-Patterson. eds., 2008), see also JAN PAULSSON, 
DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 228– 262 (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
see also M. SORNARAJAH, Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment, 136-
190 (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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individuals have access in case of a violation of the rights on the part of 
the state, as well as the obligation to comply with the decision of the 
tribunal…. without subjecting the state to the jurisdiction of a tribunal, no 
“rights” of individuals in relation to the state are established.60 
 
The classical approaches of public international law presume that the provisions that 
confer jurisdiction to arbitral tribunal are severable from those conferring rights.61 
Substantive provisions are the provisions that impose "a certain obligation of a certain 
behavior to a state, and determine the lawfulness of a state conduct"62. Procedural 
provisions are the provisions regulating dispute mechanisms in case of the breaching 
of the substantive rules, and provide or deny the injured party access to remedy.63 In 
other words, procedural rules conferring adjudicative power to an arbitral tribunal to 
resolve disputes. A better way to distinguish between these two kinds of rules is to 
compare the consequences of non-compliance with them. Non-compliance with a 
substantive provision amounts to a wrongful act.64 An investor can claim a violation of 
an MFN clause, if the host state granted an investor from a third state more favorable 
treatment than what accorded to him in the same circumstances.65 On the other hand, 
such a behavior in respect of procedural provisions does not amount to a wrongful act 
involving state responsibility.66    
    
In the context of public international law, we can see a clear distinction between 
substantive and procedural rules in the practice of the ICJ.67 This practice involves 
different subject matter such as the application of the Genocide Convention, law of 
self-determination and state immunities. The diversity of these cases "suggests the 
universality of the separation line between substantive and procedural rules, and its 
status as a core principle of international law"68. 
 
 
60  See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 143–144 (Robert W Tucker 
trans., 2d ed 1966).  
61 See Relja Radović, Between Rights and Remedies: The Access to Investment Treaty Arbitration as a 
Substantive Right of Foreign Investors, 10 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT. 42, 45 
(2019). 
62  Id. 
63  See id. 
64  See id. at 46. 
65  See id. 
66  See id. 
67  The ICJ at some point allowed the interdependence of substantive and procedural rules, See Radović, 
supra note 61, at 48. 
68 See id. at 47. 
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The first element that can be extracted from the practice of the ICJ is the severability 
of procedural provisions from substantive provisions in the same treaty.69 This requires 
separate assessment to the validity of each set of these two kinds of provisions. For 
example, in Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, the court determined the validity of the 
procedural rules in the stage of proceedings and determined the validity of substantive 
obligations in the merits phase of the case.70 The court affirmed that Iceland’s argument 
that the treaty was terminated because of the changed circumstances does not affect its 
jurisdiction since such issues belong to the merits phase of the case where the court 
would examine the substantive obligations of the treaty parties.71 
 
Secondly, substantive rules cannot affect the procedural rules and vice-versa.72 The ICJ 
asserted that substantive obligations contained in the Genocide Convention have no 
impact on the jurisdiction of the court in resolving any dispute under the Convention. 
The Court ruled as follows:  
 
Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention bears 
on the jurisdiction of the Court, and does not affect substantive 
obligations relating to acts of genocide themselves under that 
Convention. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot 
conclude that the reservation of Rwanda in question, which is meant to 
exclude a particular method of settling a dispute relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, is to be 
regarded as being incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention. [. . .]  
[T]he Court deems it necessary to recall that the mere fact that rights 
and obligations erga omnes or peremptory norms of general 
international law (jus cogens) are at issue in a dispute cannot in itself 
constitute an exception to the principle that its jurisdiction always 
depends on the consent of the parties.73 
 
This means that the substantive obligation imposed by the Genocide Convention, which 
is to desist from acts of genocide, has no impact on the jurisdictional mandate of the 
 
69 See id. 
70 See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice) Jurisdiction of the Court, 1973 I.C.J. 3, Para 40 (Feb. 2).  
71  See id. 
72 See Radović, supra note 61, at 47. 
73  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Rwanda) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 
2006 I.C.J. 126, at 6, paras 67 and 125 (Feb. 2). See also, Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. 
Australia) 1995 I.C.J. 90, at 90, para 29 (June. 33). 
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Court in resolving disputes arising out of the Convention.74 Each kind of provisions 
addresses different things. They are not ejusdem generis.75 
 
Thirdly, the substantive and procedural rules "cannot conflict with each other, and no 
conclusion can be derived from one set of rules in respect of the other"76. In 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the court recognized the procedural nature of the 
rules of immunity.77 It asserted that there was no conflict between the rules of the law 
of armed conflict and the rules on state immunity.78 In addition, the Court in Arrest 
Warrant asserted that: 
 
In the context of the personal immunities accorded by international law to 
foreign ministers), the law of immunity is essentially procedural in nature’, 
and ‘it regulates the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of particular conduct 
and is thus entirely distinct from the substantive law which determines 
whether that conduct is lawful or unlawful.79 
 
The above practice of the ICJ helped us to realize the distinction between procedural 
provisions and substantive provisions as a fundamental principal in public international 
law. This will help us to understand the relation between MFN clauses and dispute 
settlement arrangements in BITs. 
 
In the context of private international law, the distinction between procedural and 
substantive provisions is clear. 80 For example, the provisions that confer jurisdiction 
to arbitral tribunal are severable from the main contract.81 This means that, the validity 
of an arbitration clause, for instance, does not affect the substantive obligations of the 
main contract. A claim that a contract is void for illegality does not affect the validity 
of an arbitration clause at the same contract. 82 Moreover, the arbitration clause subject 
to legal rules that are different from the rules regulating the substantive provisions in 
 
74 Zachary Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails, 2 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 97, 103 (2011). 
75  Id. 
76 See Radović, supra note 61, at 47. 
77 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) Judgment, 2012 I.C.J.434. para 58 (Feb. 
3) 
78 See id. 
79  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belgium) (Judgment), 2002 I.C.J. 75 para 60 (Feb. 14). 
80 See Douglas, supra note 74, at 103.  
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
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the main contract.83 The procedural provisions have different purpose and different 
legal quality from what the substantive provisions have.  
 
The distinction between the substantive provisions in an investment treaty and the 
provisions conferring adjudicative power to arbitral tribunal is straightforward. The 
substantive provisions address the contracting state parties. While the procedural 
provisions address an international arbitral tribunal and disputing parties. These 
disputing parties are not the state parties to BIT, but the investor and the host state. 
Both investor and host state "enter into a relationship of procedural equality before the 
international tribunal once a dispute has been submitted to it"84. This procedural 
relationship subjects to the equality of arms principle in international litigation. 85 This 
principle is not respected when one of the disputing parties has the ability to amend the 
rules that regulating the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal after the dispute has arisen.86 
The object of the substantive provisions is investments that made by the nationals of 
one contracting state on the territory of the other contracting state. The object of 
procedural provisions is creating a jurisdictional mandate for an international arbitral 
tribunal to settle disputes between the investor and the host state who are in an equal 
procedural relationship.87 
 
However, there is another opinion in international investment law sees that there is no 
difference between procedural and substantive provisions.88 This opinion asserts that 
access to international arbitration is a necessary substantive right that guarantees the 
enforcement of the treaty rights.89 Others see that there is an inextricable relation 
between the procedural and substantive provisions for the purpose of the protection of 
foreign investors and investments.90  
 
The distinction between procedural and substantive provisions in BITs is clear enough 
on the eyes of international courts and arbitral tribunals. As we will see in Chapter IV, 
 
83 See id. 
84 See id. at 104. 
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
88 See Radović, supra note 61, at 52. 
89  See id. 
90   See id. at 53. See also Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain., ICSID Case No 
.ARB/97/7, Decision on objections to jurisdiction, (Jan. 5, 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 396, (2002). 
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the arbitral tribunals that applied MFN clauses to dispute settlement arrangements in 
BITs ignored the distinction between procedural and substantive rules to ensure the 
excessive protection of the foreign investment and investors. In other words, it seems 
that arbitral tribunals ignore this distinction when they want to apply MFN clauses to 
dispute settlement provisions in BITs. This vision relies on the purpose of investment 
protection. In contrast, arbitral tribunals that recognized the distinction between 
procedural and substantive rules are the tribunals that refused the application of the 
MFN clause to dispute settlement arrangements without a prior clear consent of the 
host state. Many arbitral tribunals have recognized the distinction between the 
substantive and procedural provisions as a general principle in public international 
law.91 With respect to states, their practice before arbitral tribunals asserts the 
distinction between procedural and substantive rules. Moreover, if we accepted the 
right to access international arbitration as a substantive right, the failure to do so by the 
host state would amount to a wrongful act involving state responsibility.92 In the same 
Vein, Consular jurisdiction in the past was considered essential for the protection of 
the foreigners' rights and their property. However, we cannot say that this form of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is of the same nature of the substantive rights of the foreign 
investors and it is necessary to the investment protection. The necessity of any 
procedural rules should not change its nature as procedural rules.  
 
I believe that dispute settlement arrangements are procedural rules that are different 
from substantive rules in BITs. The procedural provisions cannot be given a substantive 
character. This distinction appears clearly in the practice of the ICJ in the context of 
public international law. However, some arbitral tribunals try to take some steps 
towards connecting procedural and substantive rules in pursuance of the legitimization 
of the wrong interpretations. Neither the protection of foreign investments, nor the 
legitimization of the wrong interpretations should change the nature of the procedural 
rules in BITs. The final aim of considering dispute settlement provisions as part of the 
substantive and not the procedural provisions, is to give these clauses one-side oriented 
interpretation, investor oriented, and gave the ultimate effect to facilitate the access to 
international arbitration to guarantee excessive protection to interests and rights of 
 
91 For example, see Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, (Feb.8, 2005) 13 ICSID Rep 271, (2008). 
92  See Radović, supra note 61, at 62. 
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investors. With respect to MFN clause, treaty parties had not intended to expand its 
scope, as a treaty provision, under the will of the investors.   
 
F. Contemporary Practice Regarding the MFN Clauses in GATT and the 
WTO: 
 
It will be useful to address the question of the MFN clause more broadly to include its 
interpretation and application in fields other than international investment law. This 
clause has became the corner stone of the multilateral trading system. Under article I 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), most favored nation is granted 
to the goods of other GATT contracting states “immediately and unconditionally” at 
the border. Under the requirement of article III of the GATT, "national treatment" shall 
be provided to these goods as soon as they enter the domestic market of any of 
contracting parties. 93 The immediate and unconditional applications of most favored 
nation together with national treatment constitute the core principle of non-
discrimination under GATT.94 Under article II of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), the MFN obligation is applicable to any measure that affects trade 
in services in any field covered by this agreement.95 The importance of MFN treatment 
to GATT lays in the avoiding of discrimination in the application of tariffs and other 
treatment accorded to goods when they crossed borders.96 The WTO has extend the 
scope of the application of the MFN clause from the application in trade in goods to 
trade in services and the protection of intellectual property rights.97 
 
By reviewing the way in which MFN treatment had been applied in the GATT and 
WTO, we can determine the scope of its application within the WTO system through 
the recognition of five elements.  
 
 
93  See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 51, para 8-9. 
94  See Id. 
95  See Id. 
96  See id. 
97  See Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: 
Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin, 102 Am. J. Int'l L. 48, 48–89 (2008). 
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First, despite the fact that MFN provisions in the WTO are worded differently, the 
approach of the Appellate Body deals with them as they have the same meaning.98 The 
textual interpretation to MFN provisions is less importance than the underlying concept 
of MFN treatment. 
 
Second, the Appellate Body has interpreted MFN treatment under GATT article I in a 
manner that gave it the broadest possible application. The Appellate Body asserted that 
"any" advantages, favor, privilege or immunity means "any advantage". The Appellate 
Body's words are as follows:  
 
 [W]e note next that Article I:1 requires that "any advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity granted by any Member to any product originating in or destined 
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to 
the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
Members." (emphasis added) The words of Article I:1 refer not to some 
advantages granted "with respect to" the subjects that fall within the defined 
scope of the Article, but to "any advantage"; not to some products, but to "any 
product "; and not to like products from some other Members, but to like 
products originating in or destined for "all other" Members.99  
 
Although, the Appellate Body adopted the broadest possible application to MFN 
treatment, 'The specific issue of whether MFN treatment applies to both substantive 
and procedural rights has not been addressed by the Appellate Body"100. 
 
Third, although MFN treatment within the WTO system was meant to be unconditional, 
all of the WTO agreements contain exceptions to the application of MFN treatment to 
the extent that its application is more restricted than it appears. "Exceptions for customs 
unions and free trade areas, for safeguards and other trade remedies, as well as general 
 
98   See Appellate Body Report, European Communities —Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R para 231 (Sep. 9, 1998) (adopted 25 September 1997).  
The Appellate Body asserted that:  
[T]he Panel interpreted Article II of the GATS in the light of panel reports interpreting the national 
treatment obligation of Article III of the GATT. The Panel also referred to Article XVII of the GATS, 
which is also a national treatment obligation. But Article II of the GATS relates to MFN treatment, not 
to national treatment. Therefore, provisions elsewhere in the GATS relating to national treatment 
obligations, and previous GATT practice relating to the interpretation of the national treatment 
obligation of Article III of the GATT 1994 are not necessarily relevant to the interpretation of Article II 
of the GATS. The Panel would have been on safer ground had it compared the MFN obligation in Article 
II of the GATS with the MFN and MFN-type obligations in the GATT 1994." 
99 See Appellate Body Report, Canada —Certain Measures Affecting The Automotive Industry, 
WT/DS139/AB/R, Para 79, (Feb. 11, 2000) (adopted June.19, 2000).  
100  Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 51, para 46. 
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exceptions and provisions for special and differential treatment"101 all work as a 
limitation to the scope of MFN treatment under the WTO agreements. 
 
Fourth, the particular nature of the WTO system, with its own agreement and dispute 
settlement process to interpret and apply these agreements means that there is a limited 
relation between the interpretation and application of the MFN clause within the WTO 
and its interpretation and application in other agreements.102 Therefore, the 
interpretation and application of MFN treatment within the WTO has its own scope 
regardless how MFN clauses are treated in other agreements such as BITs.103  
 
Fifth, with respect to the application of the MFN clause in GATS, trade in service under 
GATS includes providing by a supplier of one state member through natural persons 
on the territory of another state member. Article II of GATS shall regulate the MFN 
treatment that is accorded to this services supplier. 
 
The question is whether a WTO member can rely on Article II of GATS to benefit from 
the provisions of BIT between another a WTO member and a third state that provides 
favorable measures to the service suppliers of this third State. The study group of the 
International Law Commission has found no answer to this question on practice or 
jurisprudence.104 
 
I believe that interpretation in the Appellate Body's view is "to clarify the meaning of 
existing obligations, not to modify their content"105. In addition, the interpretation and 
application of the MFN treatment within the WTO system do not raise any problem. 
Moreover, there is no practice of the WTO Appellate Body on the application of the 
MFN clause to the procedural rights of the WTO members .The WTO has its own 
mechanism for resolving disputes. Although, the WTO agreements are interpreted 
based on Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, the existence of the appellate structure 
 
101  See id. para 47. 
102  See id. para 48.  
103  See id. 
104  See id. para 51. 
105 Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, 21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW. 605, 612 (2010). 
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ensures that the interpretations of the panel, in respect of the MFN clause, can be 
rethought or abolished.106  
 
G. The Proponents and Dissenters to the Application of the MFN Clause to 
Dispute Settlement Provisions in BITs: 
 
There are two-conflict interests that affect the scope of the application of the MFN 
clause with respect to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. The application of this 
clause to dispute settlement arrangements responds to the interest of the investors. This 
facilitates and broadens the scope of access to international arbitration that offers 
international protection to investors who benefit from procedural provisions that are 
contained in other BITs. This could be happened by overriding procedures 
requirements to access international arbitration or expand the jurisdiction of arbitral 
tribunals to matters beyond these specifically stated in the basic BIT. This protection 
cannot be granted by domestic courts that, in some opinions, lack to the sufficient 
independence to judge against their governments. On the other hand, the respondent 
state seeks to limit the jurisdiction of international tribunals and denies any effects to 
the MFN clause in respect of dispute settlement arrangements, fearing about being held 
responsible for breaching a treaty obligation or being sanctioned. 
 
The answer of the question of whether the MFN clause should be applied to disputes 
settlement provisions in BITs or not, found many proponents and many dissenters. 
Each of them adopts arguments that present the case from his point of view and no one 
of them can claim a numerical supremacy of supporters. The proponents argue that the 
MFN clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. The dissenters 
argue that the MFN clause should not be applied to dispute settlement provisions in 
BITs. 
 
The proponents argue that,107 once the MFN clause existed in BIT, it should be applied 
to matters of dispute settlement provisions, since there are no differences between 
procedural and substantive provisions in BIT. They assert that there is an inextricable 
 
106  See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note, para 52. 
107  See discussion infra Part IV. A. 
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link between procedural and substantive provisions, and procedural provisions are of 
the same nature of the substantive provisions. Therefore, the MFN clause should be 
applied to procedural provisions as it is applied to substantive provisions. Second, 
dispute settlement provisions are necessary for the enforcement of the investors' treaty 
rights. Third, all BIT's provisions are negotiated between the host state and the investor, 
so there is no need to differentiate between the MFN clause and other provisions. 
Fourth, the ability to choose between varieties of dispute settlement provisions in itself 
is a favored treatment, to let the investor to choose what he desire. Finally, the 
application of the MFN clause would lead to the harmonization of international 
investment law through linking large number of BITs in relation to dispute settlement 
provisions. Since, the MFN clause incorporate procedural provisions from other state's 
BITs to the procedural provisions in the basic BIT. 
 
Dissenters argue that108 the MFN clause should be applied only to substantive rights 
not procedural rights, so it cannot be applied to dispute settlement provisions since they 
are procedural rights. Second, to apply the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions 
it has to extend, explicitly, its application to matters of dispute settlement and defines 
the references of the incorporation of these procedural provisions from other BITs. 
Third, there is no doubt that the dispute settlement provisions had been negotiated 
carefully between the parties. Therefore, dispute settlement provisions should not be 
incorporated from other BITs. Finally, in international investment arbitration 
precedents are not of binding nature whether to tribunals or states. Therefore, the 
application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement arrangements may lead to more 
conflicting investment rules and treaty shopping rather than the harmonization of 
dispute settlement mechanisms. 
 
H. Conclusion: 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the evolution of the investment protection from the 
early political communities to the recent practices of international courts and arbitral 
tribunals that clarify the framework of the MFN clause and the impact of this 
framework on the interests of both foreign investors and host states. 
 
108  See discussion infra Part IV. A. 
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In section one, I have demonstrated how interpretation of the MFN clause in relation 
to its application to dispute settlement arrangements in BITs is not a today issue. In 
fact, it is not the first nor will be the latest "episode" in a long history of a constant 
demand of foreigners to prevent domestic courts to hear their cases and instead seek 
the assurance of an international or internationalized forum. The legal position of the 
aliens has in the progress of time advanced from the complete outlawry, in the days of 
the early Rome and the German tribes, to the practical assimilation with nationals, at 
the present time. Diplomatic protection proved to be one of the notorious forms of 
protecting aliens abroad since the exercise of this protection by powerful states was 
accompanied by "gun-boat diplomacy". Moreover, the exercise of this protection 
depended on many things like the merits of the claim or geopolitical interests that might 
be affected by the making of a claim.  
 
With the existence of the colonial political and legal regimes, there was no need to 
powerful countries to recourse to international law process to protect their nationals. 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction allowed powerful states to apply their laws to their nationals 
in foreign states. Egypt is a concrete example of this practice. This extraterritorial 
jurisdiction was embodied in the Mixed Courts and Consular Courts that were about a 
set of privileges granted to the nationals of certain countries who were exempted from 
the application of domestic laws and the jurisdiction of domestic courts. After the 
termination of the Consular Courts and Mixed Courts, the obligations upon host states 
towards foreigners and their interests were and still imposed by international norms. 
Developing states have become parties to many BITs to protect reciprocal flows of 
foreign investment. In reality, this protection is for one-way flows of foreign 
investment that happened from developed and powerful countries to developing 
countries. Moreover, the scope of this protection is enhanced by the expansive and 
wrong interpretations that produced by arbitral tribunals. This resulted in a profusion 
of the awards and decisions of arbitral tribunals that give affirm and articulate the 
principles of investment protection that work as an immunity against the jurisdiction 
of the domestic courts in the host states. With the diverse and the constantly changing 
of the international environment, no one can predict the future of dispute settlement 
mechanisms in respect of international investment disputes. 
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In section two, I have explained the historical background of the MFN clause from the 
Bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN treaties) to the recent 
practices that have led us to the current legal situation. In addition, how the 
overwhelming proliferation of BITs and resorting to dispute settlement mechanisms 
have given the MFN clause a new lease on life. 
 
In section three, I have explored the definition of the MFN clause and the important 
elements that characterized this clause. First, this clause prohibits host states from 
discriminating against persons "investors" or things "investments" of a state and a third 
state. Second, the MFN clause is applied where the "investors or investments" of the 
beneficiary state is in the same relation of the third state with the host state. Third, the 
investor receives less favorable treatment than the host state provides to, the 
comparators, the third state. Fourth, states' obligations under the MFN clause are 
strictly treaty obligation, therefore it is a treaty provision as any treaty provision; it can 
be restricted to specific kinds of treatment, based on the intentions of the treaty parties. 
 
In section four, I have explained the scope of the application of the MFN clause. The 
determination of this scope is matter of treaty interpretation. Arbitral tribunals used to 
apply these clauses only to substantive provisions in BITs. The tribunal's decision in 
Maffezini was the starting point in expanding the application of this clause to dispute 
settlement arrangements in BITs. Practitioners, civil societies and states have criticized 
the arbitral tribunals for the inconsistent and unintended interpretations of MFN 
clauses. Some arbitral tribunal interpreted the MFN clause in manner not contemplated 
by the original drafting to expand the scope of the application of this clause to matters 
of dispute settlement in BITs. 
 
In section five, I have demonstrated that the distinction between substantive and 
procedural provisions is straightforward in public international law, private 
international law and international investment law. Generally, non-compliance with a 
substantive provision amounts to a wrongful act, in contrast, such a behavior in respect 
of procedural provisions does not amount to a wrongful act involving state 
responsibility. Therefore, if we accepted the right to access international arbitration as 
a substantive right, the failure to do so by the host state would amount to a wrongful 
act involving state responsibility. Although, the distinction between procedural and 
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substantive provisions in BITs is clear enough on the eyes of international courts and 
arbitral tribunals, some of them try to take some steps towards connecting procedural 
and substantive rules in pursuance of the legitimization of the wrong interpretations. 
These tribunals ignore this distinction when they want to apply MFN clauses to dispute 
settlement provisions in BITs to grant excessive protection to foreign investment. In 
fact, neither the protection of foreign investments, nor the legitimization of the wrong 
interpretations should change the nature of the procedural rules in BITs. 
  
In section six, I have addressed the question of the MFN clause more broadly to include 
its interpretation and application in GATT and the WTO. Despite the fact that MFN 
provisions in the WTO are worded differently, the approach of the Appellate Body 
deals with them as they have the same meaning. Although, the Appellate Body has 
interpreted MFN treatment under GATT article I in a manner that gave it the broadest 
possible application, the Appellate Body has not addressed the issue of the application 
of the MFN clause to procedural provisions. The interpretation and application of the 
MFN treatment within the WTO system do not raise any problem. Moreover, the 
existence of the appellate structure ensures that the interpretations of the panel, in 
respect of the MFN clause, can be rethought or abolished. 
 
In section seven, I have explored the conflict interests that affect - or affected by - the 
application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement arrangements in BITs. The 
application of this clause to dispute settlement provisions responds to the interests of 
foreign since it facilitates and broadens the scope of access to international arbitration 
that offers international protection to investors who benefit from procedural provisions 
that are contained in other BITs. This could be happened by overriding procedures 
requirements to access international arbitration or expand the jurisdiction of arbitral 
tribunals to matters beyond these specifically stated in the basic BIT. This could be 
happened by overriding procedures requirements to access international arbitration or 
expand the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals to matters beyond these specifically stated 
in the basic BIT. On the other hand, the respondent state seeks to limit the jurisdiction 
of international tribunals and denies any effects to the MFN clause in respect of dispute 
settlement arrangements, fearing about being held responsible for breaching a treaty 
obligation or being sanctioned. Then I have explained briefly the arguments of the 
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proponents and dissenters of the application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement 
provisions in BITs. 
 
In sum, I have explored the complete picture of the background and framework of the 
application of the MFN clause to matters of dispute settlement in BITs. The 
interpretation of this clause plays an important role in determining the scope of its 
application. In fact, the debate about the scope of the application of the MFN clause to 
dispute settlement provisions in BITs, is about how this clause should be interpreted. 
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II. The International Rules of Interpretation in the VCLT 
 
Understanding the role and significance of each rule of the interpretation rules is an 
indispensable criterion of the proper application of these rules and the proper 
interpretation of the BITs' provisions. Arbitral tribunals rarely justify their adopted 
interpretation, but they just refer to Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. Maybe they do 
not have to justify their adopted interpretation, since they have the power to provide 
binding interpretations. The methods of the application of the international rules on 
treaty interpretation have attract less attention rather than the concluded interpretations. 
For example, a study of the UNCTAD of the application of the MFN clause to matters 
of dispute settlement affirmed that this clause should be interpreted according to 
Articles 31 of the VCLT, however, it did not discuss how these articles should be 
applied.109 
  
The world of any human or legal person consists of normative universes. These 
universes structured around the possibility of right or wrong, of lawful or unlawful or 
of valid or void. International law is one of these normative universes. It includes rules 
and restrictions that validate or invalidate certain practices or construct a certain reality. 
Therefore, interpretation is a process that in fact may lead to correct and incorrect 
conclusions. 
 
 In additions, each of the objective and subjective approaches has his own different 
approaches to treaty interpretation, so which approach should adjudicators followed. 
Moreover, the hierarchical order of the means of interpretation is a subject of debate 
that has not been solved. In addition, many BITs lack to the textual determinacy to the 
extent that tribunals struggle in interpreting the BIT's provision. How could tribunals 
interpret the silence of some texts is another unresolved problem. For all these reasons, 
the application of these interpretative rules is a dilemma. This chapter argues that the 
problem of interpretation is not crystalized in the availability of the means of 
interpretation, but in the misapplication of the available means of interpretation.   
     
 
109  See Rep. of U.N.C.T.A.D, on Most Favoured-Nation Treatment, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/1 paras 
30– 33 (2010). 
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Section one of this chapter demonstrates the nature of treaty interpretation, and how it 
is not an exact science, but it is still a science. This science requires the application of 
certain rules to produce correct results. The second section explains treaty 
interpretation from the perspective of the objective and subjective approaches. The 
third section provides an analysis of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT and the arbitral 
use of these articles in interpreting investment treaties. This analysis includes the 
general rule of interpretation, the supplementary means of interpretation, the 
interpretation of the silence of a treaty text and the hierarchal order among the 
international means of interpretation in the VCLT. 
 
A. The Nature of the Treaty Interpretation: 
  
Treaty interpretation is a part of public international law, since treaties are concluded 
between states as the entities of international law. These treaties are not parchments or 
words carved on a stone. They are instruments that ought to provide the legal stability 
to their parties with respect to the purpose of each treaty. The provisions of these 
treaties predict the future, potential legal situations and new factual. In order to 
determine the treaty rights and obligations, its parties need to define the accurate 
meaning of these provisions. The determination of this correct legal meaning is the 
ultimate aim of the interpretation process. However, the determination of this meaning 
is a dilemma. Sometimes a treaty provision provides no accurate meaning, which raises 
the question of how to determine the correct legal meaning of this provision.  
 
With respect to the concept of interpretation, it can be described as "the process of 
determining the meaning" or "the giving of meaning to a text"110. The mainstream of 
scholars defines interpretation as "meaning ascertainment, yet also see it as serving a 
wider purpose"111. "Interpretation in international law essentially refers to the process 
of assigning meaning to texts and other statements for the purposes of establishing 
rights, obligations.... Interpretation is both a cognitive and a creative process".112  
 
110 RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION, 27 (2nd edition, the Oxford International 
Law Library, 2008).  
111 Jörg Kammerhofer, Taking the Rules of Interpretation Seriously, but Not Literally? A Theoretical 
Reconstruction of Orthodox Dogma., 86 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 125, 129 (2017). 
112 MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, VI. Interpretation in International Law,in Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law 260 (Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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Other sees that "interpretation is a secondary process which only comes into play when 
it is impossible to make sense of the plain terms of the treaty, or when they are 
susceptible of different meanings".113 "The way the word is used in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention" affirms that "only when we have already read a text, and the text has 
shown to be unclear, that we can say that we then interpret it".114 
 
Other warns that interpretation is a multidimensional process and it can be broad or 
restrictive. This process can expand the universe of international law by legitimizing 
or qualifying norms that were not previously considered as rules of international law.115 
Interpretation also can broaden the scope of the application of existing rules or expand 
the content of these rules.116 Conversely, interpretation can deprive a legal rule of any 
legal pedigree, or strip it of any meaningful content.117 Consequently, this opinion sees 
that interpretation is a multidimensional process that includes; the determination of the 
content of the legal rule and the identification of legal rules that are available by public 
international law.118 Therefore, our understanding of treaty interpretation should not be 
limited to content-determination.119 
 
The mainstream of international legal scholarship has promoted a predominantly rule-
based approach to interpretation in public international law, and the VCLT provides 
this overall model. It provides formal rules that govern treaty interpretation and operate 
as formal constraints on the interpretive freedom.120  
 
The 2006 ILC Report employs another strain of argument. It asserters that 
interpretation is a process of giving a justifiable meaning to the text, but it is not an 
actual description of a psychological process. "The starting-point is the treaty itself, 
 
113  ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR MCNAIR BARON, THE LAW OF TREATIES, 365 (1st edition, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961). 
114  ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW 
OF TREATIES 10 (FRANCISCO J. LAPORTA et al. eds., Springer, 2007). 
115  See Jean d'Aspremont, The Multidimensional Process of Interpretation: Content-Determination and 
Law-Ascertainment Distinguished, 15 Amsterdam Center for International Law. 1, 4 (2014). 
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 2.  
119 See id. at 10. 
120 See id. at 17. 
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with interpretation proceeding from the more concrete and obvious (dictionary, 
context), to the less tangible and less obvious (object and purpose, analogous treaties 
etc.) in order to give the text a justifiable meaning".121 
 
 Other asserts that interpretation is "the applicative construction of law’s meaning. That 
is to say, interpretation is an effort to guide the concretization of abstract general norms 
in individual instances, foremost in the process of rendering tribunal judgments".122 
 
From the previous definitions, we can distinguish between two fundamentally different 
conceptions of interpretation.123 First, interpretation is the process of finding out what 
the treaty texts mean or what the parties to a treaty want its texts to express.124 In other 
words, it not more than what jurists do when they understand the meaning of any treaty 
provision. Second, the conception of interpretation is unclear within international legal 
scholarship and practice.125 However, we can say that the second conception of 
interpretation as used by international lawyers is more than meaning ascertainment. 
Interpretation, according to the second conception, is a creative act that provides the 
interpreter with choices and the rules of interpretation are the sources of these 
choices.126 
 
The legal theory can help us to find out what exactly interpretation can be. Although, 
the doctrinal thinking on international law is theory-averse, avoiding theory makes the 
doctrine of interpretation impractical.127 The theoretical "ad hoc" or a single theory for 
each single case or even a single theory for a single arbitral tribunal inevitably leads to 
inconsistency and failing arguments.128 It will be useful in this thesis to use the pure 
theory of law to recognize what the legal interpretation is. Indeed, this theory is the best 
place to provide us with the theoretical foundation of interpretation. 
 
 
121   Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1 -June 9, July 3-Aug 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682. on the fragmentation of international law, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, para 464 
(2006). 
122 See Kammerhofer, supra note 111, at 132. 
123 See id.at 131. 
124  See id. 
125  See id. 
126  See id. 
127  See id. at 150. 
128 See id. 
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For Hans Kelsen, interpretation is "a mental process which accompanies law-making 
in its progress from the higher to the lower stages".129 Interpretation is linked with the 
hierarchical structure of the legal order.130 According to the structured order in the 
kelsenian prospective, the higher-order norm cannot fully determine all the contents of 
the lower norm, and the lower norm cannot be logically derived from the higher 
norm.131 The lower norm as a positive law needs an act of will to be created, and must 
not contradict the higher norm.132 Kelsen asserts, "If by interpretation we mean 
determining the sense of the norm which is to be put into effect, the result of that 
activity can only be to determine the frame which is presented by the norm".133 
According to Kelsen, we must acknowledge the possibility of a diversity of the results 
of interpretation within the frame of a norm. Therefore, the interpretation of a text need 
not inevitably to lead to a solely single decision as the only correct one, but it may lead 
to several results that each of them have - insofar as they confirm the higher norm-  the 
same equal value.134 
  
Interpretation in the Kelsenian thinking resulted in a lower-level norm that decided by 
an authorized organ who decides only the frame of possible meanings for us. If an 
interpreter imports external standers such as "morals, justice or political ideologies, one 
imports something that is not part of positive law and hence ‘justifies’ one’s decision 
by a standard incommensurate with legal scholarship’s exclusive focus on law."135 The 
judicial decision would be well grounded on law only when the adopted interpretation 
is one of these possible results within the frame prescribed the higher norm.136 
Moreover, he calls for the development of the methods of interpretation to enable the 
correct content of the frame to be precisely determined.137  
 
Kelsen rejects the idea that new norms can be made by means of elucidation from the 
higher norms or already existing norms.138 In other words, we cannot use interpretation 
 
129 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 51 L. Q. Rev. 517, 523 (Charles H. Wilson trans., 1935). 
130 Id. at 523. 
131  See id. 
132 See JÖRG KAMMERHOFER, UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW : A KELSENIAN PERSPECTIVE, 105 
(Taylor & Francis Group publisher, 2010). 
133  See Kelsen, supra note 129, at 525. 
134 See id. at 525.  
135 See, KAMMERHOFER, supra note 132, at 106. 
136  See id. at 525 - 527. 
137  See id. 
138  See id. 
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to create new norms within the legal system. He sees that the function of interpretation 
is to discover the meaning from the existing norms.139 In addition, he refuses to assign 
a special role to interpretation in the case of legal gaps, since these gaps must not be 
filled by interpretation.140 Kelsen affirms that a legal dispute can be decided based on 
a valid norm and the non-existence of this norm has to lead to the disposing of this 
dispute.141 The decision of confirming or disposing of a claim made by a party to a 
treaty against another party depends on whether law declares it a legal duty or not, since 
there is no a third possibility. When a person does not obliged by law to do a certain 
behavior, he is free to do or not to do what he is not obliged to do.142 Moreover, 
interpretation has nothing to do with the non-existence of an obligation. Kelsen called 
this as a negative norm that "operates in a decision disposing of a claim directed to a 
behavior which is not a statutory duty"143.  
 
One aspect of Kelsen's frame theorem is worth discussing for the purpose of our 
analysis. The Kelsen's frame theorem recognizes the possibility of the existence of 
correct meanings. The theory did not decide how we could choose between those 
meanings in case they are different things. 144 The determination of the frame raises 
another question; how do we determine the frame, what it looks like and how many 
possible meanings can be within the frame. However, the theory helps us to determine 
the relation between the outcomes of the interpretation process and the treaty texts. 
 
The world of any human or legal person consists of normative universes. These 
universes structured around the possibility of right or wrong, of lawful or unlawful, of 
valid or void, or permissible or impermissible.145 International law is one of these 
normative universes and it has developed rules that regulate treaty interpretation. These 
rules of interpretation validate or invalidate certain practices or construct a certain 
reality.146 Treaty interpretation operates within this normative universe and within the 
framework of pre-existing rules that have to be followed. The rules of interpretation 
 
139  See id. 
140  See id. 
141  See id. at 528. 
142  See id. at 527- 531. 
143  Id. 
144 See KAMMERHOFER, supra note 132, at 115. 
145   See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 term- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 4-5 (1983). 
146 See d'Aspremont, supra note 115, at 1. 
  36 
determine the way we go about interpretation - or ought to go about it – and this is 
essential to what can be achieved by arbitral tribunals and ad hoc committees147. 
 
Recent contributions to treaty interpretation agree that the VCLT rules, including the 
rules of interpretation in Articles 31 to 33, are binding law that applicable as a treaty 
and as customary international law.148 We can say that treaty interpretation subjects to 
certain rules that aim to conduct the behavior of interpreters in respect of the 
determination of the meaning of a treaty provisions. These rules are the product of the 
international community and must be respected by this community. Interpretation 
cannot neither change the law nor capable of creating new legal rules within the legal 
system. Interpretation is a reproduction of a legal norm and can never go beyond or 
contradict the original norm.149  
 
One may ask whether applying the interpretation rules of the VCLT would result in 
correct interpretation. I believe that arbitral tribunals are bound to apply and give effect 
to the interpretation rules.150 Moreover, interpretation is a process that in fact may lead 
to correct and incorrect conclusions. The interpretation rules serve as a common 
framework that guarantees a uniform arbitral interpretation practice of arbitral tribunals 
and ad hoc committees.151 Article 31 of the VCLT provides a compulsory general rule 
and some flexibility and discretion lies in Article 32.152 Article 31 of the VCLT 
provides four elements and this Article is expressed in mandatory terms.153 This Article 
is designed to be applied within a single and integrated process of treaty interpretation. 
"Article 31 of the VCLT is entitled the "General rule of interpretation not the "General 
rules of interpretation" and the significance of this is often overlooked".154  
 
The full compliance with the rules of interpretation will produce correct results and 
will resolve the problem of wrong interpretations that go beyond the clear meaning of 
the treaty texts.155 Conversely, "the neglect and misapplication of these customary rules 
 
147 See Kammerhofer, supra note 111, at 1. 
148  See Kammerhofer, supra note 111, at 127.  
149 See Kammerhofer, supra note 111, at 138. 
150  See YEN, supra note 58, at 75. 
151  See id. 
152  See id. 
153 See Douglas, supra note 74, at 109. 
154  Id. 
155 See YEN, supra note 58, at 75.  
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would defeat their objectives, make adjudicators’ interpretation illegitimate."156 The 
problem of interpretation is not crystalized in the availability of interpretational means, 
but in the misapplication of the available interpretational means. 
 
A crucial question in determining the nature of interpretation is whether treaty 
interpretation is a science or an art. This issue had appeared before the drafting of the 
VCLT when the ILC said, "the interpretation of documents is to some extent, an art not 
an exact science"157. When the Special Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock was 
working on the first draft of the Law of Treaties, he informed the ILC members, at the 
726th meeting, that "the subject was a vast and difficult one and he was anxious not to 
penetrate too deeply into the realm of logic and what might be described as the art of 
interpretation".158 
 
If the statement of the ILC is correct and interpretation is an art and not a science, this 
would mean that achieving certainty in interpretation is a utopian dream. Moreover, 
academics, lawyers, adjudicators and judges would be artists and not legal scientists 
and judicial decisions would be works of art not products of a legal science.159 
 
If we describe interpretation as an art, then it is a kind of antithesis to "exact science". 
This reveals the use of the epithet ‘exact’ to characterize science.160 The ILC sees that 
interpretation as an art is unlike science, where there are rules that predetermined the 
exact outcomes of any interpretational process. Therefore, interpretation cannot be 
captured in certain rules or regulated be them and the prediction of the outcomes of any 
interpretation process is impossible. In this opinion, interpretation lacks any 
deterministic process.  
 
The results of this opinion are dangerous to extent that the outcomes of any 
interpretation process will be correct. These results are works of art. Moreover, there 
 
156  See id. 
157 Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 18th Sess., May 4 – July 19, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/6309/10/Rev.1; Draft 
Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 9, Vol II, 218 (1966). 
158 Summary Records of the 726th Meeting, [1964] 1 Y.B. Int'L L.Comm'n, para 4 U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SR.726/1964.  
159  See TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES : 30 YEARS 
ON, 10 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., BRILL 2010). 
160 See id. 
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will be no rules that determine whether the results of treaty interpretation are correct or 
wrong. 
 
The idea of science as "exact" does not correspond to the legal reality at all.161 Even in 
physics, which is an exact science according to the notion of the ILC, there is always a 
"margin of error".162 Moreover, we cannot chastise interpretation for a shortcoming, as 
uncertainty, that may be existed in the exact sciences.  
 
International courts and arbitral tribunals always refer to the rules of interpretation of 
the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties and this is a sufficient evidence that there 
is a tendency to highlight the science element in treaty interpretation. The fact that 
many international courts and arbitral tribunals may or may not correctly apply 
interpretation rules will not turns the nature of treaty interpretation from a science to 
an art. 
 
Interpretation is regulated by Articles 31-33 of the VCLT, which are binding to 
adjudicators and treaty parties. Therefore, all international courts and tribunals either 
explicitly or implicitly follow the process of treaty interpretation enshrined in these 
articles. These rules are sufficient to achieve legal certainty.163 The ultimate aim of 
treaty interpretation, according to the VCLT, is to determine the binding and correct 
legal meaning of the treaty provisions according to the communicative intention of the 
treaty parties, and what they want the treaty provisions to express.164 According to 
Article 31/4 of the VCLT, an ordinary meaning shall be given to the treaty provisions 
unless it is established that the parties had intended to give a different meaning to these 
provisions.165 The proliferation of international adjudication that has reached 
unprecedented heights should not affect the function and normative content of the rules 
of interpretation in the VCLT. This diverse and constantly changing international 
environment should not turn interpretation from a science that is regulated by certain 
rules to an art that governed by no rules. 
 
161  See id. 
162 See id. 
163  See id.  
164  See Ulf Linderfalk, Is Treaty Interpretation an Art or a Science? International Law and Rational 
Decision Making, 26 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 169, 171 (2015). 
165  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
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 Although, interpretation is not an exact science, it is still a science requiring the 
application of particular rules to produce correct results.166 The VCLT puts limits for 
the creativeness and discretion of adjudicators to ensure that their findings do not 
counter the intent of the state parties that is expressed by the treaty texts.167 Therefore, 
we have to assert the scientific nature of treaty interpretation as an activity, since at the 
end it subjects to certain rules.  
 
In addition, science and art are not mutually exclusive.168 I believe that interpretation 
is a science, that is, artful. Interpretation requires the application of a set of 
predetermined rules and the correct application of these rules will result in correct 
outcomes. Conversely, the neglect or the misapplication of these rules will result in 
wrong interpretations. 
 
The application of legal rules needs many qualifications and experience. This what 
justifies that there are persons who are able to do some things better than the others are. 
This means that the application of a science to some extent needs an art. This truth 
should not refute the nature of treaty interpretation as a science that regulated by a 
certain binding rules. Moreover, it should not refute the artful nature of interpretation 
as a science that needs a scientific knowledge for the determination of the correct 
meaning of the treaty texts. However, the artful nature of interpretation as a science 
does not mean that interpretation processes are free of any constraints or rules to 
regulate. We need the art to apply correctly the rules of interpretation as a science. We 
can say that treaty interpretation is a science, that is, artful.  
  
B. Treaty Interpretation According to the Subjective and Objective 
Approaches of International Law: 
 
Each of the objective and subjective approaches has different answer to the question of 
why treaties are binding. According to the subjective approach, treaties are binding 
 
166 See Yen, supra note 58, at 103. 
167 See id.  
168  See TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra 
note 159, at 13.  
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because they express the mutual consent of their parties. 169 According to the objective 
approach, treaties are binding because of the consideration of good faith, teleology, 
reciprocity or justice considerations. These conflicting answers affected the visions of 
these two approaches in relation to treaty interpretation. Indeed, the history of treaty 
interpretation is a reflection of the conflict between the objective and subjective 
approaches.  
 
Case law and international tribunals emphasize the priority of the "natural", "ordinary", 
"usual" or "normal" meaning. Interpretation process of treaties has to produce this 
meaning.170 This "ordinary" meaning of treaty provisions seems the relevant meaning 
since it is the most reliable evidence of what the treaty parties have consented to what 
bound them. Moreover, justice requires the enforcement of what the treaty parties had 
consented to.171 However, the doctrine of "normal" meaning fails to produce a 
comprehensive solution when a treaty text can produce more than one "normal" 
meaning. Moreover, the "normal" meaning itself needs an interpretation. The existence 
of disputes about what the normal meaning is proves the failure of the normal meaning 
doctrine as a comprehensive solution to treaty interpretation.  
 
The overriding force of the "normal meaning" varies from the subjective to the 
objective understanding. According to the subjective understanding, the original intent 
of the treaty parties is the primary element of interpretation and overrides the "normal 
meaning" if they conflict with each other.172 The subjective understanding, 
"consensualism" and positivism believe that the original intents of the treaty parties are 
cornerstone of treaty interpretation. They see the treaty as the world of its parties, what 
are inside this treaty is relevant based on the intent of the treaty parties. They do not 
give any effects to any interpretations that apart from this original intent. In their 
approach, treaties bind because it is the reflection of the mutual consent of their parties. 
 
 
169  See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT, 333 (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
170   see also Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7 at 20 
(Sept.15, 1923); Interpretation of Convention of 1919 concerning Employment of Women during Night, 
Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 50 at 373(Nov.15, 1932) and Competence of the General 
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the U.N., Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 5 at 7-8 (Mar.3, 1950). 
171  See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 169, at 333. 
172  See id. at 334. 
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According to the objective understanding, "normal meaning" is a secondary element of 
interpretation.173 They assert that treaties bind because of the considerations of good 
faith, teleology, reciprocity or justice considerations.174 Treaty interpretation in this 
approach should not be limited by the meaning of the words of the treaty texts. These 
texts can be interpreted in the light of many things outside the treaty provisions. They 
affirm that the treaties as a source of public international law are something higher than 
the intent of their parties. As a result, any interpretation based on consideration such as 
good faith, teleology, reciprocity or justice overrides "normal meaning".175  
  
  The "normal" meaning cannot be determined independently without a base of the 
parties' intent or good faith and justice, since there is no independent normative 
character to that normal meaning.176 Normal meaning is the correct meaning as it is 
reasonable according to parties' intent or something higher than this intent such as good 
faith or legitimate expectations, etc.  
 
The problem of "normal meaning' with the subjective understanding is that the goal of 
interpretation is to give effect to the intentions of parties. However, we cannot use the 
parties' intentions as a mean to attain interpretation. Under this understanding, we 
should exclude any objective points about the text such as teleology, good faith or 
subsequent conduct etc. The only mean of interpretation we have is what the treaty 
parties had consented on, how consent can be used as a mean to argue and support 
treaty interpretation, how can the goal used as a mean. If the subjective approach uses 
means such as good faith, teleology, subsequent practices, etc. then it will be 
indistinguishable from the objective understanding. 
 
With respect to the objective approach, it provides no solution for determining the 
"normal meaning". This approach begins from an assumption that the parties' intentions 
are not known and we cannot justify an interpretation by referring to these intentions.177 
This approach denies the existence of "objective normality" as well as the existence of 
 
173  See id, at 335.  
174  See id. 
175  See id. 
176  See id, see also J. G. Merrills, Two Approaches to Treaty Interpretation, 4 The Australian Year Book 
of International Law Online. 55, 58 (1971). 
177  See KOSKENNIEMI, at 336.  
  42 
non-subjective criterion that can evaluate the mutual treaty rights and obligations.178 
The objective approach affirms that the treaty interpretation must not be limited by the 
intentions of the parties, but there is something beyond this intention. Treaties can be 
interpreted in the light of legitimate expectations, justice considerations, teleology, etc.  
 
Although, these two approaches, subjective and objective, are opposing each other, 
both of them are necessary to determine the proper meaning of the treaty provisions. A 
subject interpretation can be supported by objective elements; the intentions of the 
treaty parties can be determined by moving into the objective understanding and the 
objective argument can held under the subjective understanding. The doctrine of treaty 
interpretation cannot follows constantly the subjective and objective understandings. 
Interpretation shifts from a subjective approach to an objective approach vice-versa and 
adjudicators stop only in the point where they find that this interpretation is the 
reflection of what the parties had consented to. International courts and arbitral 
tribunals show that there is no conflict between these two understandings and they do 
not characterize their interpretation by anything, subjective or objective approach, 
except that this is what every states party to a treaty had consented to. 
 
C. The Analysis of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties and the Arbitral Use of these Articles to Interpret BITs: 
  
Principles, methods, rules, etc. are legal terms that describe the content of Articles 31 
and 32 of the VCLT. These articles contain ways of weighing and choosing the 
evidence of interpretation. The evidence of the intentions of the parties can be found in 
the text of a treaty, preparatory work, preamble and annexes. The evidence of 
understanding can be found in subsequent agreements after the conclusion of a treaty 
and the subsequent practices of a treaty. Although, the borders between the two kinds 
of evidence are not always clear, they may result in competing interpretations. 
Moreover, there are elements that may affect the understanding of the texts such as the 
circumstances of a treaty conclusion, the applicable rules of international law and treaty 
object and purpose. 
 
 
178  See id. 
  43 
Arbitral tribunals have to apply Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, because VCLT is a 
binding treaty upon the BIT's parties or it is a manifestation of the customary 
international rules of interpretation. These articles include the concepts such as original 
meaning of the text, context, object and purpose, subsequent agreements and practices. 
However, the method of the application of these rules is a dilemma. These rules provide 
a balance approach to treaty interpretation that recognizes equally the legitimate rights 
and interests of the host states and foreign investors. This balance can be reached only 
if each means of these interpretative means has been given its particular value, 
according to the VCLT. These means should be applied as defined under the VCLT, to 
avoid the problem of liberal interpretation of a treaty in the light of its object and 
purpose. The problem of interpretation is not crystalized in the availability of 
interpretational means, but in the misapplication of the available means of 
interpretation. 
 
The first part of this section discusses the elements that consist the general rule of 
interpretation. The second part provides the supplementary means of interpretation. 
The third part explores the interpretation of the silence of a treaty provision. The fourth 
part provides the hierarchical order among the means of interpretation in the VCLT. 
 
1. The General Rule of Interpretation According to Article 31 of the VCLT: 
 
Article 31 of the VCLT expresses an integrated single rule of interpretation that 
contains specified elements. These elements are; good faith, the terms of a treaty, 
context, treaty object and purpose, subsequent agreements between the parties, 
subsequent practice of the application of the treaty and the relevant rules of 
international law.179 
 
Adjudicators are bound to apply this rule since the previous Article uses the phrase "a 
treaty shall be interpreted …..." which affirm the mandatory nature of the application 
of these means. These means are of the same equal weight, since the paragraphs of 
Article 31 does not refer to a legal hierarchy of them. However, these separate 
 
179  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, supra note 165. 
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paragraphs reflect the logic and natural progress of the process of interpretation.180 
Interpretation should starts with the text of the treaty, then the context, object and 
purpose and then the external elements that indicate the meaning of the text and reflect 
the intentions of the parties.181 
 
According to Article 31 (1), the general rule of interpretation is based on the textual 
approach.182 This is the starting point for the interpretation of a treaty, to clarify the 
meaning of the text. This based on the assumption that the text reflects and expresses 
the intentions of the treaty parties, rather than any external factors. 
 
According to Article 31 (1) of the VCLT, "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose"183. This paragraph contains three 
principles of interpretation and combines these separate principles in one rule of 
interpretation.184 The first principle is to interpret a treaty in good faith. This principle 
flows directly from the rule "pacta sunt servanda"185. The second principle, which is 
the very essence of the textual approach, is that an interpretation has to reflect the 
ordinary meaning of the text, which is the opposite of the special meaning.186 The third 
principle is that this ordinary meaning has to be determined in the light of the text, 
context and the object and purpose of a treaty.187 
 
The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the General Assembly for the 
Admission of a State to the United Nations affirmed that:  
 
[T]he Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal 
which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to 
endeavor to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in 
the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and 
 
180 See YEN, supra note 58, at 44. 
181 See id. 
182 See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 541 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten 
Schmalenbach eds., Springer, 2012).  
183 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 31, Supra note 165.  
184  See 1966 U.N.Y.B. of the Int'l Law Comm'n. Vol II, at 221, para 12, U.N.Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. 
185  See id. 
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ordinary meaning make sense in their context that is an end of the 
matter.188 
 
The application of the general rule of interpretation is not something theoretical, but it 
has its practical effects. The way of how tribunals apply this rule, affect the outcomes 
of the interpretation process and the rights and obligations of the treaty parties. 
  
a. In "a Good Faith": 
 
Good faith as a requirement for treaty interpretation applies throughout the whole 
process of interpretation. Good faith works as a general guideline to choose between 
two or more competing meanings of the same treaty provision.189 It is a fundamental 
rule in the application of a treaty. According to Article 26 of the VCLT, a treaty "must 
be performed in a good faith"190. The application of any treaty requires its interpretation 
as a necessity element for this application, so this interpretation must take place in a 
good faith. 
 
The principle of effective interpretation "Ut res magis valeat quam pereat" that requires 
the preference of interpretation that gives a meaning to the term rather than none. This 
principle is a separate customary international law, while, good faith is a principle that 
combined with other interpretation means according to VCLT.191 According to the ILC 
" when a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not 
enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purposes 
of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted"192. 
 
It is difficult determine a concrete content of the concept "good faith". However, this 
concept appears to be a reasonable requirement whether to interpretation or the 
application of a treaty.193 This concept is the final stage of the general means of 
interpretation. Since the ordinary meaning has been established in accordance with 
 
188  Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the U.N., Advisory Opinion, 
1950 I.C.J, supra note 170. 
189 See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 548, see 
also YEN, supra note 58, at 44. 
190  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 26, Supra note 165.  
191  See YEN, supra note 58, at 44. 
192  1966 U.N.Y.B. of the Int'l Law Comm'n. Vol II, supra note 184, at 219, para 6,. 
193  See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 548. 
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context of the treaty and its object and purpose, this interpretation must result in a 
reasonable interpretation.194 In case the ordinary meaning of the words led to 
unreasonable results, another reasonable interpretation must be adopted under the 
concept of "good faith". However, I argue that this reasonableness should be 
determined in the light of the intent of the parties and their mutual consent as it appears 
from the texts. This means that the meaning of treaty texts that reflects the intent of the 
treaty parties should be the corner stone of the determination of this reasonableness. 
Adjudicators ought to discover the meaning of the treaty terms not to create this 
meaning.  
 
The decisions and awards of arbitral tribunals usually do not refer to the good faith 
principle. Adjudicators, by the other means of interpretation, may find an interpretation 
that complies with this principle and they adopt this interpretation without mentioning 
the good faith principle. On the contrary, adjudicators cannot depend only on the 
principle "good faith" without other interpretation means. This would be an incorrect 
application of article 31 of the VCLT. Then "this principle is misapplied and will be a 
blanket authorization for subjective findings of legal issues"195. It is not a standalone 
mean of interpretation. "Good faith" must be used with other interpretive elements.  
 
Some commentators see that a principle like good faith has played an important role in 
unifying the interpretations of international tribunals with respect to cases concerning 
corruption, fraud and misrepresentation in international investment. They assert that 
this principle has led to consistent decisions from various tribunals on the similar facts 
in international investment arbitration.196 
 
Arbitral tribunals usually relied on the principle of good faith to prefer an interpretation 
that give a meaning to the term rather than the interpretation the dose not. For example, 
the APPL tribunal asserted that a clause must be interpreted to give meaning to the term 
rather than none, it held that it is" a canon of interpretation in all systems of law"197. 
 
194  See id. 
195  See YEN, supra note 58, at 46. 
196 See ANDRÉS RIGO SUREDA, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY, 102 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
197  Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v. Sri Lanka., ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, (June. 27, 
1990) 4 ICSID Rep 246, (1990). 
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 However, other tribunals have a methodological problem with the application of this 
element of interpretation. Based on the generality of the term, tribunals used "good 
faith" as a blanket authorization to provide side-oriented interpretation. For example, 
the Maffezini tribunal without an examination to the context to limit the interpretation 
of the word "treatment" it assumed that there are no applicable rules of interpretation 
except "good faith" to enable the investor to access international arbitration. The 
tribunal held that: 
  
"Like all other provisions of the BIT and in the absence of other specified 
applicable rules of interpretation, Article X must be interpreted in the 
manner prescribed by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. It provides that a treaty is to be “interpreted in good faith…… 
interpretation of Article X (2) would deprive this provision of any 
meaning, a result that would not be compatible with generally accepted 
principles of treaty interpretation, particularly those of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties"198. 
 
The previous examples are evidence that the inconsistence interpretations caused by 
methodological problems. The proper use of the "good faith" as a tool is to discover 
the real meaning of a term, but using this element to justify an interpretation that goes 
beyond the ordinary meaning of a text, would lead to wrong interpretation.  
 
b. The Ordinary Meaning of Treaty Terms: 
 
The ultimate aim of treaty interpretation is to determine the correct meaning of its 
provisions. This correct meaning is a reflection of the intents of the parties and what 
these parties want the treaty to express.199 That is why adjudicators shall give the 
ordinary meaning to the treaty provisions. Unless, it has been established that the 
parties had intended to provide a special meaning to a provision, adjudicators ought to 
adopt the ordinary meaning of this provision.200 
  
 
198   Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain., ICSID Case No.ARB/97/7, Decision on 
objections to jurisdiction, (Jan. 5, 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 396, paras. 27-36 (2002).  
199  See Linderfalk, supra note 164, at 171. 
200  Id. at 172.  
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Article 31 (1) of the VCLT asserts that the textual approach is the base of the treaty 
interpretation process.201 Therefore, the ordinary meaning is the starting point of the 
interpretation process. It is natural since the terms and words of a treaty provisions have 
been written by the parties and reflect the clear intents of these parties. This is the only 
means of interpretation that includes direct indications of the intents of the parties and 
their treaty commitments. Consequently, there is no need to go beyond the ordinary 
meaning inasmuch as it is clear and there is no evidence that the treaty parties had 
intended a special meaning. 
 
The starting point to determine the "natural", "ordinary", "usual" or "normal" meaning 
of a treaty text is linguistic and grammatical. Dictionaries are a source of these 
meanings and these dictionaries may include more than one meaning to the same term. 
Adjudicators usually choose from these various definitions. Moreover, the tense of the 
treaty provisions is relevant to the ordinary meaning.202 
 
Sometimes dictionaries are not sufficient to determine the ordinary meanings of the 
texts. When the treaty obligations are vague or a legal principle based, the interpretation 
of these provisions can be a challenge. For example, the interpretation of "investment" 
or "investor" in international investment arbitration cannot be determined based on a 
dictionary. The definition of these terms can be found in domestic laws or international 
treaties. Similarly, the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment, and how a state 
can breach the investors' legitimate expectations. Adjudicators have to determine the 
content of these principles to decide whether any of them has been breached by the host 
state or not. The ordinary meaning here is not sufficient to interpret any of these 
principles. The interpretation in this case depends on both internal and external 
elements.203  
 
201  See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 542. 
202  See Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain 
Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R, para 206 (Sep. 23, 2002) (adopted 23 October 2002).  
The Appellate Body of the WTO held that: 
We agree with Chile that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture should be interpreted in a way that 
gives meaning to the use of the present perfect tense in that provision - particularly in the light of the 
fact the most of the other obligations in the Agreement on Agriculture and in the other covered 
agreements are expressed in the present, and not in the present perfect, tense. In general, requirements 
expressed in the present perfect tense impose obligations that came into being in the past, but may 
continue to apply at present. 
203 See ANDREA BJORKLUND, International Investment Agreements, 2011-2012: A review of Trends and 
New Approaches, in 2019 YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2012-2013, 
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Arbitral tribunals may rely on other means of interpretation to confirm the ordinary 
meaning that they adopted. For example, the APPL tribunal relied on the spirit of the 
treaty, the principle of effectiveness, precedents and the treaty object and purpose to 
affirm the suitability of the ordinary meaning.204 Other tribunals may state the ordinary 
meaning based on the literal reading of the text without any reference to the 
interpretation process especially when the terms are not vague. 205 
 
The ordinary meaning requires the interpretation of the texts in the light of the context 
and the treaty object and purpose. Some commentators assert, "Object and purpose are 
modifiers of the ordinary meaning of a term which is being interpreted, the sense that 
the ordinary meaning is to be identified in their light"206. In addition, the context works 
as an aid selection to the ordinary meaning and modifier of any inconsistent 
interpretation.207 Similarly, other sees that the context and the treaty object and purpose 
work as a big picture to check the suitability of the ordinary meaning.208 According to 
this opinion, the ordinary meaning must fit in the context and the treaty object and 
purpose, otherwise, it should be tailored to fit in.209 However, I argue that the employed 
terms in the treaty are the main sources of the intents of the parties. There is no a direct 
indication of the intents of the parties in the treaty "object and purpose". Treaty object 
and purpose must come as a second step to affirm an ordinary meaning, not to change 
or modify it. 
 
  Tribunals may rely on the prior tribunals’ interpretations of a particular standard of 
protection when this standard is a term of art. The treaty parties use this term because 
it has its known meaning in a specific field. It is reasonable that the parties predict the 
usual meaning for this term.210 Precedents may help in determining the ordinary 
meaning of a term of art. However, arbitral tribunals carefully analyze the decisions 
 
289 (Oxford University Press, kindle edition, 2014). 
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and the awards of each other to ground their own decisions, not to find the ordinary 
meaning of a term.  
 
Because of the generality of the investment treaty terms, some arbitral tribunals have 
used the ordinary meaning in conflicting ways. Consequently, they judge differently in 
same kind of disputes, which resulted in contradictory decisions. Some tribunals 
depend on the textual reading to adopt the broad meaning of the term. This adoption 
based on an assumption that the parties have not expressly provided any limitations to 
the generality of this term. For example, arbitral tribunals used to apply MFN clauses 
to the substantive provisions only, without the procedural provisions in BITs.211 In 
Maffezini, based on the open worded MFN clause that allows its application to "all 
matters", the tribunal applied it to dispute settlement provisions. The tribunal adopted 
an implicit interpretation that excluded any restrictions on the meaning of the MFN 
clause because the limitations were not expressly provided for in this clause. This 
allowed the incorporation of procedural provisions from the host state’s third-party 
treaty to the basic treaty to facilitate the access to international arbitration.212 
 
On the contrary, the open worded MFN clauses that were examined in Plama, Salini, 
Telenor, Berschader, and Wintershall, are broad enough to be applied to dispute 
settlement provisions. However, the tribunals rejected this application according the 
ordinary meaning that should not be based on an assumption.213 
 
The determination of the ordinary meaning is a dilemma. The practice of arbitral 
tribunals approve that the same treaty provision can provide two or more conflicting 
ordinary meanings. For instance, with respect to the application of the MFN clause to 
the procedural provisions in BITs, one of the ordinary meanings is based on an 
assumption and the implicit consent of the pretties to the BIT.214 This assumption is 
that the open worded clause should be applied on its generality, since the parties 
implicitly have agreed upon the broad scope of the application. On the contrary, the 
 
211  See Zachary, supra note 74, at 101-105. 
212  See Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain., ICSID Case No.ARB/97/7, Decision on 
objections to jurisdiction, (Jan. 5, 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 396, paras. 27-28 (2002).  
213   See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 
173-175 (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
214 See Case Law infra Part III.A.1. 
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other ordinary meaning is based on the explicit consent of the parties not on an 
assumption.215 Arbitral tribunals who adopted this ordinary meaning refused the 
application of this clause to the procedural matters in BITs because the two parties had 
not explicitly provided their consent to this broad scope of application. 
 
Moreover, the MFN clause is a term of art in international investment law and has its 
ancient interpretation before the Maffezini case. The treaty parties have used this clause 
because of its well-known interpretation and content, not to redefine its scope of 
application according to the foreign investors' desires. The determination of treaty 
obligations should be based on explicit evidence not assumptions. Adjudicators cannot 
use the silence of a clause to interpret it in a manner that modifies or expands the scope 
of its application and broadens the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.  
 
I believe that the natural and ordinary meaning of the texts is the basis of interpretation. 
However, the ordinary meaning of a treaty provision should not be determined in the 
abstract, but in the context of the terms and in the light of the object and purpose of the 
treaty. 
     
c. The Context: 
 
Article 31 (1) does not allow the determination of the ordinary meaning independently 
of the whole treaty. The treaty terms have to be interpreted in the context of the whole 
treaty, so adjudicators have to look at the treaty as a whole. All the elements of the 
context specified in this Article are connected directly or indirectly to the treaty. These 
elements are:216  
 
-  The treaty text, including its preamble and annexes 
- Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
 
215 See Case Law infra Part III.B.1. 
216  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 31, supra note 165. 
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- Any instrument, which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty. 
 
With respect to international investment arbitration, arbitral tribunals rely on the text, 
preamble and annex to identify and understand the context of the treaty provisions. 
These tribunals rarely rely on the other two means, related agreements and instruments, 
because of the unavailability of these means.217 
 
The Permanent Court of International Justice asserted that treaty words obtain their 
meaning from the context of their use, and the context is of the same importance of the 
linguistic meaning in determining the correct meaning of the treaty terms.218 The entire 
terms of the treaty have to be taken into account as a context this includes the preamble 
and annexes.219 Even the title of a treaty has to be taken into account as a context.220 
 
This requires also a comparison between the meaning of a term, a phrase or a provision 
and same use of it in elsewhere in the treaty. The understanding of the consequences 
of the same treaty terms illuminates the ordinary meaning of these terms.221 The 
analogues wording of a relevant treaty assists in determining the textual interpretation 
of the terms of the treaty.222  
      
The preamble of the international investment treaty may explicitly state the aim and 
purpose of this treaty, which illuminates the context of the whole treaty. The preamble 
of the BITs always reflects the mutual agreement of the treaty parties to promote trade 
and protect investments that are made by the nationals of one contracting party in the 
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territory of the other contracting party.223 The treaty provisions, preamble and annexes 
consist the context of the any BIT. The context reflects the textual approach of 
interpretation. It serves as a mean to confirm the intended meaning or to help in the 
selection of one of the competing ordinary meanings. 
 
d. The Object and Purpose of the Treaty:   
 
According to Article 31 (1), "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty... in the light of its 
object and purpose"224. The VCLT did not define neither the content of the treaty object 
and purpose nor its elements. The treaty object and purpose require discussing not only 
the method of ascertaining them but also the priority that should be given to them in 
the process of treaty interpretation. 
 
The provisions of some BITs explicitly indicate treaty object and purpose. However, 
many of these BITs lack a clear "object and purpose", which make it difficult to 
determine this interpretive element.225 Other BITs have no single object and purpose, 
but many different or may be conflicting "objects and purposes".226    
 
The treaty object and purpose are not an independent mean of interpretation, there is 
an inextricable relation between it and the ordinary meaning.227 This mean reflects the 
 
223  See Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment, France v. U.S., 1952 
I.C.J. 176. at 26 (Aug. 27). 
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of the islands and maritime spaces’. Honduras itself recognizes that the islands dispute is not a conflict 
of delimitation but of attribution of sovereignty over a detached territory. It is difficult to accept that the 
same wording ‘to determine the legal situation’, used for both the islands and the maritime spaces, would 
have a completely different meaning regarding the islands and regarding maritime spaces. 
224  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 31, supra note 165. 
225  See YEN, supra note 58, at 62. 
226   See Appellate Body Report, US Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R. para 17 (Oct. 12, 1998) (adopted 6 Nov 1998). The Appellate Body held that "the 
Panel failed to recognize that most treaties have no single, undiluted object and purpose but rather a 
variety of different, and possibly conflicting, objects and purposes. This is certainly true of the WTO 
Agreement." 
227   See 47 RUTH SULLIVAN, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW 
OF TREATIES, 204 (Ulf Linderfalk. et al. eds., 2010), at 204. 
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teleological approach of interpretation that ascertain the general object and purpose of 
the treaty. The process of interpretation requires a link between the purpose of the treaty 
and its text. Therefore, if the texts of the treaty constitute a single object that aims to 
achieve a specific purpose, the interpretation of these texts has to be harmonized with 
the object and purpose of this treaty. This relationship between the ordinary meaning 
and the treaty object and purpose would prevent treaty interpretations that are 
incompatible with the correct meaning of the texts. Where the contractual and 
consensual elements are clear according to the text of the treaty, the treaty object and 
purpose are considered a crucial element in the treaty interpretation. However, this 
comforting picture of international treaties does not exist in international investment 
law. Usually contractual and consensual elements are not clear in BITs and both host 
states and foreign investors invoke contradictory objects and purposes. 
 
 The treaties' subject and purpose can be expressed in the text, such as Article 1 of the 
Charter of the Untied Nation.228 In addition, the kinds of some treaties may be helpful 
in determining the object and purpose. For example, the object and purpose of the 
boundary treaties is "stable and final boundaries".229 
  
The preamble of a treaty regularly includes the treaty purpose as stated by the parties. 
For example, the ICJ in the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in 
Morocco case affirmed that:" the purposes and objects of this Convention were stated 
in its preamble"230.  
 
In international investment arbitration, some tribunals rely on the title or the preamble 
to determine the treaty object and purpose, which is always, promote and protect 
foreign investments.231 This has become a usual assumption for the investment treaties. 
The problem here is that some of these preambles are very carefully negotiated, and 
others just copied and pasted.232 Moreover, the title or the preamble is not the 
 
228  See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 546. 
229  See id. 
230 See Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment, France v. U.S., 1952 
I.C.J. 176. at 196 (Aug. 27).    
231  See YEN, supra note 58, at 63. 
232  See GARDINER, supra note 110, at 186. 
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appropriate place for stating treaty obligations, unlike the treaty provisions or 
annexes.233 
  
The tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan, for example, asserted that a treaty interpreter must 
give effect to the subject and object that projected by the treaty as whole. The tribunal 
ascertained the object and purpose, in the first instance, from the text of the BIT.234 In 
the same vein, the tribunal in Philippe Gruslin v. Malaysia, analyzed both the preamble 
and the substantive articles of the treaty to determine the object and purpose of the 
treaty.235 
 
Some tribunals simply interpret the provisions of a treaty based on its purpose and 
subject, without any references or indications to how the tribunal reached this purpose 
and subject. For example, in the Sedelmayer (Franz) v. Russian Federation, the tribunal 
concluded that the aim of the treaty is to promote the investments, as so far as possible, 
in the two parties. Based on this conclusion, the tribunal justified the granting 
protection to investment that corresponds to the previous purpose.236 Similarly, in Saba 
Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, the tribunal stated the phrase "the object and purpose of 
investment protection treaties" in general, without any further elaboration. Based on 
this ungrounded treaty purpose, the tribunal avoided the application of a BIT provision 
that requires the compliance of investments with the host state's domestic laws to be 
considered investments under the BIT. The illegality of investments, according to the 
 
233  See id. 
234   See, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ISCID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, para 165(6 Aug 2003) 8 ICSID Rep 406 (2005). 
235 See Phillipe Gruslin v. Malaysia , ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award,  paras. 13.8 - 13.9 (27 Nov 
2000). 
 The tribunal held that: 
13.8 The meaning of investment in Article 10 is informed by the stated objects of the IGA as expressed 
in its preamble (see para 9.1 above) by reference to the creation of favourable conditions for greater 
economic co-operation for investments by nationals of one party in the territory of the other. 
13.9 Plainly this objective is carried through by the substantive articles. Article 2 reflects the preamble’s 
promotion of investment in the territory of one party by nationals of the other contracting party. Article 
3 deals with investments made within the territory by nationals of the other contracting party. Each of 
Articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and 12 also is predicated on the same subject matter of investments by nationals of one 
state party in the territory of the other party. In this context of the definitions of Article I, it is clear to 
the Tribunal that the concept of investment is to be read as confined to the same defined subject matter 
of investments by nationals of one contracting party in the territory of the other. 
236  See Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation, Award, SCC, Case No 106/1998, IIC 106, 59 (July.7, 1998). 
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tribunal, denies the substantive protection of the BIT and the run counter to the previous 
purpose.237 
 
The subject and purpose in BITs is connected with the interests of the parties. In 
multilateral treaties the "subject and purpose" does not related to a specific interest of 
the parties. Therefore, this mean of interpretation may become less important in 
interpreting the multilateral treaties with the non-existence of a specific "object and 
purpose" of the parties.  
 
With respect to the priority that should be given to the treaty object and purpose in 
treaty interpretation, they serve to affirm the ordinary meaning or the intentions of the 
treaty parties. Therefore, the treaty "object and purpose" is not a stand-alone mean of 
interpretation. It serves to confirm the ordinary meaning of the texts that reflects the 
intentions of the treaty parties. Moreover, the objects and purposes do not contain direct 
obligations. Investment treaties are characterized by the generality and ambiguity of 
their language, so treaty "object and purpose" should be elaborated comprehensively 
in the decisions of the arbitral tribunals. The merely mention of the object and purpose 
of a treaty to prefer a meaning to another would lead to wrong outcomes. 
 
• The Multiple Purposes of a Treaty: 
 
With the generality and ambiguity of the treaty provisions and the lack of consensual 
elements, adjudicators may find more than one purpose to the same treaty. Moreover, 
with the detailed treaty provisions some tribunals examine only the purpose of the 
provision that govern the dispute in question. 
 
 In ADF Group, Inc. v. US, the arbitral tribunal affirmed the NFTA's objectives in 
Article 201(1) and its preamble are on a high level of generality that not suitable with 
the dispute in question. The tribunal found that the particular detailed provision in its 
particular place of the treaty functions as lex specialis, such as national treatment, most-
favored nation treatment and transparency. The tribunal held that "the object and 
 
237  See Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, (July.14, 2010) ICC 
439, para.119 (2010). 
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purpose of the parties to a treaty in agreeing upon any particular paragraph of that treaty 
are to be found, in the first instance, in the words in fact used by the parties in that 
paragraph".238 
 
The previous opinion raises many concerns. Adjudicators will find uncountable 
purposes related to the same treaty. The whole purpose of the treaty is connected to 
specific interests of the parties, what if the new purposes affect some of these interests. 
The purposes of the same provision can vary from a treaty party to another. For 
example, the MFN clause aims to protect the treaty rights of the foreign investor. This 
investor may consider the purpose of this clause is to protect his right by facilitating 
access to the international arbitration. On the contrary, the host states believe that the 
MFN clause aims to prevent discrimination in relation to the substantive treatment and 
access to international arbitration is against their interest. Since they may be held 
responsible and being sanctioned. How could we balance between these contradictory 
purposes? 
  
Another opinion calls for the balancing between the competing purposes of the same 
treaty.239 In interpreting investment treaties, according to this opinion, tribunals have 
to figure out the consequences of the excessive protection of the foreign investors.240 
This excessive protection, affect badly the promotion of the investments in host states.  
 
In Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, a dissenting opinion shouts to balance between 
the competing purposes of the treaty. This opinion calls the tribunal to consider the 
effects of the investors' excessive protection and its impact on the promotion of 
investments. The opinion asserted that opining a wide door before investors to switch 
their disputes from the normal jurisdiction of the commercial arbitration or domestic 
courts to international investment arbitration would hamper the promotion of 
investments. This opinion added that the arbitral tribunals created dangerous 
precedents that provide privileges to the foreign investors. 241 
 
238 See ADF Group, Inc. v. US, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1, Award (Jan.9, 2003) 6 ICSID Rep 470 
para 147 (2004). 
239 See SUREDA, supra note 196, at 27. 
240 See id. 
241  See Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland , Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion, (Agu. 19th, 2005) 
IIC 98, para. 11(2005). 
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However, the general rule of interpretation refers to a single overarching purpose as a 
telos to the whole treaty.242 In the case of the multi- purposes treaties, adjudicators have 
to take into account the various purposes to reach one single purpose of the treaty to 
best confirm the ordinary meaning, regardless the consequences of the adopted 
interpretation. In other words, the consequences of interpretation are not an element of 
the interpretation process. International arbitral tribunals must pay great attention to the 
consent of the contracting states and the explicit meaning of the terms of the treaty. 
This would demonstrate a proper administration of international justice with respect to 
interpretation of the treaties. Adjudicators have to be mindful of Sir Ian Sinclair's words 
of the "risk that the placing of undue emphasis on the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty 
will encourage teleological methods of interpretation which, in some of its more 
extreme forms, will even deny the relevance of the intentions of the parties"243. 
 
I believe that the treaty object and purpose, as a guidance for interpretation does not 
mean to consider other affected interests. According to Art 31 (1) of the VCLT, any 
ambiguity in the language should be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms ... in the light of its object and purpose". We 
cannot divided the object and purpose of a treaty into many objects purposes according 
to the provisions of the treaty. We must read the treaty in a manner that gives effect to 
the object and purpose of the whole BIT. Article 31 of the VCLT speaks of one singular 
"object and purpose". It is unacceptable to say that the singular "object and purpose" is 
related to a single provision. This contradicts Article 31 of the VCLT that speaks of the 
entire treaty as relevant to interpretation not its individual provisions. 
  
e. Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice: 
 
Subsequent agreement and subsequent practice, with other elements According to 
Articles 31(3) of the VCLT, constitute the context for the purpose of treaty 
interpretation. Subsequent agreements should be at the same rank of the interpreted 
treaty. Since, "the external means of interpretation must be of equal rank of the object 
 
242 See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 546. 
243  See Sir Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 130 (2ed edition, Manchester 
University Press, 1984). 
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of interpretation"244. The subsequent practice of the parties related to the 
implementation of a treaty is an objective evidence of the mutual understanding of this 
treaty.245 This subsequent practice should be an element of interpretation insofar it 
consists a sufficient, consistent and notable pattern of a state behavior related to the 
treaty in question. 
 
Both agreements should be between the treaty parties and "regarding to the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions"246. Some arbitral 
tribunals examine the practices of the parties that occurred during the ratification 
process of the BIT.247 However, this is not considered a practice for the purpose of 
interpretation that requires the practice to be subsequent and related to the interpretation 
or the application of the treaty provisions.  
 
Many arbitral tribunals depend on the practice of the treaty parties to interpret BITs 
without any elaboration to the status of this practice according to the VCLT. In National 
Grid PLC v. Argentine Republic, the tribunal examined the Argentine and Panamanian 
exchanged diplomatic notes with an “interpretative declaration” to determine whether 
the MFN clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions or not.248 The 
tribunal asserted, "The review of the treaty practice of the State parties to the Treaty 
with regard to their common intent is inconclusive"249. The practice lacks the 
qualifications of subsequent practice under the VCLT. It is not about the application of 
the BIT in the question. It did not establish any agreement between the parties regarding 
to the interpretation. In general, this practice does not reflect any understanding of the 
parties to the provisions of the BIT. Moreover, states negotiate and draft investment 
treaties as separated deals between two parties; they are governed by the principle pacta 
sunt servanda. When tribunals examine the practice of a state related to other BIT, they 
apply subsidiary means related other treaties.250  
 
 
244 See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 554. 
245  See id. 
246  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 31, supra note 165. 
247   See, for example, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/18, Award (May. 12, 2005) 7 ICSID Rep 492, para. 57-65 (2005).  
248 See National Grid PLC v. Argentina, IIC 178 (2006), Ad Hoc Tribunal (UNCITRAL), Decision on 
Jurisdiction, para 85(June.20, 2006).  
249  Id. 
250 See YEN, supra note 58, at 54.  
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Article 31 (2) and (3) requires qualifications for these agreements and practices to be 
relevant. First, an agreement that signed by all of the treaty parties and related to the 
BIT in question. Second, any instrument related to the treaty, concluded by one of the 
parties, and accepted by the others. Third, subsequent agreements or practices between 
the parties related to the treaty. Adjudicators who rely on the previous materials, they 
rely on clear interpretive materials according to the VCLT.  
 
I believe that each BIT stands alone as a separated agreement between the two states 
without any contemporary or subsequent agreements. Therefore, any BIT between one 
of the parties and a third state is not relevant, since the BIT in question is the BIT that 
should be interpreted not the host state’s third-party BIT. Similarly, the practices should 
be between the parties to BIT, otherwise it would fall under Article 32 of the VCLT 
that may be taken into account as a common intent of the parties. Subsequent 
agreements and practices as elements of interpretation are well established in the 
practice of international courts and they are important elements of interpretation 
especially in the early international jurisprudence.251 However, in international 
investment treaties, states rarely have subsequent practices or subsequent agreements 
under the concept that is stated in Article 31 (3) of the VCLT.252  
   
f. Any Relevant Rules of International Law Applicable in the Relation 
between the Parties: 
 
The relevant rules of international law are another element that has to be taken into 
account with the context to interpret the treaty provisions. This mean refers to the 
international legal system as a whole as part of the context of every treaty subjects to 
international law.253 By this mean, the VCLT created the foundation of a systematic 
approach to the interpretation of international treaties and whatever their subject matter, 
treaties are a creation of the international law and their operation is predicated upon 
that fact.254  
 
 
251 See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 555. 
252  See id. 
253  See id. at 560. 
254  See id. 
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Under this mean, the relevant rules can be existed in all the primary sources of 
international law.255 According to Article 38 (1) of the ICJ, these primary sources are 
conventions, international customary rules and the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations.256 
  
This interpretational mean refers to the international legal system as a single system. 
Moreover, it mitigates the effects of what the ILC called the fragmentation of 
international law, and promotes its systemic integration.257 Based on this mean, treaty 
interpretation transgresses all specialized sub-regions of international law, such as 
international investment law, environmental law, trade law, international criminal law, 
law of the sea and human rights law.258  
 
The ILC's Study Group depended of the decision of the ICJ in oil platform case to shed 
the light on the role of Article 13 (3) (c) in treaty interpretation. The court invoked 
Article 13 (3) (c) to interpret the treaty provisions and asserted that the treaty in 
question cannot work independently from the rules of international law on the use of 
force, even to limit the context. The court continued, "The application of the relevant 
rules of international law relating to this question thus forms an integral part of the task 
of interpretation entrusted to the Court".259   
 
Only the rules of international law that are applicable in the relations between the 
parties, can be used for the purpose of interpretation. In Maffezini v. Spain, 260 the 
tribunal examined the provisions of the ICSID convention to determine whether the 
basic BIT requires the exhaustion of local remedies before access to international 
arbitration or not. The tribunal asserted that the relevant articles of the ICSID 
convention reverse the traditional international rules. The tribunal interpreted the BIT 
provisions to determine whether Spain has conditioned its acceptance to the tribunal's 
jurisdiction on the exhaustion of local remedies or not. 
 
 
255  See YEN, supra note 58, at 55. 
256  See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 38, date in force Oct.24, 1945, 479 U.N.T.S. 35. 
257  See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 561. 
258  See id. 
259   Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S), Decision on Jurisdiction, 2003, I.C.J. 161, (Nov.6, 2003),  
260 See Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain., ICSID Case No.ARB/97/7, Decision on 
objections to jurisdiction, (Jan. 5, 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 396, paras. 21-23. (2002).  
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Some tribunals relied on the general rules of international law to interpret the treaty 
provisions and determine the obligations of the parties. For example, in Noble 
Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, the tribunal relied on one of the general rules to interpret 
the Umbrella clause. The Tribunal asserted, "The well-established rule in general 
international law that in normal circumstances per se a breach of a contract by the State 
does not give rise to direct international responsibility on the part of the State."261 
 
Some tribunals relied on customary international law as relevant rules to interpret treaty 
provisions. For example, in Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, 262 the tribunal 
depended on the principle of good faith as a general principle of customary 
international law, not as a mean of interpretation, to interpret the term "investment". 
The tribunal found that the investments that are protected internationally under the BIT 
are only those are made in compliance with the principle of good faith and do not 
attempt to misuse the domestic legal system. Similarly, the NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission asserted that customary international rules are relevant in the 
interpretation of the NAFTA's standards.263  
 
Some tribunals misapply the "relevant rules of international law" in the treaty 
interpretation. They skip the logical sequences of the steps of the treaty interpretation 
process, which requires a search for the ordinary meaning in the light of the context, 
object and purpose of the treaty.264 For example, the tribunal in Alex Genin and others 
v. Estonia, skipped all the means of interpretation and immediately equated between 
the treaty terms and international customary rules, to interpret a provision that grant 
investors fair and equitable treatment.265       
 
261Noble Ventures Incorporated v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/01/11, IIC 179 (2005), Award, 
(Oct.5,2005) para 53, (Oct.12,2005). 
The tribunal emphasized that: 
 This derives from the clear distinction between municipal law on the one hand and international law on 
the other, two separate legal systems (or orders) the second of which treats the rules contained in the first 
as facts.". However, in para 55, it concluded, "An umbrella clause, when included in a bilateral 
investment treaty, introduces an exception to the general separation of States obligations under municipal 
and under international law. 
262  See Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, IIC 367 (2009), Award, 
(Apr.9, 2009) (Apr.15, 2009).  
263 See Notes of Interpretation on Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, N.A.F.T.A Free Trade Comm'n, 
267.B.2 (July.31, 2001). 
264  See YEN, supra note 58, at 60-61. 
265  See Alex Genin and others v. Estonia, ICSID Case No.ARB/99/2, Award (June.25, 2001)17 ICSID 
Rev-FILJ 395 para. 367 (2002). 
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The role of "the relevant rules of international law" is to affirm or clarify the ordinary 
meaning of the treaty terms. Where there are applicable rules between the parties such 
as conventions, international customary rules and the general principles of international 
law, adjudicators must examine these rules to determine the correct interpretation. 
Searching the various binding rules and commitments of the parties is helpful for the 
reasonableness of the interpretation of the BITs. The rules of public international law 
that have been developed over centuries will be an effective guidance to the 
interpretations of these BITs. 
       
g. A Special Meaning Instead of Ordinary Meaning: 
 
A special meaning may adopted to a particular treaty term when anything relevant to 
the treaty and its parties indicates that they had intended to provide this special meaning 
to this term. Both the ordinary and special meaning might be titled as methods that 
indicate to the adjudicators how to deal with the interactions between evidence.266 
Article 31 (4) of VCLT is an exception of the adoption of the ordinary meaning that 
governed by Article 31 para1. This exception deals with the cases when the parties 
replace the ordinary meaning, implicitly or explicitly, by a special one.267  
 
Article 31 (4) includes two cases according to which adjudicators have to adopt the 
special meaning. The First, when the text and the context of a treaty have technical 
meaning because of a specific field that is covered by this treaty.268 In this case, it seems 
that the interpreters try to give the treaty provisions their ordinary meaning in the light 
of the field that is covered by this treaty. The second, when the treaty parties intended 
to give the term a special meaning instead of its ordinary meaning.269 This special 
meaning, as a method of interpretation, looks for the intentions of the parties, rather 
 
 The tribunal held that "while the exact content of this standard is not clear, the Tribunal under stands it 
to require an “international minimum standard” that is separate from domestic law, but that is, indeed, a 
minimum standard. Acts that would violate this minimum standard would include acts showing a wilful 
neglect of duty, an insufficiency of action falling far below international standards, or even subjective 
bad faith". 
266  Summary Records of the 726th Meeting, [1964] 1 Y.B. Int'L L.Comm'n, at 1179 U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SR.726/1964. 
267  See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 568.  
268  See id.  
269 See id. at 569. 
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than what is the text expresses. It looks for a meaning that is different from the ordinary 
meaning of the term. The burden of proof that the parties had intended to provide a 
special meaning to a treaty term lies on the party who invokes the existence of this 
special meaning and the mutual intents towards this meaning. The permanent Court of 
International Justice affirmed this point in the Eastern Greenland case when it held that: 
 
[T]he geographical meaning of the word "Greenland", i.e. the name which 
is habitually used in the maps to denominate the whole island, must be 
regarded as the ordinary meaning of the word. If it is alleged by one of the 
Parties that some unusual or exceptional meaning is to be attributed to it, 
it lies on that Party to establish its contention.270  
 
Article 31 (4) of the VCLT expressly asserts that the special meaning prevails over the 
ordinary meaning, if it is established that the parties so intended. This proves the 
fundamental role of the parties' intents in treaty interpretation. This article implicitly 
asserted that the ordinary meaning of the text has the priority in treaty interpretation, 
since the ordinary meaning is the reflection of the intents of the parties, and these 
parties can adopt another meaning instead of this ordinary meaning. Therefore, the 
interpretation of the treaty terms should be consistent with the intent of the parties as it 
appears from the treaty provision. 
    
2. The Supplementary Means of Interpretation According to Article 32 of 
the VCLT: 
 
Article 31 of the VCLT uses exhaustive means of interpretation as "a general rule" of 
interpretation. On the contrary, Article 32 of the VCLT uses what might be called non-
exhaustive method of enumeration under the name of supplementary means of 
interpretation. This leaves a discretionary power to adjudicators to use "beside the 
preparatory work and the circumstance of the conclusion of a treaty, also other 
evidences and methods"271. The using of the word "including" in Article 32 indicates 
that the preparatory work and the circumstance are examples, and supplementary 
means, in this Article, is not an exclusive list. 
 
270  Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (Greece. V. Turkey),1925 Advisory Opinion, P.C.I.J. 
(Ser.B) No.10, para 16 (Feb. 21). 
271  Summary Records of the 726th Meeting, [1964] 1 Y.B. Int'L L.Comm'n, at 1179 U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SR.726/1964. 
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Consequently, the purpose of applying these means is: (1) to confirm the meaning that 
resulting from the application the general rule of interpretation under Article 31 of the 
VCLT, or (2) when the application of this general rule leaves the meaning ambiguous 
or obscure, or resulted in manifestly absurd or unreasonable meaning.272 Under Article 
32 of the VCLT, adjudicators can apply the supplementary means, but they are not 
obliged to apply these means when the application of general rule resulted in a clear 
meaning.273  
 
a. The Preparatory Work of a Treaty: 
 
There is no a recognized definition of the preparatory work (travaux preparatoires) in 
international law.274 Moreover, there are no rules according to which the adjudicators 
can determine the kind of materials that are qualified as a preparatory work, neither 
how far back in the history of a treaty can the adjudicators go to look for a preparatory 
work.275 Arbitral tribunals use preparatory work as a resource of clarification 
information that affirms a meaning that has been accepted, at least implicitly, by the 
treaty parties.276 These tribunals depend on anything that helps to determine the 
meaning of a treaty provision, since the purpose of the preparatory work, as a mean of 
interpretation, is to discover what is the parties had intended to in their treaty.277 
 
The materials that can be a preparatory work must be able to be objectively to assist 
adjudicators. These materials must be part of the outside world of the treaty. 278 This 
includes all documents relevant to the treaty from its preparation to its conclusion.279 
For example, memoranda, drafts, commentaries, other statements and observations 
transmitted by states to each other.280  
 
 
272  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 32, supra note 165, art 32. 
273 See Summary Records of the 726th Meeting, supra note 271. 
274  See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 574. 
275  See id.  
276   See Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Treaty Interpretation, 20 European Journal of International Law, 952, 
955, (2009).  
277  See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 574. 
278  See id. 
279  See id. at 575. 
280  See id. 
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b. The Circumstances of the Conclusion of a Treaty: 
 
According to Article 32, the circumstance of the conclusion of a treaty, along with 
preparatory work, is supplementary means of interpretation.281 This Article allows 
adjudicators to take into account the circumstance of the conclusion of a treaty in 
interpreting its provisions. This includes the contemporary circumstances and the 
historical context of the conclusion of the treaty.282 The factual circumstances present 
at the time of the treaty conclusion and the historical background of the treaty, reflect 
what was presented in the minds of the treaty parties at the time of the treaty 
conclusion.283  
 
The WTO Appellate Body in several occasions referred to the circumstances of the 
conclusion of a treaty according the meaning in Article 32 of the VCLT. The Appellate 
Body asserted that: 
 
 [I]n the light of our observations on "the circumstances of the conclusion" 
of a treaty as a supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of 
the Vienna Convention. We consider that the classification practice in the 
European Communities during the Uruguay Round is part of "the 
circumstances of the conclusion" of the WTO Agreement and may be used 
as a supplementary means of interpretation within the meaning of Article 
32 of the Vienna Convention.284 
 
The adjudicators have to be aware of the events, facts and circumstances of the 
conclusion or drafting history of the treaty. It is not acceptable to separate between the 
provisions of the treaty and these circumstances nor to neglect the relationship between 
these provisions and the external conditions of the treaty parties.  
 
The value of the circumstances of the conclusion of a treaty, and its formation, as a 
supplementary mean of interpretation should be subjected to certain qualifications. The 
VCLT did not designate these qualifications. Consequently, adjudicators, in 
 
281  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 33, supra note 165. 
282  See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, supra note 182, at 578. 
283  See id. 
284   Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer 
Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R, para 92 (June.5, 1998) (adopted 22 June 1998). 
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international investment arbitration, are the higher power that determines what should 
be considered as circumstances of a conclusion of the treaty and the value of these 
circumstances as a supplementary mean of interpretation. Adjudicators determine this 
on case-by-case bases. 
 
3. The Interpretation of the Silence of a Treaty Term: 
 
Adjudicators may find a treaty provision that is vague, ambiguous or silent to the extent 
that it does not give a determinate answer to the question of whether its application 
covers a particular issue or not. The interpretation of this provision can give conflict 
answers to the question of whether the parties to a treaty had included or excluded that 
issue from the scope of the provision's application. How should we interpret this 
provision? For example, if the parties to a treaty intended to apply a provision to a 
specific issue, should this provision explicitly defines this issue as a subject matter of 
its application. In this case, this treaty provision will not be applied to any issues except 
these that are defined by the provision, regardless the broad wording of this clause or 
its generality. Alternatively, if the parties to a treaty intended to exclude an issue from 
the scope of the application of a treaty provision, should this provision explicitly 
excludes this issue from the scope of its application. In this case, the treaty provision 
will be applied to all the issues that are subjected to the treaty except these issues that 
the provision has explicitly excluded from the scope of its application. 
 
This problem raises the question of who should bear the risk of the silence of the treaty 
provision. Should this silence be interpreted in favor of the host state or in favor of the 
foreign investors? There are two conflicting answers to this question. 
 
First, the doubt or ambiguity in treaty provisions should be interpreted in favor of the 
host state rather than foreign investors. This opinion assumes that governments are held 
with the standards of transparency and responsibility in their relations with the foreign 
investors.285 In contrast, the other opinion considers that the broad wording of the treaty 
 
285   See T. W alde, Separate Opinion appended to Award in International Thunderbird Gaming 
Corporation v. United Mexican States, asserted: 
 [T]he main principles underlying the NAFTA (preamble Article 102) as developed in the most recent 
and authoritative jurisprudence by arbitral tribunals require that, in case of doubt, the risk of ambiguity 
of a governmental assurance is allocated rather to the government than to a foreign investor, and that the 
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provision is a presumption in favor of the protection of the foreign investors. According 
to this opinion, adjudicators should interpret the jurisdictional provisions or the 
standards of states liability in favor of the foreign investors. Since this would elevate 
the systematic protection of foreign investors. This opinion equals between the 
investors' interests and human rights within any state with respect to the priority 
governmental decision-making.286 Others call for limitations to the protection of the 
foreign investors based on the principle of minimum limitation of the state sovereignty. 
According to this opinion, this minimum limitation should be the starting point of the 
interpretation of any ambiguous provision and this is the ordinary meaning that the 
generality of any treaty cannot override it.287 
 
The application of MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions raises the same 
debate. With the broad wording of the MFN clause that includes phrases like "all 
matters or MFN treatment", some arbitral tribunals applied this clause to dispute 
settlement provisions in BITs and others refused this application.288  
 
I believe that the problem is not about who should bear the risk of the silence of the 
treaty provision; it is about the correct interpretation of the provision. Adjudicators 
must not interpret the treaty provisions by presumptions in their minds. They have to 
examine all the means of interpretation to find the real and correct meaning of the treaty 
provisions. The interpretation of a treaty is to determine the treaty rights and obligations 
of the parties, not the renegotiation of this treaty. Adjudicators should follow the logic 
sequence of the application of the rules of interpretation to find the correct meaning of 
the terms of the treaty. 
 
government is held to high standards of transparency and responsibility for the clarity and consistency 
in its interaction with foreign investors.  
International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, Award, IIC 136 (2006). UNCITRAL para 
3324 (Jan.26, 2006).  
286  See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW, 139 
(Oxford Monographs in International Law, 1st edition, 2007).  
Harten asserted, 
 [B]ecause investment treaties use such broad language to define core concepts, the presumption in favor 
of investment protection systematically favors an expansive approach to jurisdiction or, in the case of 
the standards of review, to state liability. This elevates the norm of investor protection in the same way 
that doctrines of human rights prioritize certain individual rights over those of the state, and the result is 
to exaggerate the importance of investor protection in relation to the other values and concerns that are 
at stake in governmental decision-making. 
287  See INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (Andrea Bianchi et al, eds., Oxford 
University Press, 1st edition, 2015). 
288  See Case Law infra Part III. A, B. 
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4. The Hierarchical Order among the Means of Interpretation in the 
VCLT:   
 
The hierarchical preference of the means of interpretation is another dilemma in the 
treaty interpretation. The issue of the determinate significance of the various means of 
interpretation has not been settled, at least, in a satisfactory way whether before or after 
the codification of the VCLT, which resulted in a significant amount of debate. 
Different approaches to interpretation of treaties have been embedded in Articles 31 
and 32 of the VCLT. These articles contain ways of weighing and choosing the 
evidence of interpretation. The evidence of the intentions of the parties can be found in 
the text of a treaty, preparatory work, preamble and annexes. The evidence of 
understanding can be found in subsequent agreements after the conclusion of a treaty 
and the subsequent practices of a treaty. Moreover, there are elements that may affect 
the understanding of the texts such as the circumstances of a treaty conclusion, the 
applicable rules of international law and treaty object and purpose. The application of 
these rules may result in competing interpretations. 
 
 Adjudicators usually face contradictory evidence through the application of the 
interpretation rules. The concluded interpretation for the same text may vary from the 
application of one rule to another and the nature of the treaty itself would vary. 
Depending on the text of a treaty, as a source of the intents of the parties, would 
guarantee the stability to the treaty rights and obligations, whereas, depending on 
teleological tools of interpretation would develop these rights and obligations. 
 
The application of each rule of the rules of interpretation separately would resulted in 
conflicting interpretations to the same text. This is what happened with the ICJ in 
deferent stages of proceedings; it gave different interpretations to the same provision.289 
 
289 See Application of the Int’l Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Geor. v. Russ.), 2008 I.C.J. (Order of Oct.15); Application of the Int’l Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.) preliminary objections judgment, 2011I.C.J. 140 
(Apr.1). 
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Moreover, the ICSID tribunals interpreted the same provision differently in two cases 
that were included similar facts.290  
 
The ILC, during the codification of the means of interpretation in 1964-1966, was very 
careful not to prejudice the hierarchy among the means of interpretation. In its 1966 
commentary, the ILC explicitly asserted that the order of the Articles 31 and 32 does 
not mean a hierarchical order to the application of these means. The commission 
asserted, "The application of the means of interpretation in the article would be a single 
combined operation"291 and "all the various elements, as they were present in any given 
case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally 
relevant interpretation."292 The ILC added that the division line between the primary 
means and the supplementary means is not a strict line, and the function of both kinds 
of means is to "establish a general link between the two articles and maintains the unity 
of the process of interpretation"293.  
 
Some argue that the sequence of these rules in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT consists 
a hierarchical order that has to be followed.294 According to this opinion, tools like 
ordinary meaning, text, context and purposes are not applied together at the same time. 
For example, they see that the role of treaty object and purpose is less than searching 
for the meaning, the role of treaty object and purpose is to confirm this meaning. They 
see that the VCLT gave the priority to the textual approach.295    
 
Others see that all the interpretational means should be considered as unity and 
complete each other. This opinion sees that the order of Article 31 and 32 as a list does 
not provides a hierarchical sequence. They affirm that the general rule of interpretation 
does not include a chronological or hierarchical order among the rules of interpretation. 
This allows the interpretive process to take place by using any or all of these 
 
290 See Kılıç İnşaat İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/1, ICC 964 (2013), Decision on treaty authenticity and interpretation (July.2, 2013). See also 
Sehil Inşaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti.v. Turkmenistan. ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6, ICC 711 (2015), 
Decision on Jurisdiction, (Feb.13). 
291  Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 18th Sess, supra note 157. 
292 Id. at 219, para 8. 
293 Id. at 220, para 14. 
294  See SUREDA, supra note 196, at 21. 
295  See id. 
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interpretive rules simultaneously.296 In the same vein, the tribunal in Millicom 
International Operations BV and Sentel GSM SA v. Senegal, sees that there is no 
hierarchical order between Article 31 and 32 of the VCLT and all the means of 
interpretation "combine with each other and complete each other"297. 
 
This unresolved question has led to inconsistent interpretations to many provisions in 
BITs. It leaves adjudicators with a great discretionary power to the extent that the 
parties to a treaty cannot predict the interpretation of their treaty provisions. 
Adjudicators determine the applicable rule of interpretation and this rule can vary from 
a tribunal to another. Then interpretation will not be about the meaning of the text, but 
about which rule of the rules of interpretation will be applied. This discretionary power 
is the main reason for a sharp criticism. H. Lauterpacht asserted that: 
 
… as a rule they (rules of interpretation) are not the determining cause of 
judicial decision, but the form in which the judge cloaks a result arrived at 
by other means… it is a fallacy to assume that the existence of these rules 
is a secure safeguard against arbitrariness or partiality."298            
 
Lauterpacht adds that, we should not focus on the criticism of the rules of interpretation 
or their numbers, but we have to focus on the manner of the application of these rules, 
the accuracy of a certain rule and the hierarchal order among these rules when all of 
them should be applied.299 
 
Similarly, another opinion compares the rules of interpretation to playing cards. This 
opinion asserts that the flexibility of the rules of interpretation in the VCLT allows to 
all the approaches of interpretation to be applied, and these rules can be twisted and 
bent and the priority can be given according to the preference of the interpreter. This 
opinion sees that the adopted interpretation relies on which card of the VCLT cards 
will be selected.300 
 
 
296 See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 18th Sess, supra note 157. 
297 See Millicom International Operations BV and Sentel GSM SA v Senegal, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
ICSID Case No ARB/08/20, IIC 450 (2010),para 62 (July.16, 2010). 
298   H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of 
Treaties, 26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 48, 53 (1949). 
299  See id.  
300  See INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 287, at 44. 
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Thus, the interpretation rules in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT bind the treaty parties, 
international courts and tribunals. The structure framework of these rules allows for 
discretion and flexibility to these courts and tribunals in applying these rules.301  
 
I argue that the application of the rules of interpretation in the VCLT is compulsory 
and the full compliance with them will resolve the problems of inconsistent and 
conflicting interpretations in investor-state arbitration. Neglecting the logical sequence 
of these rules will create inconsistent interpretations and conflicting decisions in 
disputes that are governed by the same treaty provisions that have the same wording. 
The neglect and misapplication of the international rules on treaty interpretation will 
lead to wrong interpretations.  
 
I believe that the logical sequence of the concepts in Articles 31 of the VCLT reflects 
the logical and natural progression of the process of interpretation of the treaty. This 
progression should start with the ordinary meaning of the text, then the context, object 
and purpose and then any external elements that reflect the intents of the parties. The 
ordinary meaning that reflects the intents of the parties should prevails over other tools 
of interpretation. The treaty object and purpose is a second step that affirms the ordinary 
meaning. Adjudicators should not use the treaty object and purpose as a stand-alone 
mean of interpretation. The great emphasis on the object and purpose will deny any 
relevance of the intents of the parties to the interpretation of their treaty. In addition, 
the supplementary means of interpretation are used only in two cases and for one 
purpose. They are used to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to 
Article 31 resulted in either ambiguous or unreasonable meaning. This means that 
supplementary means are used to confirm the ordinary meaning resulting from Article 
31 of the VCLT. Following the logical sequence of the rules of interpretation will led 
to correct conclusions. 
 
Many arbitral tribunals used the unresolved question of the hierarchical order among 
the means of interpretation to grant excessive protection to the foreign investors. 
Tribunals depend on the assumption that the purpose of any BIT is to protect the foreign 
investors, and the international arbitration will guarantee this protection. These 
 
301  See SUREDA, supra note 196, at 75. 
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tribunals give the priority to many tools of interpretation except the text of the treaty, 
to expand the application of the MFN clause beyond the ordinary meaning of its 
wording. They give foreign investors the right to amend the treaty after its conclusion. 
The contemporary case law in the next chapter will indicate this fact. 
  
D. Conclusion: 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the nature of treaty interpretation, treaty Interpretation 
according to the subjective and objective approaches of international law, the analysis 
of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the arbitral 
use of these articles to interpret BITs. 
 
In the first section, I have demonstrated how the world of any human or legal person 
consists of normative universes. These universes structured around the possibility of 
right or wrong, of lawful or unlawful, of valid or void, or permissible or impermissible. 
International law is one of these normative universes and it has developed rules that 
regulate treaty interpretation. These rules of interpretation validate or invalidate certain 
practices or construct a certain reality. Treaty interpretation operates within this 
normative universe and within the framework of pre-existing rules that have to be 
followed. The rules of interpretation determine the way we go about interpretation - or 
ought to go about it – and this is essential to what can be achieved by arbitral tribunals 
and ad hoc committees. I have distinguished between two different conceptions of 
interpretation. The first sees interpretation as a process of finding out what the treaty 
texts mean or what the parties to a treaty want its texts to express. The second sees that 
interpretation is more than meaning ascertainment. Interpretation, according to the 
second conception, is a creative act that provides the interpreter with choices and the 
rules of interpretation are the sources of these choices. I have analyzed the pure theory 
of law to find out what exactly interpretation can be. According to Kelsen, we cannot 
use interpretation to create new norms within the legal system or to provide meanings 
that contradict the interpreted text. The function of interpretation is to discover the 
meaning from the existing norms. Kelsen refuses to assign a special role to 
interpretation in the case of legal gaps, since these gaps must not be filled by 
interpretation. He considers these gabs as a negative norm and interpretation has 
nothing to do with the non-existence of an obligation.  
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I have answered the crucial question of whether treaty interpretation is a science or an 
art. I have indicated the problems with opinion who says that interpretation is an art. 
This means that achieving certainty in interpretation is a utopian dream. Moreover, the 
outcomes of any interpretation process will be correct since the results are works of art. 
In addition, there will be no any rules to determine whether the results of treaty 
interpretation are correct or wrong. International courts and arbitral tribunals always 
refer to the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties and 
this is a sufficient evidence that there is a tendency to highlight the science element in 
treaty interpretation. The fact that many international courts and arbitral tribunals may 
or may not correctly apply interpretation rules will not turns the nature of treaty 
interpretation from a science to an art. However, interpretation is not an exact science, 
it is still a science requiring the application of certain rules to produce correct results. 
In addition, science and art are not mutually exclusive. Interpretation is a science, that 
is, artful. Interpretation requires the application of a set of predetermined rules and the 
correct application of these rules will result in correct outcomes. Conversely, the 
neglect or the misapplication of these rules will result in wrong interpretations. This 
means that the application of a science to some extent needs an art. This truth should 
not refute the nature of treaty interpretation as a science that regulated by a certain 
binding rules. 
 
In section two, I have discussed the treaty interpretation from the perspectives of the 
objective and subjective approaches. I have illustrated that each of them has his 
different answer to the question of why treaties are binding. These conflicting answers 
affected the visions of these two approaches in respect of treaty interpretation. 
However, the subjective and objective approaches affirm the priority of the "ordinary" 
meaning of treaty provisions, they do not agree on what the ordinary meaning is 
especially when the treaty provision provides more than one ordinary meanings. This 
conflict crystalized in the disagreement on the overriding force of the "ordinary 
meaning". According to the subjective understanding, the original intent of the treaty 
parties is the primary element of interpretation and overrides the "ordinary meaning" if 
they conflict with each other. On the contrary, in the objective understanding, "ordinary 
meaning" is a secondary element of interpretation. The objective understanding gives 
the priority, in treaty interpretation, to the considerations of good faith, teleology, 
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reciprocity or justice considerations. Indeed, both approaches have failed to provide a 
comprehensive solution to treaty interpretation. To follow the subjective approach, we 
have to exclude any objective elements of interpretation, in the same vein, to follow 
the objective approach we have to exclude any subjective elements of interpretation. If 
one of these approaches uses the elements of the other, both of them will be 
indistinguishable. I concluded that both of them are necessary to determine the proper 
interpretation of the provisions of BITs. Adjudicators cannot not constantly follow one 
approach without the other. Adjudicators shift from a subjective approach to an 
objective approach vice-versa and stop only in the point where they find that this 
interpretation is the reflection of what the parties had consented to. Adjudicators do not 
characterize their interpretation by anything except that this is what every state had 
consented to. 
 
In section three, I have explained the functional use of each mean of the means of 
interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 in the VCLT and the arbitral use of these means. In 
addition, I have discussed how should arbitral tribunals interpret the silence of treaty 
provisions, and how should these tribunals follow the logical hierarchical order among 
the means of interpretation. 
 
I have argued that however, it is difficult to determine a concrete content to "good 
faith", it applies throughout the whole interpretation process and it works as a general 
guideline to choose between two or more competing meanings. This element can give 
effect to interpretation that gives a meaning to a term rather than none. This element 
also can give effect to interpretation that enables the treaty to have appropriate effects 
rather than none. Arbitral tribunals usually do not refer to "good faith" as a mean of 
interpretation. This element of interpretation helped in unifying interpretations in 
respect of disputes concerning corruption, fraud and misrepresentation in international 
investment arbitration. I have asserted that some tribunals used this element of 
interpretation as a blanket authorization to provide one side-oriented interpretation, 
investors oriented. This is not a stand-alone element of interpretation and the proper 
use of "good faith" as a tool is to discover the real meaning of term, but using this 
element to justify an interpretation that goes beyond the ordinary meaning of a text, 
would lead to wrong interpretation. 
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With respect to the ordinary meaning, I have argued that it is the starting point of the 
interpretation process. The practice of the arbitral tribunals asserts that the same treaty 
provision can provide two or more conflicting ordinary meanings. Usually these 
tribunals turn to dictionaries to search for the linguistic meanings, but dictionaries are 
not sufficient to determine the ordinary meanings of specific terms. Therefore, the 
interpretation of terms like "investment", "investor" or "MFN clauses" in international 
investment arbitration cannot be determined based on the dictionary definitions. The 
MFN clause is a term of art in international investment law and has its ancient 
interpretation before Maffezini case. The treaty parties have used this clause because of 
its well-known obligations, not to redefine its scope of application. Adjudicators cannot 
use the silence of a clause to interpret it in a manner that modifies or expands the scope 
of its application and broadens the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals. I concluded that the 
ordinary meaning of a treaty provision should not be determined in the abstract, but in 
the context of the terms and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty. 
 
With respect to the context, the treaty words obtain their meaning from the context of 
their use, and the context is of the same importance of the linguistic meaning in 
determining the correct meaning of the treaty terms. The entire terms of the treaty have 
to be taken into account. In addition, a context includes the preamble and annexes. This 
element requires also the comparison between a term, a phrase or a provision's 
meanings and same use of it, in elsewhere in the treaty. The context reflects the textual 
approach of interpretation. It serves as a mean to confirm the intended meaning or to 
help in the selection of one of the competing ordinary meanings. 
 
With respect to the treaty object and purpose, I have examined the framework of this 
element in treaty interpretation. This element is not a stand-alone mean of 
interpretation. There is an inextricable relation between it and the text. The objects and 
purposes do not contain direct obligations, and both serves to affirm the ordinary 
meaning or the intents of the treaty parties. I have argued that many arbitral tribunals 
have relied on the object and purpose to justify their pro-investor interpretations. 
Placing great emphasis on the "object and purpose" of a treaty will deny any relevance 
of the intents of the treaty parties to interpretation and would lead to wrong outcomes. 
This element serves to confirm the ordinary meaning of the texts that reflects the 
intentions of the treaty parties. Investment treaties are characterized by the generality 
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and ambiguity of their language, so treaty "object and purpose" should be elaborated 
comprehensively in the decisions of the arbitral tribunals. The merely mention of the 
object and purpose of a treaty to prefer a meaning to another would lead to wrong 
outcomes. 
 
With respect to the multiple purposes of a treaty, some treaties include provisions that 
explicitly indicate the object and purpose, but most BITs have no single purpose. With 
the generality and ambiguity of the treaty provisions and the lack of consensual 
elements, adjudicators may find more than one purpose to the same treaty. Moreover, 
with the detailed treaty provisions some tribunals examine only the purpose of the 
provision that govern the dispute in question. I concluded that according to Art 31 (1) 
of the VCLT, any ambiguity in the language should be interpreted “in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms ... in the light of its 
object and purpose". We cannot divided the object and purpose of a treaty into many 
objects purposes according to the provisions of the treaty. We must read the treaty in a 
manner that gives effect to the object and purpose of the whole BIT. Article 31 of the 
VCLT speaks of one singular "object and purpose". It is unacceptable to say that the 
singular "object and purpose" is related to a single provision. This contradicts Article 
31 of the VCLT that speaks of the entire treaty as relevant to interpretation not its 
individual provisions.  
 
With respect to the subsequent agreement and subsequent practice, Article 31 (2) and 
(3) of the VCLT requires some qualifications for these agreements and practices to be 
relevant. First, an agreement that signed by all of the treaty parties and related to the 
BIT in question. Second, any instrument related to the treaty, concluded by one of the 
parties, and accepted by the others. Third, subsequent agreements or practices between 
the parties related to the treaty. Adjudicators who rely on the previous materials, they 
rely on clear interpretive materials according to the VCLT. I have explained that each 
BIT stands alone as a separated agreement between the two states without any 
contemporary or subsequent agreements. Therefore, any BIT between one of the parties 
and a third state is not relevant, for the purpose of interpretation under Article 31 of the 
VCLT, since the BIT in question is the BIT that should be interpreted not the host 
state’s third-party BIT. Similarly, the practices should be between the parties to BIT, 
otherwise it would fall under Article 32 of the VCLT that may be taken into account as 
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a common intent of the parties. Subsequent agreements and practices as elements of 
interpretation are well established in the practice of international courts and they are 
important elements of interpretation especially in the early international jurisprudence. 
I concluded that in international investment treaties, states rarely have subsequent 
practices or subsequent agreements under the concept that is stated in Article 31 (3) of 
the VCLT. 
 
With respect to the relevant rules of international law, these rules have to be taken into 
account in interpreting treaty provisions. This mean refers to the international legal 
system as a whole as part of the context of every treaty subjects to international law. 
By this mean, the VCLT created the foundation of a systematic approach to the 
interpretation of international treaties and whatever their subject matter, treaties are a 
creation of the international law and their operation is predicated upon that fact. Under 
this mean, the relevant rules can be existed in all the primary sources of international 
law. According to Article 38 (1) of the ICJ, these primary sources are conventions, 
international customary rules and the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations. This interpretational mean refers to the international legal system as a single 
system. Based on this mean, treaty interpretation transgresses all specialized sub-
regions of international law, such as international investment law, environmental law, 
trade law, international criminal law, law of the sea and human rights law. I concluded 
that the role of "the relevant rules of international law" is to affirm or clarify the 
ordinary meaning of the treaty terms. Where there are applicable rules between the 
parties such as conventions, international customary rules and the general principles of 
international law, adjudicators must examine these rules to determine the correct 
interpretation. Searching the various binding rules and commitments of the parties is 
helpful for the reasonableness of the interpretation of the BITs. The rules of public 
international law that have been developed over centuries will be an effective guidance 
to the interpretations of these BITs. 
 
With respect to the special meaning, it may be adopted to a particular treaty term when 
anything relevant to the treaty and its parties indicates that they had intended to provide 
this special meaning to this term. Both the ordinary and special meaning might be titled 
as methods that indicate to the adjudicators how to deal with the interactions between 
evidence. Article 31 (4) of the VCLT includes two cases according to which 
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adjudicators have to adopt the special meaning. The First, when the text and the context 
of a treaty have technical meaning because of a specific field that is covered by this 
treaty. In this case, it seems that the interpreters try to give the treaty provisions their 
ordinary meaning in the light of the field that is covered by this treaty. The second, 
when the treaty parties intended to give the term a special meaning instead of its 
ordinary meaning. This special meaning, as a method of interpretation, looks for the 
intentions of the parties, rather than what is the text expresses. I concluded that Article 
31 (4) of the VCLT expressly asserts that a special meaning prevails over the ordinary 
meaning, if it is established that the parties so intended. This proves the fundamental 
role of the parties' intents in treaty interpretation. This article implicitly asserted that 
the ordinary meaning of the text has the priority in treaty interpretation, since the 
ordinary meaning is the reflection of the intents of the parties, and these parties can 
adopt another meaning instead of this ordinary meaning. Therefore, the interpretation 
of the treaty terms should be consistent with the intent of the parties as it appears form 
the treaty provisions. 
 
In addition, I have explored the supplementary means of interpretation; the preparatory 
work of a treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion according to the VCLT. the 
purpose of applying these supplementary means is: (1) to confirm the meaning that 
resulting from the application the general rule of interpretation under Article 31 of the 
VCLT, or (2) when the application of this general rule leaves the meaning ambiguous 
or obscure, or resulted in manifestly absurd or unreasonable meaning. Under Article 
32 of the VCLT, adjudicators can apply the supplementary means, but they are not 
obliged to apply these means when the application of general rule resulted in a clear 
meaning. 
 
With respect to the preparatory work a treaty, there are no rules according to which the 
adjudicators can determine the kind of materials that are qualified as a preparatory 
work, neither how far back in the history of a treaty can go the adjudicators look for a 
preparatory work. However, the materials that can be a preparatory work must be able 
to be objectively to assist adjudicators. These materials must be part of the outside 
world of the treaty. This includes all documents relevant to the treaty from its 
preparation to its conclusion. For example, memoranda, drafts, commentaries, other 
statements and observations transmitted by states to each other. With respect to the 
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circumstance of the conclusion of a treaty, it reflects what was presented in the minds 
of the treaty parties at the time of the treaty conclusion. Adjudicators, in international 
investment arbitration, are the higher power that determines what should be considered 
as circumstances of a conclusion of the treaty and the value of these circumstances as 
a supplementary mean of interpretation. Adjudicators determine this on case-by-case 
bases. 
 
Then I have demonstrated how different tribunals interpret the silence of the treaty 
provisions. This problem raises the question of who should bear the risk of the silence 
of the treaty provision. The first opinion sees that this silence be interpreted in favor of 
the host state. The second opinion considers that the broad wording of the treaty 
provisions is a presumption in favor of the protection of the foreign investors. I have 
concluded that the problem is not about who should bear the risk of the silence of the 
treaty provision; it is about the correct interpretation of the provision. Adjudicators 
must not interpret the treaty provisions by presumptions in their minds. They have to 
examine all the means of interpretation to find the real and correct meaning of the treaty 
provisions. The interpretation of a treaty is to determine the treaty rights and obligations 
of the parties, not the renegotiation of this treaty. Adjudicators should follow the logic 
sequence of the application of the rules of interpretation to find the correct meaning of 
the terms of the treaty. 
 
With respect to the hierarchical order among the means of interpretation in the VCLT, 
this issue has not been settled, at least, in a satisfactory way whether before or after the 
codification of the VCLT. I have argued that the application of the rules of 
interpretation is compulsory and the full compliance with them will resolve the 
problems of inconsistent and conflicting interpretations in investor-state arbitration. 
Neglecting the logical sequence of these rules will create inconsistent interpretations 
and conflicting decisions in disputes that are governed by the same treaty provisions 
that have the same wording. The neglect and misapplication of the international rules 
on treaty interpretation will lead to wrong interpretations.  
 
I concluded that the logical sequence of the concepts in Articles 31 of the VCLT reflects 
the logical and natural progression of the process of interpretation of the treaty. This 
progression should start with the ordinary meaning of the text, then the context, object 
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and purpose and then any external elements that reflect the intents of the parties. The 
ordinary meaning that reflects the intents of the parties should prevails over other tools 
of interpretation. The treaty object and purpose is a second step that affirms the ordinary 
meaning. Adjudicators should not use the treaty object and purpose as a stand-alone 
mean of interpretation. The great emphasis on the object and purpose will deny any 
relevance of the intents of the parties to the interpretation of their treaty. In addition, 
the supplementary means of interpretation are used only in two cases and for one 
purpose. They are used to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to 
Article 31 resulted in either ambiguous or unreasonable meaning. This means that 
supplementary means are used to confirm the ordinary meaning resulting from Article 
31 of the VCLT. Following the logical sequence of the rules of interpretation will led 
to correct conclusions.  
 
 
In sum, I argued that interpretation is not an exact science, but it is still a science 
requiring the application of particular rules to produce correct results. In addition, the 
terms of the treaty are the sources of the intents of the parties who have employed these 
terms to express their ordinary meaning. The context of the treaty is not its historical 
or political context; it is the meaning of the terms within the whole treaty. The treaty 
object and purpose are not a stand-alone mean of interpretation and are not an 
independent source of the parties' intents. It is a second step to confirm the ordinary 
meaning and it cannot override the clear meaning of the text. Moreover, emphasizing 
the treaty object and purpose in interpretation may deny the relevance of intentions of 
the treaty parties. Adjudicators have to examine exhaustively all interpretation 
elements, according to its logical sequence, to find the real and correct meaning of the 
treaty. 
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III. Contemporary Case Law 
 
The question of whether the MFN clause should be applied to matters of dispute 
settlement in BITs or not is a question about how arbitral tribunals should interpret this 
clause. There are two visions established in the jurisprudence and no one of them can 
claim a numerical supremacy of supporters. The first vision argues that the MFN clause 
should be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. The second vision argues 
that this clause should not be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. 
 
The previous two points of views are driven by two conflicting decisions of the ICSID 
followed by two lines of subsequent tribunals' decisions that followed both sides. The 
first section of this chapter discusses the contemporary case law on the application of 
the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I indicate the problems with 
the decisions that have applied MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. 
The second section provides the solutions for these problems by discussing the 
decisions that have rejected this application. 
  
A. Case Law that has applied the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement 
Provisions in BITs: 
 
The excessive protection of the foreign investors and investments is the corner stone of 
this line of thinking of the arbitral tribunals. This vision of thinking can be classified 
under the objective understanding of the interpretation. They create international norms 
without the consent of the states. They override the ordinary meaning of the treaty 
provisions by many considerations that vary from a tribunal to another. These 
considerations are; protecting foreign investors internationally by facilitate the access 
to international arbitration; the harmonization of dispute settlement provisions by 
connecting provisions of same kind in other BITs, and adopt a broad interpretation to 
MFN clauses to benefit from state's broad consent retroactively after initiating 
international arbitration. 
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1. Maffezini v. Spain: 
 
The confusion behind the incorporation of dispute settlement provisions form other 
BITs to the basic BIT by using the MFN clause arose out form the tribunal's decision 
in Maffezini v. Spain. This was the first ICSID decision that dealt with the interpretation 
and the application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs.  
 
In Maffezini v. Spain case, the question before the tribunal was whether the Argentine 
Claimant is able to initiate arbitration before pursuing local remedies for eighteen 
months as provided for under Spain-Argentina BIT, or whether he could benefit, under 
MFN clause, from Spain-Chile BIT that provides more favorable access conditions to 
international arbitration. The Spain-Chile BIT provided for six months waiting without 
prior domestic recourse before national courts.302 
 
According to the dispute settlement provision in the Spain-Argentina BIT, disputes that 
arise out of this BIT and concerning an investment between an investor of one 
contracting party and the other contracting party, may be submitted to international 
arbitration "in any of the following circumstances: 
 
 a) at the request of one of the parties to the dispute, if no decision has been 
rendered on the merits of the claim after the expiration of a period of 
eighteen months from the date on which the proceedings referred to in 
paragraph 2 of this Article have been initiated, or if such decision has been 
rendered, but the dispute between the parties continues. 
 b) if both parties to the dispute agree thereto.303 
 
The MFN clause in Article IV (2) of the Spain-Argentina BIT provided "in all matters 
subject to this Agreement, this treatment shall not be less favorable than that extended 
by each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors of a third country".304  
 
 
302  See Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain., ICSID Case No.ARB/97/7, Decision on 
objections to jurisdiction, (Jan. 5, 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 396, (2002). 
303  See id. para 19. 
304  See id. para 38. 
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Spain argued that the Spain-Chile BIT in respect of Argentina is res inter alios acta 
and the claimant cannot invoke the application of the dispute settlement provisions in 
this BIT.305 Moreover, the term "all matters" refers to substantive matters or the 
material aspects of the treatment and does not refer to the procedural or jurisdictional 
matters.306 In addition, under the principle ejusdem generis the MFN clause should be 
applied only to the same matters, and cannot be extended to matters that are different 
from those in the basic BIT.307 Above all, the purpose of the MFN clause is to avoid 
discrimination against foreign investors and this discrimination take place only to 
within the substantive treatment to investors.308 
 
Although, the tribunal admitted the fact that the basic treaty - Spain-Argentina BIT- 
does not refer expressly to dispute settlement provisions as subject matter of the MFN 
clause, the tribunal rejected Spain's arguments. 309 The tribunal gathered many 
justifications for its new mistaken interpretation and application. This mistaken and 
pro-investor interpretation is a result of the neglect and misapplication of the 
international rules of interpretation in the VCLT. 
 
The tribunal considered that nowadays there is an inextricable relation between 
settlements arrangements and the protection of foreign investors.310 The tribunal added 
that international arbitration has replaced the old abuse practices of the past by a new 
international protection.311 Moreover, the court admitted that the investors' rights and 
interests are better protected by international arbitration rather than recourse to 
domestic courts, which are preferred by the host states.312  
 
The tribunal asserted that, if the third-party contain dispute settlement arrangements 
that provide more favorable protection to investors' rights and interests, this protection 
should be extended to the beneficiary of the MFN clause in the basic BIT.313 The 
tribunal did not require any references of incorporation in the MFN clause, since the 
 
305  See id. para 41. 
306  See id. 
307  See id. 
308  See id. para 42. 
309  See id. para 54. 
310  See id. 
311  See id. para 55 
312  See id. 
313  See id. para 56. 
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subject matter of the basic BIT is the same subject matter of the another BIT, which is 
the protection of investors or the promotion of trade.314 
 
In addition, the tribunal examined Spain's practices during the negotiation that had led 
to the recent BIT and its negotiation with other countries at the same time.315 The court 
concluded that the Spain supported the investors' right to submit investment disputes 
directly to international arbitration.316 Moreover, the tribunal examined in detail Spain's 
practices in respect of BITs with other countries and the tribunal concluded that Spain 
preferred practice that allows access to international arbitration.317 
 
Another justification to this mistaken interpretation is that the application of the MFN 
clause to dispute settlement provisions will lead to the harmonization of dispute 
settlement provisions by linking the all BITs of the host state together through MFN 
clauses.318 The tribunal concluded that the MFN clause in the Spain-Argentina BIT 
includes phrase "all matters", therefore, the application of the MFN clause should be 
expanded to cover dispute settlement provisions. According to the tribunal, the 
previous phrase asserted that the parties implicitly agreed to apply the MFN clause to 
matters of dispute settlement in BITs.319 Since the BIT did not explicitly exclude 
dispute settlement arrangements from the subject matter of MFN clause.  
 
For all these reasons, the tribunal found that the MFN clause linked the "the Spain-
Argentina BIT" - the basic treaty- to other Spain's BITs and, under two conditions the 
investor can rely on more favorable conditions to access international arbitration. First, 
both the basic BIT and the host state’s third-country BIT have to deal with the same 
subject matter, which is protecting investors' rights and interests or the promotion of 
the trade. Second, a more favorable treatment that is granted by a third-party treaty to 
another investor.320 
 
 
314  See id. 
315  See id. paras 57 -62. 
316  See id.  
317  See id. 
318  See id.   
319  See, id. 
320  See Id. 
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I believe that the tribunal has adopted a broad and mistaken interpretation to the MFN 
clause to extend the scope of its application to dispute settlement arrangements in BITs. 
The tribunal has committed many mistakes in the interpretation of this clause to provide 
excessive protection to the foreign investors regardless the treaty provisions or their 
ordinary meaning.  
 
The interpretation of this clause came one-side oriented, investor oriented, and gave 
the ultimate effect to facilitate access to international arbitration to better protect 
investors' rights and interests. The tribunal gave the priority to the interests of the 
investor rather than the host state. How this could be justified against the host state 
without its clear acceptance and based on the interpretation of the MFN clause. 
 
The arbitral tribunal depended on the broad wording of the MFN clause that included 
the phrase "all matters" to interpret the ambiguity of this text in favor of the investor 
based on the implicate acceptance of the treaty parties. The tribunal failed to follow the 
logical sequence of the rules in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT that reflects the logical 
and natural progression of the interpretation process of any treaty. This progression 
should starts with the ordinary meaning of the text, then the context, object and purpose 
and then any external elements that reflect the intent of the parties. This tribunal gave 
the priority to many tools of interpretation except the text of the treaty to expand the 
application of the MFN clause beyond what the parties had intended to. This tribunal's 
decision gave the investor the right to amend the treaty after its conclusion. The phrase 
"all matters" is silent on whether the MFN clause covers dispute settlement 
arrangements or not. The MFN clause is a "term of art" that has a history of application 
according to which it applies only to substantive treatment. The tribunal should not 
interpret the silence of this clause to establish a meaning against the ordinary meaning 
of this "term of art", regardless its well-known interpretation. Moreover, the starting 
point in interpreting this silence is the minimum limitation of state sovereignty, which 
works in favor of limiting the protection of investors. Even the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase "all matters" affirm this assumption - the minimum limitation of state 
sovereignty - and does not sufficient to override it. 
 
In interpreting the MFN clause, the tribunal just skipped the other means of 
interpretation such as ordinary meaning of the treaty text and context. The tribunal 
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grounded its interpretation on the purpose of the BIT, which is the protection of 
investors. However, Spain asserted that the purpose of the whole treaty is to prevent 
discrimination in relation to the material economic treatment not the procedural 
treatment.321 The tribunal put great emphasis on the purpose of the BIT to the extent 
that it denied any relevance to the intents of the parties. I argue that the tribunal failed 
to read the treaty in a manner that gives effect to the object and purpose of the whole 
BIT. Article 31 of the VCLT speaks of one singular "object and purpose". It is 
unacceptable to say that the singular "object and purpose" is related to a single 
provision. Since this contradict with Article 31 of the VCLT that speaks of the entire 
treaty as relevant to interpretation not its individual provisions. Moreover, the purpose 
of a treaty is not a stand-alone mean of interpretation. It is used to confirm the ordinary 
meaning that should be given to the terms of the BIT in their context.   
 
The tribunal assumed that there is a direct relation between the procedural and 
substantive provisions in BITs, so it applied the MFN clause to the procedural 
provisions. However, the distinction between the substantive provisions in an 
investment treaty and the provisions conferring adjudicative power to arbitral tribunal 
is straightforward. The substantive provisions address the contracting state parties. 
While the procedural provisions address an international arbitral tribunal and disputing 
parties. These disputing parties are not the state parties to BIT, but the investor and the 
host state. Both investor and host state enter into a relationship of procedural equality 
before the arbitral tribunal once a dispute has been submitted to it. This procedural 
relationship subjects to the equality of arms principle in international litigation. This 
principle is not respected when one of the disputing parties has the ability to amend the 
rules that regulating the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal after the dispute has arisen. 
In addition, both of these kinds of provisions have its own purpose and each of them 
imposes different obligations and rights. The object of the substantive provisions is 
investments that made by the nationals of one contracting state on the territory of the 
other contracting state. The object of procedural provisions is creating a jurisdictional 
mandate for an international arbitral tribunal to settle disputes between the foreign 
investor and the host state who are in an equal procedural relationship. The invalidity 
 
321  See id. para 41-42. 
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of substantive provisions cannot affect the validity of the procedural provisions in the 
BIT and the contrary is right.  
 
After skipping the other means of interpretation, the tribunal mentioned three kinds of 
practices; public practice, practice of the negotiation that led to the conclusion of the 
BIT and subsequent practices with other BITs. All these practices lack the 
qualifications of subsequent practice under Article 31 (3) the VCLT. Subsequent 
practice should be an element of interpretation insofar it consists a sufficient, consistent 
and notable pattern of a state behavior related to the treaty in question. This practice 
should be between the parties of the BIT in question and should be related to the 
implementation or interpretation of this BIT or any instrument related to the treaty, 
concluded by one of the parties, and accepted by the others. Adjudicators who rely on 
the previous materials, they rely on clear interpretive materials according to the VCLT.  
 
The practices that were mentioned by the tribunal are not relevant to the interpretation 
of the BIT in the question before this tribunal. The old abuse practice of the past and 
Spain's practice regard the other BITs were not between the parties of the dispute before 
the tribunal. In addition, the practices during the negotiation that led to the BIT do not 
consider a subsequent practice according to article 31 of the VCLT. States negotiate 
and draft BITs as separated deals between two parties these BITs are governed by the 
principle pacta sunt servanda. Indeed, these practices do not reflect any understanding 
of the parties to the MFN clause in this case and are not relevant to treaty interpretation. 
 
Finally, the application of MFN clause to disputes settlement arrangements will not 
lead to the harmonization of these arrangements. On the contrary, the incorporation of 
these arrangements would increase the treaty shopping in BITs that would affect the 
binding nature of BITs. Moreover, this will lead to the counterproductive to the 
harmonization of dispute settlement provisions. Above all, there is no any national or 
international rule that requires from an arbitral tribunal to harmonize the dispute 
settlement mechanisms in BITs. 
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2. National Grid Plc. v. Argentine Republic: 
 
After Maffezini award, many tribunals followed the same line of thinking with the same 
conclusion, but with different analysis. One of these cases is National Grid Plc. v. 
Argentine Republic.  
 
In this case, Argentina asserted that the wording of the MFN clause in question is 
different from the MFN clause in Maffezini case, since the text of the treaty indicates 
that the parties had not intended to apply the MFN clause to dispute settlement 
provisions.322  
 
Article 3 of the UK-Argentina BIT included the National treatment and Most-favored 
Nation Provisions. Article 3 (2) of this Article reads as follow, "Neither Contracting 
Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments, to treatment less 
favorable than that which it accords to its own investors or to investors of any third 
State".323 
 
The tribunal affirmed that the previous MFN clause does not expressly refer to the 
dispute settlement mechanisms, however, this clause affirms that these mechanisms are 
not included among the exceptions of the application of this clause.324 The tribunal 
asserted, "As a matter of interpretation, specific mention of an item excludes others: 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius".325 The tribunal used the same justifications of 
the Maffezini tribunal. It concluded that the interpretation of "most-favored nation 
treatment" with respect to the disposal of investment includes the protection of the 
investment through international arbitration. 
 
While the tribunal in Maffezini v. Spain grounded its jurisdiction on the broad wording 
of MFN clause the included the phrase "all matters", the tribunal in National Grid Plc. 
v. Argentine Republic found that the MFN treatment with respect to "the use and enjoy 
 
322  See National Grid PLC v. Argentina, IIC 178 (2006), Ad Hoc Tribunal (UNCITRAL), Decision on 
Jurisdiction, paras 56-57 (June.20, 2006).   
323  See id. para 82. 
324 See id. para 82. 
325  Id.  
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of investments" expands the scope of the application of this clause to cover dispute 
settlement mechanisms.326 This allows the incorporation of dispute settlement 
provisions in other argentine BITs that accord favorable procedural conditions with the 
UK-Argentina BIT. The tribunal affirmed that submitting disputes only to domestic 
courts is a procedural matter that leads to the inequity among investors, which will 
defeat the object and purpose of the BIT.  
 
The same mistaken way of Maffezini, the interpretation of the MFN clause came one-
side oriented, investor oriented, and gave the ultimate effect to facilitate access to 
international arbitration to guarantee the better protection of foreign investors' rights 
and interests. Although, the wording of the MFN clause did not include any mention to 
dispute settlement arrangements, the tribunal interpreted its silence in favor of the 
interests of the investors. The tribunal put great emphasis on the purpose of the BIT, 
protecting investors, to the extent that it denied any relevance to the intent of the parties 
to the interpretation process. 
     
3. RosInvest Co UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation: 
 
The arbitral tribunals that followed the Maffezini way of thinking relied on the broad 
interpretation of MFN clauses to expand their jurisdiction under more favorable 
conditions that allow foreign investors to access international arbitration. The 
RosInvest tribunal relied on the MFN clause to expand the subject matter of the 
international arbitration's jurisdiction. This case is a glaring example of how can the 
arbitral tribunals ignore the clear ordinary meaning of the treaty terms and adopt 
interpretations that are against the intent of the parties. 
 
The basic BIT of the UK - Soviet Union allowed the submission of compensation 
disputes only to international arbitration, but not for the adjudication of expropriation 
itself that was under the jurisdiction of the domestic courts of the parties.327 The MFN 
 
326  See id. para 94.  
327   See RosInvest Co UK Ltd v. Russian Federation, SCC, Case No. V079/2005, IIC 315 (2007), 
Jurisdiction award, para. 23 (Oct.1, 2007). 
Article (8) of the UK–Soviet BIT/IPPA reads as follow 
 "Disputes between an Investor and the Host Contracting Party 
(1) This Article shall apply to any legal disputes between an investor of one Contracting Party and the 
other Contracting Party in relation to an investment of the former either concerning the amount or 
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clause provided protection regarding the "management, maintenance, use, enjoyment 
or disposal of investment".328 The tribunal used this clause in the basic BIT to expand 
its scope of jurisdiction to cover the disputes about expropriation by incorporating 
better procedural arrangements in other BITs. This better protection is existed in the 
Denmark-Russia BIT provisions that allow the access to international arbitration for 
both compensation and expropriation disputes. The tribunal found that the Denmark-
Russia BIT provided for more favored procedural treatment than what the UK - Soviet 
Union BIT provided for.329 
 
States may have many significant reasons to limit the jurisdiction of international 
arbitral tribunals. Both adjudicators and investors have to put these restrictions in mind 
before initiating an investment. The states parties to the BIT have agreed upon these 
dispute settlement arrangements. These arrangements are in favor of the interests of the 
both contracting states. With respect to expropriation, both United Kingdom and Soviet 
Union have decided - in the BIT - that the affected investor has the right to prompt 
review by a judicial authority of the Contracting Party making the expropriation.330 
However, the tribunal completely ignored the explicit intent of states parties and the 
clear meaning of the treaty texts and expanded its jurisdiction to subject matter beyond 
the intent of the parties to the BIT. This interpretation forms a clear violation to ratione 
consensus. 
 
4. Hochtief Aktiengesellschaft. v. Argentine Republic: 
 
The arbitral tribunal in Hochtief case continued to interpret MFN clause in the similar 
way of Maffezini case. The Argentina-Germany BIT, the basic BIT, provided for 
arbitration after pursuing local remedies for eighteen months.331 Under the MFN clause 
in the basic BIT, the tribunal found that the investor could circumvent this period and 
 
payment of compensation under Articles 4 or 5 [Article 5 was on expropriation] of this Agreement, or 
concerning any other matter consequential upon an act of expropriation in accordance with Article 5 of 
this Agreement, or concerning the consequences of the non-implementation, or of the incorrect 
implementation, of Article 6 of this Agreement. 
328  Id. 
329  See id. paras 124-128. 
330  See id. para 23, art 5 (1) of the UK-Soviet BIT. 
331 See Hochtief Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, SCC Case No. ARB/07/31, IIC 513 (2011), 
Decision on Jurisdiction (Oct. 24, 2011). 
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submit the dispute to international arbitration before the elapsing of this period, as 
provided for in the Argentina-Chile BIT.332  
 
I believe that the tribunal by this decision helped the investor to circumvent the treaty 
procedural obligations that stand in his way to international arbitration. This proves 
that the arbitral tribunals assume that the single object and purpose of the BIT is to 
protect the foreign investors. The great emphasis that they put on the object and purpose 
will deny any relevance of the intents of the parties to the interpretation of the BIT. The 
object and purpose do not contain direct obligations; they serve to affirm the ordinary 
meaning. Therefore, the treaty "object and purpose" is not a stand-alone mean of 
interpretation. It serves to confirm the ordinary meaning of the texts that reflects the 
intentions of the treaty parties. 
 
5. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic: 
 
In similar way, the Argentina-Italy BIT did not allow disputes to be submitted to the 
ICSID before pursuing local remedies for eighteen months before the domestic 
administrative or judicial bodies. Under the MFN clause in article 3 (1) of the 
Argentina-Italy BIT the investor sought to apply the more generous provisions in the 
Argentina-US BIT. Article VII of the Argentina-US BIT provided: "the investor may 
choose to submit the dispute for resolution to the domestic courts or administrative 
tribunals, or to deal with it in accordance with previously agreed dispute settlement 
procedures, or, after six months from the date on which the dispute arose, to submit it 
to international arbitration".333  
 
Argentina's two main new arguments were; first, the MFN clause in the Argentina-Italy 
BIT refers to the granted treatment to investments "in the territory", while arbitration 
takes place outside Argentina and beyond its sovereign powers. Second, resorting to 
domestic courts cannot be less favorable choice to investors.334 
 
 
332 See id. 
333  See Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, IIC 498 (2011), Final 
Award (June. 21, 2011). 
334 See id. para 55. 
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The arbitral tribunal affirmed that the term "treatment" in the MFN clause is wide 
enough to expand the application of this clause to dispute settlement provisions. 
Moreover, the phrase "all other matters regulated by this argument" also is wide enough 
to expand the scope of the application of the MFN clause to cover dispute settlement 
arrangements.335 The tribunal asserted that the words "within its own territory" limit 
the scope of MFN clause with respect to treatment of the host state. The tribunal 
affirmed that the legal protection that Argentina shall give to the investor is a question 
before the tribunal and Argentina has no power to decide the way of this protection. 
Moreover, this legal protection is not tied to a particular territory. Therefore, the 
tribunal found that the phrase "within its own territory" does not exclude dispute 
settlement provisions from the scope of the application of MFN clauses.336 In addition, 
the tribunal believed that "a system that gives a choice is more favorable to the investor 
than a system that gives no choice"337. 
 
Based on the wide interpretation of the MFN clause, the tribunal found that under the 
more favored conditions in the Argentina-US BIT, the investor could choose between 
domestic courts and international arbitration without any legal need to pursue 
compulsory local remedies before access to international arbitration. 
 
B. Case Law that has rejected the Application of the MFN Clause to Dispute 
Settlement Provisions in BITs: 
 
The previous line of thinking in Maffezini and the subsequent decisions of the various 
arbitral tribunals adopted a mistaken interpretation to the MFN clause. Indeed, the 
proponents of applying MFN clauses to dispute settlement have found strong 
opposition. Many arbitral tribunals rejected the application of the MFN clause to 
dispute settlement provisions in BITs without an explicit consent form the BITs' parties 
to apply this clause to matters of dispute settlement. They require that this clause 
expressly indicate that the two parties intended the application of this clause to such 
arrangements. The followers of this vision respect the international rules of 
interpretation in the VCLT. This vision recognizes that the agreement between the 
 
335  See id. para 99. 
336  See id. para 100. 
337  Id. para 101. 
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parties to arbitrate is a prerequisite for national or international arbitration. This opinion 
affirms that this agreement should be clear and unambiguous. 
  
1. Plama v. Bulgaria: 
 
Plama v. Bulgaria is a unique case, the investor in this case sought to rely on the MFN 
clause to replace the entire dispute resolution mechanism that provided for in the basic 
BIT with another mechanism.338 In this case, the claimant, a Cypriot investor, under 
Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT (the basic) was limited to access international arbitration for 
disputes concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules only. The question before the tribunal was whether this 
investor could benefit from the host state's broader consent to ICSID arbitration under 
other BITs that allows access to ICSID for any breach to these applicable BITs. 
 
The MFN clause in Article 3 (1) of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT provided "each 
Contracting Party shall apply to the investments in its territory by investors of the other 
Contracting Party a treatment which is not less favorable than that accorded to 
investments by investors of third states"339. 
 
The most obvious thing in the arbitral tribunal's decision is the tribunal's reasoning to 
make a choice between the competing ordinary meanings based on the logical sequence 
of the rules of interpretation in the VCLT.  
 
The tribunal asserted that it is not clear whether the term "treatment" in the MFN clause 
includes or excludes the application of disputes settlement provisions contained in 
other BITs to which Bulgaria is a party. The tribunal examined the context of the MFN 
clause and found that it may support the Claimant demands; however, the context alone 
in the light of the other elements of interpretation was not persuadable to the tribunal.340 
 
 
338  See Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, (Feb.8, 2005) 13 ICSID Rep 271, (2008). 
339  See id. at 187. 
340  See id. para 189. 
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The tribunal examined the object and purpose of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT in the 
preamble and the title, this "object and purpose" was "the creation of favorable 
conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party"341. The tribunal asserted that the object and purpose of the 
treaty are not sufficient to conclude that the contracting parties had intended to use 
MFN clause to incorporate settlement disputes mechanisms from other BITs to the 
basic BIT. The tribunal was mindful of the Sir Ian Sinclair’s warning to not to put great 
emphasis on the "object and purpose" to an extreme form to the extent that denies the 
relevance of the intentions of the treaty parties.342 
 
The tribunal also examined the practices of Bulgaria with other states for clarifying the 
meaning of the BIT text. These practices showed that Bulgaria has concluded more 
liberal dispute settlement provisions. The tribunal held that the practices of Bulgaria 
with other states are note relevant for the interpretation of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT, 
since the negotiations between Bulgaria and Cyprus did not indicate that the parties had 
intended to provide for the MFN clause a meaning based on the Bulgarian practices 
with other states. Moreover, the tribunal found that these negotiations indicate that the 
contracting parties had not intended to extend the application of MFN clause to dispute 
settlement provisions.343   
 
With respect to the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the BIT, the tribunal 
affirmed that in the time of the conclusion of the BIT in question Bulgaria was under 
the communist regime that favored BITs with limited protection for foreign investors 
and limited dispute settlement provisions. These circumstances of the Bulgaria-Cyprus 
BIT indicate that the contracting parties did not intend to extend the application of MFN 
clause to dispute settlement provisions in BIT.344 
 
The tribunal affirmed the fact that the traditional diplomatic protection by home states 
for their citizens has been replaced by investor's direct access to international 
arbitration against the host states. This makes investors-states arbitration largely 
 
341  See id. para 193. 
342  See Sinclair, supra note 243. 
343  See Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, para. 195. 
344  See id. para 196. 
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accepted avenue for resolving investment disputes. However, the tribunal emphasized 
that this phenomena does not override the fundamental prerequisite for arbitration: an 
agreement of state – investor to arbitrate, which is an established principle in the 
domestic and international law and this agreement must be clear and unambiguous.345 
Moreover, the tribunal asserted that this agreement to arbitrate consists of state's 
consent to arbitrate in advance in respect of disputes that are covered by the BIT, and 
then the acceptance thereof by the investor if he so desires.346 
 
With respect to the interpretation of the silence of MFN clause, the tribunal asserted 
that it could not be presumed that the contracting states had agreed to replace by 
incorporating disputes settlement mechanisms from other BITs that have been 
negotiated in entirely different circumstances and context. 347 Moreover, such intents 
must be clearly expressed.  
 
With respect to the alleged harmonization of dispute settlement provisions, the tribunal 
affirmed that this could not be achieved by the reliance of the arbitral tribunals on the 
MFN clauses.348 This would provide investor with "basket of treatment" with respect 
of dispute settlement provisions, and then he will has the ability to pick up and choose 
provisions from various procedural provisions in the various BITs to which the host 
state party. The host states would find themselves in confront of various number of 
dispute mechanisms to which they had not given their consent. Indeed, this would lead 
to the counterproductive to the harmonization of dispute settlement arrangements in 
the BITs of the host state.  
 
As a result, the tribunal concluded that the MFN clause in question should not be 
interpreted to as providing the consent of Bulgaria to arbitrate the recent dispute. 
Moreover, the investor cannot rely on the MFN clause to incorporate more favorable 
dispute settlement provision from the other BITs to which Bulgaria is a contracting 
party.349       
 
 
345  See id. para 198. 
346  See id. 
347  See id. paras 204-207. 
348  See id. paras 221-224. 
349  See id. para 227. 
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I believe that the tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria applied the international means of 
interpretation in the VCLT to determine the real meaning of the treaty text without any 
oriented interpretation. The tribunal balanced between the evidence to clarify the real 
meaning of the MFN clause. With the generality of the text, it weighted between the 
object and purpose, practices, circumstance surrounding the BIT and its conclusion to 
clarify the ordinary meaning of the text. The tribunal gave each mean of interpretation 
its value to interpret the MFN clause, and elaborated how it managed to conclude the 
final adopted interpretation. 
 
2. Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v. The Russian Federation: 
 
This case is an obvious example that even if the MFN clause has the same wording of 
the MFN clause in Maffezini case that include the phrase "all matters", it should not be 
applied to dispute settlement provisions. Similarly, in the Rosinvest case, Russia argued 
that only disputes concerning the amount or mode of compensation for expropriation 
could be submitted to international arbitration.350 Under article (10) of (the basic BIT) 
the Belgium-Russian Federation BIT, only Russian arbitration court has the jurisdiction 
to determine whether an expropriation took place or not.351 The investor attempted to 
rely on the MFN clause in article 2 in the basic treaty to benefit from more favored 
conditions in the Denmark - Russia BIT that provided international arbitration for any 
investment disputes falling under the BIT.352  
 
The arbitral tribunal asserted that the ordinary meaning of the phrase "all matters 
covered by the present treaty" is clear, however, it must be seen in its context in the 
BIT with relation to the definition of the treatment that shall be applied to these 
matters.353 The tribunal found that the BIT did not include a definition for "the most 
favored nation clause". The tribunal relied on the Protocol of the Treaty that provides 
the most favorable treatment to the investors in the territory of one party from the 
nationals of the other contracting party.354 The tribunal found that linking between "all 
 
350  See, Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 080/2004, 
ICC 314 (2006), Award (Apr.21, 2006). 
351  See id. 
352  See id. at 86.  
353  See id. para 185. 
354  See id. 
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matters"," treatment" and "in its territory" indicates that the MFN clause is applied only 
to the material rights in the territory of one of the contracting party to the BIT, so the 
MFN clause should be applied only to substantive matters. Then the tribunal rejected 
the application of MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions, since the phrase "all 
matters" cannot expand this application beyond the intents of the parties to the BIT. 
 
In my opinion, the tribunal found that the starting point to determine whether the MFN 
clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions or not must be assessed 
according to the intent of the contracting parties and based on the interpretation of the 
basic BIT. The ordinary meaning of the MFN clause cannot be determined, and its 
broad wording was not persuadable, to the tribunal, to expand its scope of application 
to dispute settlement provisions. The object and purpose of the treaty is, the ordinary 
aim of any BIT, to promote and protect investments, however, this broad statement was 
not able to construct an ordinary meaning to the MFN clause. Moreover, there was no 
any preparatory work, subsequent agreements or practices related to the BIT to provide 
any guidance to interpret this clause.  
 
The reasonable way to interpret the text and indicate the intents of the parties is to 
connect the text of the treaty with other relevant available facts. The tribunal weighed 
between the facts and found that the balance between these facts does not affirm the 
broad application of the MFN clause to cover dispute settlement provisions. The text 
of the treaty does not clearly refer to the ability to incorporate more favorable dispute 
settlement arrangements from other BITs to the Belgium-Russian Federation BIT. 
 
The adopted interpretation of the MFN clause in this case followed the same correct 
way of interpretation in Plama v. Bulgaria. The tribunal has not been affected by the 
interests of the foreign investors to provide pro-investor interpretation. The tribunal 
tried to interpret the terms to figure out the real meaning or ordinary meaning in the 
light of other elements of interpretation. The tribunal discovered the meaning and did 
not create it. 
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3. Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic: 
 
In the same vein, the arbitral tribunal in Daimler case rejected to apply the MFN clause 
to dispute settlement provisions in BIT. The question arose before the tribunal is 
whether the German investor was to pursue domestic remedies before the Argentinian 
courts for eighteen months prior to initiate international arbitration according to the 
Argentina-Germany BIT or could he benefit from the Argentinian-Chile BIT that did 
not require this procedure.355 
 
In this case, the German-Argentine BIT contained two MFN clauses. The first is 
general one that addresses the MFN treatment and national treatment.356 The second 
MFN clause deals with a particular substantive protection.357  
 
In interpreting MFN clauses in the German-Argentine BIT, the tribunal examined the 
ordinary meaning of the term "treatment" in both MFN clauses in the context of the 
whole BIT. Then it differentiated between the treatment of foreign investors and the 
treatment of investments. Then it examined this ordinary meaning in the light of the 
object and purpose of the BIT. Finally, the tribunal searched whether the state practices 
would confirm the conclude interpretation or not. 
 
 
355 See Daimler Financial Services AG v Argentine Republic, ICSID, Case No. ARB/05/1, ICC 560 
(2012) Award (Aug. 22, 2012). 
356  See id. para. 205.  Article 3 of the German-Argentine BIT reads as follow: 
(1) Neither Contracting Party shall accord investments in its territory by nationals or companies of the 
other Contracting Party, or investments in which nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party 
are participating, treatment less favorable than the treatment accorded investments of its own nationals 
or companies or investments of nationals or companies of any third country. 
(2) With respect to their activities in connection with investments in its territory, nationals and companies 
of the other Contracting Party shall not be accorded treatment less favorable by a Contracting Party than 
its own nationals and companies or nationals and companies of third countries. 
(3) Such treatment shall not refer to privileges granted by a Contracting Party to nationals or companies 
of third countries by virtue of their membership in a customs or trade union, a common market, or a free 
trade area. 
(4) The treatment granted in this Article shall not refer to advantages accorded by a Contracting Party to 
nationals or companies of third countries under an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation or 
other agreements regarding tax matters. 
357  See id. para. 206. Article 4 of the German-Argentine BIT provided: 
 Nationals or companies of a Contracting Party shall enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party in respect of the matters provided for in this Article. And 
mentioned three substantive protection; (1) Full legal protection and security, (2) Expropriation, 
nationalization, and equivalent measures, (3) Losses owing to war or internal strife. 
  100 
The tribunal examined the wording of these MFN clauses in light of the treaty text and 
context. However, the word treatment employed 13 times in the treaty and its protocol, 
none of the treaty provisions gives this word a specific definition. 358 The tribunal found 
that the MFN clauses were generally worded and provide clues in different directions. 
The tribunal found that the context of the treaty provides a clear limitation to the 
generality of the MFN clauses. The tribunal affirmed that the most favored treatment 
that provided for by the whole BIT is territorially limited, including MFN clauses that 
stated "treatment in its territory".359 In addition, none of the BIT's obligations acts in a 
manner outside the host states. The territorial limitation is a general limitation that 
governs the universe of the German-Argentine BIT. Therefore, the tribunal concluded 
that the BIT clearly expressed a territorial limitation on the scope of the application of 
its provisions, including MFN clauses, and did not intended to provide MFN clauses 
an extra-territorial scope to cover dispute settlement provisions outside the host state.360  
 
With respect to the treaty object and purpose, it was to promote and protect the 
investments in the host state. The tribunal found that the text of the treaty did not 
revealed any indications that the parties had intended to protect foreign investments in 
the particular manner that was invoked by the investor, by the incorporation of dispute 
settlement provisions form other BITs. The tribunal affirmed that it would be incorrect 
to characterize the investor's position, as it is more compatible with BIT object and 
purpose than the host state's position.361     
 
The tribunal concluded that the treaty materials suggested that the contracting parties 
to the German-Argentine BIT had intended to provide the most favorable treatment to 
the investments within the host state's territory.362 The tribunal affirmed that none of 
the treaty materials authorized the tribunal to interpret MFN clauses in an evolutive 
way to achieve a broad meaning that desired by the investors.363 Moreover, the relevant 
 
358 See id. para 217. 
359  See id. para 225, Article 1(1) of the German-Argentine BIT  defines qualifying investments 
territorially; Article 2 territorially limits the States’ obligations in respect of fair and equitable treatment 
and arbitrary or discriminatory measures; Article 4 does likewise for the States’ obligations concerning 
full legal protection and security, expropriation, and losses in cases of war or other conflict. 
360  See id. para. 231. 
361  See id. paras. 254-260. 
362  See id. para. 278. 
363  See id. 
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subsequent practices of the parties confirm the adopted interpretation by the tribunal.364 
In addition, the silence of the states should not be interpreted as consent to access 
international arbitration. This states' consent to submit disputes to international 
arbitration must be established and interpreted based on clear indicators.  
 
For all the previous reasons, the tribunal rejected to apply MFN clauses, in the basic 
BIT, to dispute settlement provisions. The tribunal asserted that the procedural 
requirements act as a strict limit to arbitrate disputes between Argentina and the 
German investor, and this must be strictly complied with before access to international 
arbitration. The tribunal held that  
 
[T]o put it more concretely, since the Claimant has not yet satisfied the 
necessary condition precedent to Argentina’s consent to international 
arbitration, its MFN arguments are not yet properly before the Tribunal. 
The Tribunal is therefore presently without jurisdiction to rule on any 
MFN-based claims unless the MFN clauses themselves supply the 
Tribunal with the necessary jurisdiction.365 
 
The tribunal in this case followed the same fair way of interpretation according to the 
VCLT to determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the BIT. The tribunal 
interpreted the text in the light of the treaty context, object and purpose and 
supplementary means. The tribunal depended on the explicit meaning of the text not an 
implicit one. It did not put great emphasize on the purpose of the treaty, from the 
investor's point of view, to not to deny the relevance of the states' intent to 
interpretation. It balanced between the competing purposes of the BIT, the protection 
of investors and the promotion of investments to put one single purpose to the BIT. 
  
4. ICS Inspection and Control Services Limited (United Kingdom) v. The 
Republic of Argentina: 
 
In the same vein of thinking, the arbitral tribunal in ICS case refused to apply MFN 
clause to dispute settlement provisions in BIT. The question arose before the tribunal 
is whether the British investor was to pursue domestic remedies before the Argentinian 
domestic courts for eighteen months before initiating international arbitration as the 
 
364  See id. paras 261-278. 
365 Id. para 200. 
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Argentina-UK BIT provided for, or could he benefit from the Argentinian-Lithuania 
BIT that has a fork in the road provision. This provision granted the Lithuanian 
investors the right to choose between local remedies or submitting their disputes 
directly to international arbitration.366 
 
The tribunal in this case followed the same way of interpretation in the previous cases. 
In interpreting MFN clauses in the Argentina-UK BIT, the tribunal examined the 
ordinary meaning of the term "treatment" in the context of the whole BIT. Then it 
differentiated between the treatment of investors and the treatment of investments. 
Then it examined this ordinary meaning in the light of the object and purpose of the 
BIT. Finally, the tribunal searched whether the state practices would confirm the 
concluded interpretation or not.367 
 
The tribunal concluded that the Argentina-UK BIT requires a mandatory eighteen 
months litigation prior to pursue international arbitration and the failure of the foreign 
investors to comply with this prerequisite deprives the tribunal of its jurisdiction.368 
The tribunal refused to apply the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions. 
 
C. Conclusion: 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed the contemporary case law on the application of MFN 
clauses to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I have indicated the problems with the 
decisions that have applied the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I 
have explored the solutions for these problems by discussing the decisions that have 
rejected to apply the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. 
 
 There are two visions established in the jurisprudence and no one of them can claim a 
numerical supremacy of supporters. The first vision argues that the MFN clause should 
be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. The second vision argues that this 
clause should not be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. These two points 
 
366 See ICS Inspection and Control Services Limited v. Argentine, PCA Case No. 2010-9, ICC 528 
(2012) Award on jurisdiction (Feb.10, 2012).  
367  See id. paras 238-317. 
368  See id. para 326. 
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of views are driven by two conflicting decisions of the ICSID followed by two lines of 
subsequent tribunals' decisions that followed both sides. 
 
   The arbitral tribunals that have applied the MFN clause to dispute settlement 
provisions in BITs adopted a mistaken interpretation to this clause. The neglect and 
misapplication of the international rules of interpretation in the VCLT is what 
characterizes the decisions of these tribunals. The confusion behind the incorporation 
of dispute settlement provisions form other BITs to the basic BIT by using the MFN 
clause arose out form the tribunal's decision in Maffezini v. Spain. This was the first 
ICSID decision that dealt with the interpretation and the application of the MFN clause 
to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. After Maffezini award, many tribunals 
followed the same line of thinking with the same conclusion, but with different analysis 
of the MFN clause. 
 
On the other hand, many arbitral tribunals, in Plama v. Bulgaria and the subsequent 
decisions, adopted correct interpretation that rejected the application of the MFN clause 
to dispute settlement provisions in BITs without an explicit consent form the BITs' 
parties to apply this clause to matters of dispute settlement. The followers of this vision 
respect the international rules of interpretation in the VCLT. This vision recognizes 
that the agreement between the parties to arbitrate is a prerequisite for national or 
international arbitration. This opinion affirms that this agreement should be clear and 
unambiguous. 
 
Although, the previous cases involving same facts, same legal provisions, similar treaty 
rights and obligations, the arbitral tribunals reached different conclusions. They 
answered the same question of whether foreign investors should rely on the MFN 
clause to incorporate most favorable procedural treatment form the host state’s third-
party BITs to access international arbitration or not. The first line of decisions adopted 
one-side oriented interpretation, investor-oriented, to provide excessive protection to 
investors on the international level. The second line of decisions focused on discovering 
the interpretation that compatible with the intent of the parties. In sum, I argued that 
the duty of adjudicators is to discover the meaning of the treaty provisions, examining 
all evidences according to the logical sequence of the interpretational rules in the VCLT 
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and provide the states parties to BITs with impartial interpretations. It is not duty of 
adjudicators to create meanings or assume the intent of the parties.   
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IV. The Jurisprudence of the Application of the MFN Clause to Matters of 
Dispute Settlement in BITs 
 
The main question before the previous tribunals was whether the foreign investors 
should rely on the MFN clause to incorporate most favorable procedural treatment form 
other BITs to access international arbitration or not. However, the question lurks in the 
jurisprudence is whether the MFN clause should serve as a title of jurisdiction to 
allocate the adjudicatory authority between domestic courts and international arbitral 
tribunals or not. The decisions of Maffezini v. Spain, Plama v. Bulgaria and subsequent 
cases created two visions in the jurisprudence of international investment law. Each of 
these visions adopts many arguments that support his point of view.  
 
The first section of this chapter discusses these two visions in international investment 
law. The second section provides an assessment of the vision that calls for the 
application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions and suggestions to 
resolve the interpretive problems of the MFN clause. 
 
A. Two visions in international investment law:  
 
The application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs is a 
question of how arbitral tribunals should interpret these clauses. Should these tribunals 
follow the understanding of Plama v. Bulgaria that adopted the ordinary meaning as 
an evidence to the parties' intent? Or, they should follow the understanding of Maffezini 
v. Spain by giving effect primarily to considerations such as good faith, justice or 
reciprocity and a consideration like justice can override this ordinary meaning. 
 
There are two visions established in the jurisprudence and no one of them can claim a 
numerical supremacy of supporters. The first vision argues that the MFN clause should 
be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. The second vision argues that this 
clause should not be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. 
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With respect to the first vision, it began with the arbitral tribunal's jurisdictional 
decision in Maffezini v. Spain.369 The proponents of this vision argue that the tribunal 
in Maffezini v. Spain grounded its interpretation on the public international law.370 This 
is clear with the usage of international law concepts, such as res inter alios actos and 
the ejusdem generis rules, in application and interpreting the MFN clause in 
international treaties.371 The tribunal framed the role of the MFN clause as a positive 
systematic contribution to the governance of international investment rules. In this 
view, the MFN clause is a multilateralization device that works on the harmonization 
of international investment law and the procedural protection of the foreign 
investments and investors and will strengthen the power of arbitral tribunals that will 
urge the host states to respect their treaty obligations.372 It asserts that foreign investors 
should rely on the MFN clause to benefit from dispute settlement provisions in other 
BITs that grant other investors more favorable treatment to overcome the problems of 
the admissibility of investor - state claims before international arbitral tribunals.373 
 
They affirm that the exhaustion of local remedies or pursuing these remedies for a 
period before accessing to international arbitration might impede the enforcement of 
the treaty rights of the foreign investors.374 They emphasize that the national legal 
system and domestic courts are insufficient to guarantee the protection and 
enforcement of the investment treaty rights, since, BITs does not applied directly within 
the domestic legal system of the host state, moreover, the domestic courts lack to the 
sufficient independence to judge against their governments to enforce these treaty 
rights.375 In addition, arbitral tribunals have accepted that foreign investors should 
circumvent the admissibility requirements by relying on the MFN clause to benefit 
from the dispute settlement arrangements that are contained in other BITs that grant 
other investors most favorable access conditions to international arbitration.376 
 
369  See, Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain., ICSID Case No.ARB/97/7, Decision on 
objections to jurisdiction, (Jan. 5, 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 396, (2002). 
370  See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, Maffezini v. Plama: Reflections on the Jurisprudential Schism in the 
Application of Most Favored-Nation Clauses to Matters of Dispute Settlement, in BUILDING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF ICSID, 251, 253(Meg Kinnear, 
et al. eds., Kluwer Law International, kindle edition 2015). 
371  See id. at 256-258.  
372  See id. at 258.  
373 See SCHILL, supra note 213, at 151.  
374  See id.  
375  See id. at 153.  
376  See id.  
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They also argue that the debate on the application of the MFN clause is not merely 
about selecting the proper interpretation of this clause. The debate has become higher 
than this. The MFN clause has become an effective tool by which the foreign investors 
can import procedural and substantive provisions from the host state’s third-party 
BIT.377 They believe that the broad interpretation of the MFN clause and the ability of 
importing dispute settlement provisions form other BITs, is consistent with the 
teleological view that BITs are not designed only to protect the rights of foreign 
investors, but also to maximize this protection.378 
 
They do not concern about the wording of the MFN clause that varies from BIT to 
another, they affirm that this clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions 
in BITs as a general principle in international investment law and this application 
should be independent from the exact wording or meaning of the MFN clause in any 
dispute.379 
 
With respect to the second vision, the followers of this vision reject the application of 
the MFN clause to dispute settlement arrangements in BITs, unless this clause 
expressly indicates that the contracting states intended the application of this clause to 
these arrangements. This vision recognizes that the agreement of the parties to arbitrate 
is a prerequisite for national or international arbitration and such agreement should be 
clear and unambiguous.  
 
This vision began with the arbitral tribunal's jurisdictional decision in Plama v. 
Bulgaria.380 It argues that the tribunal in this case, by contrast to Maffezini v. Spain, 
denied any application of the public international law rules such as ejusdem generis 
and the private law thinking characterizes this tribunal.381 The proponents of this vision 
affirm that the tribunal equalized between BITs and private contracts and applied the 
 
377  See Simon Batifort & J. Benton Heath, The New Debate on the Interpretation of MFN Clauses in 
Investment Treaties: Putting the Brakes on Multilateralization, 111 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 873- 913 (2017). 
378  See id, at 912.  
379  See SCHILL, supra note 213, at 153.  
380  See Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, (Feb.8, 2005) 13 ICSID Rep 271, (2008). 
381  See SCHILL, supra note 370, at 256-258.  
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pacta sunt servanda rule and it dealt with international arbitration, as it is a commercial 
arbitration.382 The tribunal also differentiated between the application of the MFN 
clause to dispute settlement provisions and the clear and unambiguous state's consent 
as a prerequisite to initiate disputes before international investment arbitration. 
Therefore, provisions state's consent is required to apply this clause to dispute 
settlement arrangements in BITs. In their opinion, adjudicators should not have a 
governance vision in relation to dispute settlement provisions, since their own universe 
is the bilateral investment treaty. In addition, the application of the MFN clause to 
dispute settlement provisions will lead to the permutations of treaty provisions that lead 
to the counterproductive to the harmonization of dispute settlement arrangements.383  
 
According to this opinion, the broad wording of the MFN clause allows its application 
only to substantive matters not to the dispute settlement provisions in BITs. There is a 
fundamental distinction in public international law between the substantive and 
procedural provisions. Whereas, the first kind addresses the parties and imposes 
substantive obligations upon the host states, the second kind creates a jurisdictional 
mandate for an arbitral tribunal, and addresses arbitral tribunals and dispute's parties 
who are in a procedural relation, and this distinction should be taken into consideration 
regarding the application of the MFN clause. Therefore, both substantive and 
procedural provisions have a different purpose. The object of the substantive provisions 
is the investments made by an investor in a host state and the object of the procedural 
provisions is the adjudicative power of an arbitral tribunal and the arbitral parties.384 
Therefore, the proponents of this vision accept that investors can rely on the MFN 
clause, under the basic BIT, to benefit from more favorable substantive treatment in 
other BITs, but those investors cannot establish the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals 
based on this clause. 
 
 
 
382  See id.  
383  See id. at 259.  
384 See Douglas, supra note 74, at 97. 
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B. The assessment of the vision that calls for the application of the MFN clause 
to dispute settlement provisions in BITs and suggestions to resolve the interpretive 
problems of the MFN clause:  
 
The MFN clause is of the same nature of any treaty provisions. Interpreting the MFN 
clause based on assumptions that it has its special nature, has specifically negotiated or 
in the light of the friendly preamble, this will not give us a complete picture. 
 
I believe that the broad wording of the MFN clause does not allows adjudicators to 
expand the scope of the application of this clause to matters of dispute settlement in 
BITs. This proper interpretation will be reached by resolving the interpretive problems 
of the BITs in investor-state arbitration.   
 
The words and terms of this clause have been employed by the treaty parties to express 
a specific meaning. The proper application of the means of interpretation will lead to 
the correct and consistent meaning of this clause. The starting point of interpretation is 
to find the ordinary meaning of the clause. The MFN clause is a term of art that has its 
historical background of application and interpretation. This historical background 
refers to the application of this clause to substantive matters in BITs. The treaty parties 
have employed this clause to express this specific ancient meaning, not the meaning 
that may invoked by the foreign investors. This clause may express a new or different 
meaning if it is established that the parties to the BIT so intended.  
 
The major problem is that many provisions in BITs, such as the MFN clause, lack 
textual determinacy. It may be argued that this indeterminacy is the main reason for the 
conflicting decisions and arbitral tribunals struggle because of the generality and 
vagueness of the provisions of the BITs. The problem of the interpretation of the MFN 
clause is not crystalized in its indeterminacy, but in the misapplication of the available 
means of interpretation in the VCLT. Although, interpretation is not an exact science, 
it is still a science requiring the application of certain rules to produce correct results. 
The following of the logical sequence of the rules of interpretation will reduce the area 
of uncertainty as guidance for the choice between the different meanings. It will also 
rationalize the interpretation process and adjudicators behavior.  
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Adjudicators must first look for the ordinary meaning of the text. This is the starting 
point of the interpretation process, in the light of the context and treaty object and 
purpose. These terms and words of the provisions have been written by the parties and 
reflect the clear intent of these parties. This means that the tribunals must examine the 
text of the treaty to find whether the treaty parties intended to expand the scope of the 
application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions or not. Searching for 
potential limitations is acceptable insofar the text itself allows so. Arbitral tribunals 
must not assume the scope of application of any treaty provision. Since this assumption 
without an evidence from the text will be misinterpretation. In addition, interpretation 
should be impartial not in favor of one of the parties and against the other without clear 
evidence from the text.   
 
The silence of the treaty term should be interpreted in the light of clear evidence to 
override its ambiguity. The tribunals in Maffezeini, National Grid, Hochtief and 
Impregilo ignored the functional history of the MFN clause and interpreted it based on 
its generality. This was one-side oriented, investor oriented, interpretation. They 
interpreted the silence of the MFN clause in favor of the excessive protection of the 
foreign investors. Moreover, the tribunal in RosInvest Co UK Ltd  The Russian 
Federation totally ignored the clear meaning of the BIT's provisions and allowed the 
investor to submit a dispute to international arbitration against the ordinary meaning of 
the text. 
 
Each BIT has limited its application to particular persons "ratione personae" to 
particular matters "ratione materiae" or to a certain time "ratione temporii". The treaty 
parties may restrict access to international arbitration by specific restrictions such as; 
negotiation between investors and host state, pursuing domestic courts for a time or 
allow to arbitration for particular disputes. Any interpretation do not respect these 
limitations would violate the treaty rights and obligations. 
 
With respect to the treaty object and purpose, all BITs include the phrase "protect and 
promote the investments" whether in the preamble, title or the treaty texts. This 
impartial object and purpose works in favor of both foreign investors and host states. 
It protects the investors, investments and host states. We cannot divided the object and 
purpose of a treaty into many objects and purposes according to the provisions of the 
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treaty. The MFN clause does not has a specific purpose that is different from the 
purpose of the whole BIT. We must read the treaty in a manner that gives effect to the 
object and purpose of the whole BIT. Article 31 of the VCLT speaks of one singular 
"object and purpose". It is unacceptable to say that a singular "object and purpose" is 
related to a single provision. This contradicts Article 31 of the VCLT that speaks of the 
entire treaty as relevant to interpretation not its individual provisions. 
 
In addition, the ambiguity of a text does not allow treaty object and purpose to override 
the ordinary meaning of this text or other potential context that may indicate this 
ordinary meaning. Since, treaty object and purpose is not a stand-alone mean of 
interpretation, nor does it contains direct obligations. They serve to affirm the ordinary 
meaning of the texts. So, the merely mention of the object and purpose to mysteriously 
interpret the MFN clause, is clear evidence of the manipulation of the means of 
interpretation. Emphasizing on the treaty "object and purpose" to an extreme extent, 
not only will it deny the relevance of the intentions of the treaty parties, but also it will 
provide the priority to the interests of the investors with respect to interpretation. Then 
interpretation will become a continuation of the treaty negotiation for the sake of the 
investors' excessive protection. Connecting the text, context, object and purpose of the 
whole treaty will give us a negative answer to the question of whether the MFN clause 
should be applied to dispute settlement provision in BITs or not. 
 
The tribunals assumed a direct relation between the procedural and substantive 
provisions that covered by the MFN clause, so it applied the MFN clause to the 
procedural provisions. However, the distinction between the procedural and 
substantive provisions in an investment treaty is straightforward. The substantive 
provisions address the contracting state parties. While the procedural provisions 
address an international arbitral tribunal and disputing parties. These disputing parties 
are not the state parties to BIT, but the investor and the host state. Both investor and 
host state enter into a relationship of procedural equality before the arbitral tribunal 
once a dispute has been submitted to it. This procedural relationship subjects to the 
equality of arms principle in international litigation. This principle is not respected 
when one of the disputing parties has the ability to amend the rules that regulating the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal after the dispute has arisen. In addition, both of these 
kinds of provisions have its own purpose and each of them imposes different 
  112 
obligations and rights. The object of the substantive provisions is investments that 
made by the nationals of one contracting state on the territory of the other contracting 
state. The object of procedural provisions is creating a jurisdictional mandate for an 
international arbitral tribunal to settle disputes between the foreign investor and the 
host state who are in an equal procedural relationship. How can one of the parties able 
to change the jurisdiction of the tribunal after the risen of this dispute. Finally, the 
invalidity of substantive provisions cannot affect the validity of the procedural 
provisions in the BIT and the contrary is right. 
 
With respect to the contemporary or subsequent treaty practices of the parties, all the 
tribunals that followed Maffezini case have misapplied these means of interpretation. 
Article 31 (2) and (3) requires some qualifications for these practices to be relevant. 
First, an agreement that signed by all of the treaty parties and relegated to the BIT in 
question. Second, any instrument related to the treaty, concluded by one of the parties, 
and accepted by the others. Third, subsequent agreements or practices between the 
parties related to the treaty. Adjudicators who rely on the previous materials, they rely 
on clear interpretive materials according to the VCLT.       
 
However, the BIT stands alone as a separated agreement between the two contracting 
states without any contemporary or subsequent practices and agreements. Therefore, 
any BIT between one of the parties and a third state is not relevant, since the BIT in the 
question should be interpreted not the host state’s third-country BIT. Similarly, the 
practices should be between the BIT parties otherwise it would fall under Article 32 of 
the VCLT that may be taken into account as a common intent of the parties. However, 
according to Article 32 of the VCLT, supplementary means of interpretation are used 
only when the application of Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or 
unreasonable.385 The contemporary or subsequent treaty practices, in this case, do not 
reflect the understanding of the parties. 
 
Some arbitral tribunals and foreign investors have overestimated the functional role of 
the MFN clause. Some adjudicators framed the role of this clause as a positive 
systematic contribution to the governance of international investment rules. They use 
 
385 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 31-32, supra note 165. 
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this clause as a multilateralization device that works on the harmonization of dispute 
settlement mechanisms in BITs. This is a mistaken justification for the wrong 
interpretation of the MFN clause. First, there is no a general principle in international 
law that requires from adjudicators to harmonize dispute settlement provisions in the 
various BITs of the host states.386 States themselves who can harmonize these 
mechanisms based on their intentions, since these provisions included in treaties that 
are concluded by states. Arbitral tribunals should only interpret treaty provisions to 
apply them not to guarantee the unity of the wording of these provisions.  
 
On the other hand, the precedents of international arbitral tribunals cannot do nothing 
neither with the harmonization of dispute settlement provisions, nor with the 
interpretation of any treaty provisions. In international investment arbitration 
precedents is of non-binding nature. Arbitral tribunals do not blindly follow the 
previous decisions whether the decisions of the same tribunal or other tribunals. 
However, these tribunals critically analyze the decisions of each other to build their 
decisions on better arguments, not to follow precedents. In addition, the application of 
the MFN clause to matters of dispute settlement would lead to the counterproductive 
to the harmonization.       
 
The VCLT provides an appropriate framework of interpretation that recognizes equally 
the legitimate rights and interests of both host states and foreign investors. Arbitral 
tribunals have to acknowledge completely the binding nature of these rules as a starting 
point in treaty interpretation. Merely referring to Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT 
without their proper application would be useless. The application of these 
interpretational rules is a part of the acknowledgment of their binding nature. The 
application of these interpretational rules will guarantee an effective way to reach 
correct interpretations. Arbitral tribunals should analyze the application of these rules 
in interpreting a treaty provision. They have to provide the reasonable reasons that led 
them to these interpretations. It is not acceptable that adjudicators avoid the application 
of the rules of interpretation and just state the concluded interpretations without any 
further elaboration of how they reached these results. This reasoning will enrich the 
 
386 See ANDREA BJORKLUND, International Investment Law and Arbitration: 2012 in Review, in 109 
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2012-2013, 196 (Oxford University 
Press, kindle edition, 2014). 
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jurisprudence of treaty interpretation, and respect the ordinary meaning of the treaty 
terms that reflects the intentions of the parties. An incomplete application of these rules 
will lead to wrong interpretations. 
 
Adjudicators should grant each rule of the rules of interpretation its value according to 
the VCLT. Depending on means without the others will lead to wrong interpretations 
that contradict the ordinary meaning that reflects the intent of the parties. The starting 
point in interpretation should be the ordinary meaning of the text. The context and 
treaty object and purpose should be an affirmative tool to the ordinary meaning. The 
circumventing these rules to interpret a treaty according to its object and purpose, 
would deny any relevance of the intent of the parties to the interpretation of their treaty.  
 
The supplementary means of interpretation are used only in two cases and for one 
purpose. They are used to determine the meaning when the application of the general 
rule in Article 31 of the VCLT resulted in either ambiguous or unreasonable meaning. 
This means that the supplementary means are used to confirm the ordinary meaning 
resulting from Article 31 of the VCLT. Adjudicators are obliged to apply the general 
rule of interpretation, while they do not have to apply the supplementary means when 
the application of the general rule resulted in a clear meaning. The text of the treaty 
reflects the agreement between the parties, but these supplementary means do not bind 
the treaty parties together.  
 
In sum, in determining whether the MFN clause should be applied to dispute settlement 
provisions or not there must not be interpretive assumptions in favor of the foreign 
investors or the host states. This application is a matter of treaty interpretation. The 
interpretation of the MFN clause is not different form the interpretation of any other 
treaty provisions. This clause is not negotiated separately or in a way that differs from 
the other treaty provisions. This MFN clause subjects to certain limitations that limit 
the whole treaty. The scope of the MFN clause should not extend the limitations of the 
application of the BIT, which is "ratione personae", "ratione materiae" and "ratione 
temporii". The scope application of the BIT should work as a limitation to the 
application of the MFN clause. 
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The MFN clause should not be applied to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. This 
application would increase the uncertainty in international investment arbitration and 
no state would be able to predict the outcomes of the interpretation process to any 
provision in the BIT. The question would not be what the correct interpretation of the 
treaty provisions is, but which rule of the rules of interpretation will be applied. Treaty 
interpretation is not an exact science, but it is still a science requiring the application 
of particular rules to produce correct results. The problem of interpretation is not 
crystalized in the availability of the means of interpretation, but in the misapplication 
of the available means of interpretation.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has analyzed the interpretation of the international investment treaties and 
the application of the MFN clause to matters of dispute settlement provisions in BITs. 
The purpose of this thesis is not to discuss whether the using of BITs to harmonize 
dispute settlement mechanisms is necessary and feasible or not. This harmonization is 
not a legal matter it is a policy choice. States have their sovereign rights to determine 
whether to harmonize their mutual treaty rights and obligations or not. The aim of this 
thesis is to respect the ordinary meaning of the text of the treaty and other means of 
interpretation and to respect the intentions of the parties as it is expressed in the terms 
of the treaty. Treaty interpretation must proceed from the ordinary meaning of the 
words of the treaty even if we do not like them. It is a necessity to respect the intent of 
the treaty parties as it is expressed in treaty provisions, otherwise, state sovereignty will 
be useless in international investment law.  
 
In this thesis, I have argued that the interpretation of the MFN clause in relation to its 
application to dispute settlement arrangements in BITs is not a today issue. In fact, it is 
not the first nor will be the latest "episode" in a long history of a constant demand of 
foreigners to prevent domestic courts to hear their cases and instead seek the assurance 
of an international or internationalized forum. Indeed, investors, foreigners and 
colonial powers always wanted "exceptionality" in the forum that deals with legal 
disputes. Foreign investors do not accept the local jurisdiction and demand special 
treatment in in a manner where they can control better the outcome of the adjudicative 
process. The development of foreign investors' treatment started from the complete 
outlawry in the early political communities to what is reflected in the current network 
of international investment agreements. I have also explored the evolution of the 
investment protection from the early political communities to the recent practices of 
international courts and arbitral tribunals that clarify the framework of the MFN clause 
and the impact of this framework on the interests of both foreign investors and host 
states. The interpretation of this clause plays an important role in determining the scope 
of its application. In fact, the debate about the scope of the application of the MFN 
clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs, is about how this clause should be 
interpreted.  
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I have explored the nature of treaty interpretation, the analysis of Articles 31 and 32 of 
the VCLT and the arbitral use of these articles to interpret BITs. I have argued that the 
world of any human or legal person consists of normative universes. These universes 
structured around the possibility of right or wrong, of lawful or unlawful or of valid or 
void. International law is one of these normative universes. It includes rules and 
restrictions that validate or invalidate certain practices or construct a certain reality. 
Therefore, interpretation is a process that in fact may lead to correct and incorrect 
conclusions. 
 
Each arbitral tribunal applies the rules of interpretation form its point view. As a result, 
the values of these rules vary from one tribunal to another and from a dispute to another. 
This entails unpredictability and inconsistency of the tribunals' decisions with a clear 
tendency to provide excessive protection to investors. The VCLT provides an 
appropriate framework of treaty interpretation that recognizes equally legitimate rights 
and interests of both the host states and the foreign investors. Arbitral tribunals have to 
acknowledge the completely binding nature of these rules. This will not happen until 
they adopt the exhaustive application of the means of interpretation in the VCLT. The 
actual application of these means works as a roadmap to reach the correct meanings. 
Interpretation is not an exact science, but it is still a science requiring the application 
of particular rules to produce correct results. Therefore, the problem of interpretation 
is not crystalized in the availability of interpretational means, but in the misapplication 
of the available means of interpretation. 
 
 The terms of the treaty are the sources of the intents of the parties who have employed 
these terms to express their ordinary meaning. The context of the treaty is not its 
historical or political context; it is the meaning of the terms within the whole treaty. 
The treaty object and purpose are not a stand-alone mean of interpretation and are not 
an independent source of the parties' intents. It is a second step to confirm the ordinary 
meaning and it cannot override the clear meaning of the text. Moreover, emphasizing 
the treaty object and purpose in interpretation may deny the relevance of the intentions 
of the treaty parties to the interpretation of their treaty. Adjudicators have to examine 
exhaustively all interpretation elements, according to its logical sequence, to find the 
real and correct meaning of the treaty provisions. 
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 In addition, I have discussed the contemporary case law on the application of MFN 
clauses to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I have indicated the problems with the 
decisions that have applied the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. I 
have explored the solutions for these problems by discussing the decisions that have 
rejected to apply the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in BITs. Although, 
these cases involving same facts, same legal provisions, similar treaty rights and 
obligations, the arbitral tribunals reached different conclusions. They answered the 
same question of whether foreign investors should rely on the MFN clause to 
incorporate most favorable procedural treatment form a third-party treaty to access 
international arbitration or not. The first line of decisions adopted one-side oriented 
interpretation, investor-oriented, to provide excessive protection to investors on the 
international level. The second line of decisions focused on discovering the 
interpretation that compatible with the intent of the parties. I have argued that the duty 
of adjudicators is to discover the meaning of the treaty provisions, examining evidence 
according to the logical sequence of the interpretational rules in the VCLT and provide 
the states parties to BITs with impartial interpretations. Indeed, adjudicators are not 
supposed to create the meaning, but to discover it.   
 
I have also discussed the jurisprudence of the application of the MFN clause to matters 
of dispute settlement in BITs. The question lurks in the jurisprudence is whether the 
MFN clause should serve as a title of jurisdiction to allocate the adjudicatory authority 
between domestic courts and international arbitral tribunals or not. There are two 
visions established in the jurisprudence and no one of them can claim a numerical 
supremacy of supporters. I have analyzed the two visions in international investment 
law. I have provided an assessment of the vision that calls for the application of the 
MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions and suggestions to resolve the interpretive 
problems of the MFN clause. I have concluded that in determining whether the MFN 
clause should be applied to dispute settlement provisions or not there must not be 
interpretive assumptions in favor of the foreign investors or the host states. This 
application is a matter of treaty interpretation. The interpretation of the MFN clause is 
not different form the interpretation of any other treaty provisions. This clause is not 
negotiated separately or in a way that differs from the other treaty provisions. This 
MFN clause subjects to certain limitations that limit the whole treaty. The scope of the 
MFN clause should not extend the limitations of the application of the BIT, which is 
  119 
"ratione personae", "ratione materiae" and "ratione temporii". The scope application 
of the BIT should work as a limitation to the application of the MFN clause. 
 
The duty of adjudicators is to discover the meaning of the treaty provisions, examining 
evidence according to the logical subsequence of the interpretational rules in the VCLT 
and provide the parties with impartial interpretations. The establishment of a unified 
international system of investors' rights protection or universal investors' rights system 
should depend on how many states ratify multilateral investment treaties to make 
legally binding commitments to establish such a system. It is not the duty of 
adjudicators to impose such a system on states. The application of the means of 
interpretation will be misused to create and establish excessive protection to foreign 
investors against the intent of states parties who created the BIT. The conflicting 
interpretations will outlive and repeat themselves in many decisions. This thesis is an 
alert message to the coming generations to apply the rules of interpretation honestly, to 
determine the treaty rights and obligations based on facts not assumptions. A full 
compliance with the international rules of interpretation in the VCLT will lead to 
correct interpretations and ensure that these interpretations are consistent with parties’ 
intention as it is expressed in the terms of the treaty. 
 
